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U.S. foreign policy traditions
Multilateralism vs. unilateralism since 1776
In this study I take issue with several conventional assumptions em-
ployed by scholars of U.S. foreign policy. First and foremost, I argue that 
the “turn-around” thesis – which states that the United States turned 
away from isolationism and toward multilateralism during the Sec-
ond World War – is overstated. In contrast, I offer an argument where 
I discard the term “isolationism” altogether and frame the discussion 
as whether the United States has mainly exhibited a unilateral or mul-
tilateral internationalist foreign policy. Here, I take the position that 
the United States has mainly pursued unilateral internationalism. By 
“unilateral internationalism” I mean seeking to retain one’s freedom 
of action while engaging with other countries. This has been achieved 
either through lax formal obligations or overwhelming control of the 
decision-making bodies governing the rules of the interaction. Thus, I 
argue that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the United States suf-
ficiently safeguarded its unilateral maneuverability when constructing 
the second postwar order in the 1940s. Therefore, rather than the Sec-
ond World War and the international institutions inaugurated in 1945 
signifying a “turn-around” to Wilsonian multilateralism, the postwar 
order built by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman in fact 
accommodated the historic U.S. foreign policy tradition of unilateral 
internationalism. 
Keywords: U.S. foreign policy, unilateralism, multilateralism, isolationism, 
League of Nations, United Nations, hegemony, unipolarity.
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Introduction
One of the most common assumptions in the study of American for-
eign policy is that “the events of the Second World War brought about 
a revolution in American attitudes.”1 The revolution is said to con-
sist of the United States turning away from an aloof past (previously 
labeled “isolationism”) and accepting an international commitment. 
Political scientists, economists, and historians generally agree that the 
United States failed to shape international politics in the interwar pe-
riod because of its rejection of membership in the League of Nations, 
but that the United States fundamentally changed with World War 
II, discarding its earlier tradition of aloofness in favor of multilateral 
internationalism.2 
This is the basis for contemporary critiques of U.S. unilateralism: 
the United States needs to return to its multilateral foreign policy tra-
dition as unilateralism is not really what the United States is supposed 
to stand for.3 As such, observers agree that there is a genuine U.S. for-
eign policy tradition that consists of commitment to multilateral in-
stitutions, and that this tradition was cemented by the “turn-around” 
during the Second World War.
1 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 32.
2 This is a conventional assumption found in textbooks and scholarly accounts. Text-
books will usually divide up U.S. foreign policy history into pre- and post-1941 or 
1945. See for example, Michael J. Hogan, ed., Paths to Power: The Historiography of 
American Foreign Relations to 1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); or 
the Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations series, particularly Akira Iriye, Vol. 
III: The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945. That the United States underwent a funda-
mental turn-around with the Second World War is a common assumption in political 
science, agreed upon by realists, liberal, and constructivist theorists alike, albeit for 
different reasons. The general exception to this assumption is found among revision-
ist historians who argue for an overall continuity in U.S. foreign policy in terms of 
expansionism, and commercial empire. See, for example, Michael Hunt, The American 
Ascendancy: How the United States gained and wielded global dominance (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007). 
3 G. John Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” Perspectives on Politics 1, 
no. 3 (September 2003).
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 The “turn-around” thesis, however, is based on several assumptions 
about the nature of U.S. foreign policy that are open to question-
ing. The first questionable assumption is that what the United States 
turned away from was an earlier foreign policy tradition of aloofness 
(the older “isolationism” has been discredited by historians of U.S. 
foreign relations, but is still in use among political scientists and some 
historians). The second assumption is that the United States has his-
torically vacillated between its urge to be aloof from world politics 
and an urge to participate (as exemplified by its leadership role in the 
League of Nations negotiations in Paris in 1919 and subsequent rejec-
tion of the Treaty of Versailles).4 The third and final assumption is that 
it took the Second World War to finally settle this internal dispute be-
tween aloofness and internationalism, and that the institutional order 
building that took place under U.S. auspices in the 1940s signaled a 
profound domestic turn-around in U.S. foreign policy towards a new 
tradition of multilateral internationalism. 
In this study, I take issue with these conventional assumptions em-
ployed by scholars of U.S. foreign policy. I argue that this foreign poli-
cy dichotomy (aloofness/internationalism) is mostly incorrect, and that 
rather than experiencing “cycles” of internationalism and aloofness, 
the United States has exhibited one dominant foreign policy posture: 
unilateral internationalism. By “unilateral internationalism” I mean that 
the United States has maintained as much maneuverability as possi-
ble while always engaging with other countries, meaning it has been 
constantly internationalist. This internationalism has been character-
ized by unilateralism – in other words, seeking to retain one’s freedom 
of action. This has been achieved either through lax formal obliga-
tions or overwhelming control of the decision-making bodies govern-
ing the rules of the interaction. Furthermore, I argue that contrary 
to the conventional wisdom of a turn-around to multilateralism, the 
United States sufficiently safeguarded its unilateral maneuverability 
4 Contemporary authors who accept the isolationist/internationalist dichotomy include 
John Gerard Ruggie, “The Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American For-
eign Policy” International Security 21, no. 4 (spring 1997); G. John Ikenberry, Af-
ter Victory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Trevor B. McCrisken, 
American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1974 (New 
York: Malgrave Macmillan, 2003). Joan Hoff Wilson, on the other hand, uses the term 
“independent internationalism,” by which she means a more-or-less narrow pursuit 
of national interest by multilateral means when necessary, but by unilateral means if 
possible. See Wilson, “The American Century: From Sarajevo to Sarajevo,” in Michael 
J. Hogan, ed. The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the “American Century” 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Jeffrey Legro, in Rethinking the World: 
Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005) 
explicitly rejects the term “isolationism” and uses aloofness and separatism instead. 
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when constructing the second postwar order in the 1940s. Thus, rather 
than the Second World War and the international institutions inaugu-
rated in 1945 signifying a “turn-around” to Wilsonian multilateralism, 
the postwar order built by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. 
Truman in fact accommodated the historic U.S. foreign policy tradi-
tion of unilateral internationalism. 
This thesis goes against the assumption underlying most politi-
cal science scholarship on U.S. foreign policy, which argues that the 
United States displayed historic vacillation between aloofness and in-
ternationalism, before it permanently turned toward multilateral in-
ternationalism with the Second World War. The general U.S. foreign 
policy literature’s reliance on this foreign policy dichotomy (aloofness/
internationalism) in fact stems from outdated scholarship in history 
and will be explicitly challenged. I aim to reconfigure our current un-
derstanding of this dichotomy and its relationship to twentieth cen-
tury U.S. foreign policy, ultimately helping to solve one of the most 
persistent “puzzles” of American foreign policy: what exactly hap-
pened between 1919 and 1945, and what did the U.S. “turn-around” 
to multilateral internationalism really entail? Furthermore, I hope 
that taking the important unilateral tradition in U.S. foreign policy 
history seriously will enable a more frank discussion of what, exactly, 
future U.S. foreign policy is likely to consist of: unilateral internation-
alism or multilateral internationalism. 
Outline of study 
The first chapter investigates the first two assumptions listed above by 
presenting the literature on the foreign policy dichotomy and tracing 
its development in the field of history.5 We shall see that the assump-
tion of a fundamental “turn-around” in U.S. foreign policy associated 
with the Second World War (and the basis for today’s assumption by 
scholars and practitioners alike that the United States is a country 
5 The foreign policy dichotomy is connected to an identity dichotomy which cannot 
be explored here because of issues of space. The identity dichotomy – which in fact 
underlies the foreign policy dichotomy – presents this vacillation between aloofness 
and internationalism as stemming from a Janus-faced American identity: on the one 
hand an exemplary identity (illustrated by John Winthrop’s “City Upon a Hill”), on 
the other, a missionary identity (exemplified by Manifest Destiny or Wilsonianism, 
for example). The history of U.S. foreign policy is thus most commonly told by two 
interrelated dichotomies: a foreign policy dichotomy (aloof/internationalist) linked 
to an identity dichotomy (exemplary/missionary). This is a topic I explore at length 
elsewhere. See Hilde E. Restad, “Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of American 
Exceptionalism and Unilateralism” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2010). 
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deeply committed to multilateralism) in fact hinges on an outdated as-
sumption about “isolationism” in earlier U.S. history – an assumption 
no longer employed by historians of U.S. foreign relations. 
The second chapter presents the first of two case studies (namely, 
the First and Second World Wars) that aims to invalidate the third as-
sumption presented above. In the second chapter, I shall argue that the 
Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations in 1919 and 1920 did not 
signal a retreat to an “aloof” tradition in U.S. foreign policy, nor did 
it confirm a new tradition of interwar isolationism; rather, the United 
States continued to pursue its dominant foreign policy tradition, charac-
terized as unilateral internationalism. During the interwar period, the 
United States maintained a high level of involvement in international 
politics – including European power politics. Some of the foreign pol-
icy behavior can be characterized as unilateral, such as rejecting the 
League Covenant and passing the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s; oth-
ers can be characterized as multilateral, such as the Washington naval 
treaties. To be sure, there existed staunchly nationalist pockets in the 
American political and voting classes, but these elements cannot be 
defined as “isolationist” without the term losing its essential meaning.6 
Despite the general consensus in American diplomatic history that the 
term “isolationism” should be abandoned for early U.S. foreign policy, 
the 1930s holds out as the last possible isolationist bastion.7 
Notwithstanding the Neutrality Acts, I argue that the term “iso-
lationism” is unhelpful in the American case and our understanding is 
enhanced by using the terms unilateral and multilateral international-
ism instead of isolationism versus internationalism. The United States 
conducted active multilateral diplomatic efforts in the interwar period 
aimed at arms control (in terms of naval disarmament) and used eco-
nomic policy as a tool of security policy. It also behaved in unilateral 
ways. The rejection of the League of Nation and the Neutrality Acts 
have received too much attention, however, and are simply not the 
best measurement of American foreign policy posture in the inter-
war period. There was a majority in favor of ratification of the League 
Covenant, and the Neutrality Acts were devised by “isolationists” as 
6 This will be discussed later in the chapter. By “nationalist” I mean protectionist eco-
nomic legislation and unilateral security policy. See for example, Legro, Rethinking the 
World, 71.
7 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 486, 502. Herring writes that the interna-
tionalism that had competed with more traditional attitudes during the 1920s was 
“replaced by a new isolationism” with the Great Depression.
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well as by internationalists.8 This is not to say there were no important 
differences between the 1930s and the 1940s – obviously there were. 
The general argument in favor of a turn-around from a long-standing 
tradition of aloofness, however, has been exaggerated. 
Because our understanding of U.S. foreign policy and its histo-
ry is enhanced by using the terms unilateral and multilateral, rather 
than “isolationist” and “internationalist,” I must present a discussion 
of how to properly define “multilateral.” The third chapter will thus 
provide a short interlude between chapter 2 (presenting World War 
I) and chapter 4 (World War II) in order to discuss what, exactly, is 
meant by the term “multilateral,” a term at the center of any argument 
concerning the U.S. “turn-around” to multilateralism with the Second 
World War.
In the fourth chapter, I will present the second case study, which 
will argue that the U.S. tradition of unilateral internationalism con-
tinued longer than commonly thought after World War II despite in-
ternational order building. Notwithstanding the flurry of multilateral 
activity at the international level during and after the Second World 
War, the American domestic level foreign policy revolution has been ex-
aggerated. The turn-around thesis in fact entails making an argument 
about both the increased level of multilateral cooperation at the inter-
national level as well as a domestic foreign policy transformation on 
the part of the United States. Unquestionably, there were important 
differences in U.S. behavior between the 1930s and 1940s, especially 
in terms of formal U.S. security commitments. 
The main argument of this study, however, is that the turn-around 
thesis exaggerates the U.S. commitment to multilateralism while it 
understates the fundamental commitment to unilateralism. The study 
will end with a conclusion that reviews U.S. foreign policy after the 
end of the Cold War, as the decade of the 1990s provided a unique op-
portunity for the United States to pursue its preferred foreign policy 
strategy in a unipolar international system. 
8 As also pointed out by Bear F. Braumoeller, “The Myth of American Isolationism,” 
Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (2010): 359. 
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Chapter 1
 The isolationist/
internationalist dichotomy
Introduction: old and new paradigms
For quite some time, the reigning paradigm in the study of American 
foreign policy was that the United States was founded as a country 
that sought to isolate itself from the world, cutting off any ties to 
potential corrupting influences emanating from the Old World.9 As 
the famous revolutionary Thomas Paine wrote, the American colonies 
“ought form no partial connection with any part of [Europe]. It is the 
true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions.”10 
The classic paradigm of early U.S. foreign policy thus character-
izes the United States as an isolated and isolating country that re-
ally only emerged onto the international scene in the late nineteenth 
century. Only in 1898, when the United States suddenly and force-
fully expelled the Spanish empire from the U.S. sphere of influence in 
the Spanish–American War, did the United States begin to free itself 
from its historic “isolationism.” Curiously, however, the United States 
also somehow acquired colonies in Asia (the Philippines, among oth-
ers) – a rather puzzling series of events for an “isolationist” country. 
This imperial “aberration”– as historian Samuel Flagg Bemis called 
it11 – marked the transition from isolationism to internationalism in 
U.S. foreign policy according the old paradigm, and this tradition was 
9 Walter LaFeber, The American Age. United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 
1750 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 19. See also Felix Gilbert, To the 
Farewell Address (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 43. 
10 Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776; reprint, New York: Peter Eckler Publishing Co, 
1918), 24.
11 Samuel Flagg Bemis called the Philippine acquisition an aberration, as Dexter Perkins 
notes in his book, The American Approach to Foreign Policy, 20. 
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finally cemented with Woodrow Wilson’s quest to make the world 
“safe for democracy.”12 This was, in short, the old isolationist/inter-
nationalist dichotomous paradigm of diplomatic history, one that was 
also utilized by political scientists writing about U.S. foreign policy.13 
But there were some tensions in this classic story of the United 
States. How does a country simply stumble onto a continental (and 
subsequently, an overseas) empire and, eventually, world power status? 
Was the continental expansion in the nineteenth century perhaps of 
significance not just for those studying “domestic” frontier history, but 
also to those studying U.S. diplomatic history? Indeed, much of the 
scholarship depicting early U.S. foreign policy as isolationist became 
outdated, albeit while remaining influential, between 1960 and 1990, 
especially in textbooks and fields other than diplomatic history, such 
as political science.14 
From the mid-twentieth century, the so-called revisionist histo-
rians of the Wisconsin School, led by William Appleman Williams, 
would challenge the classic story of isolationism. Turning the clas-
sic paradigm on its head, the revisionist historians argued that the 
United States was actively participating in international affairs from 
its inception, and that it never aimed to isolate itself from the world. 
Rather, the United States had always been “expansionist” and much 
12 “By popular theory,” Edward McNall Burns wrote in 1957, “the history of the foreign 
policy of the United States falls into two periods – a period of isolation from 1776 to 
1898 and a period of intervention in world affairs from 1898 to the present.” Burns, 
America’s Sense of Mission. Concepts of National Purpose and Destiny (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957), 277. Some historians would argue that the 
United States in fact had cycled between internationalism and isolationism through-
out its history, whereas others argued the United States was first isolationist, then 
internationalist (a periodic description).
13 For newer accounts endorsing the “isolationist” paradigm, see Frank L. Klingberg, Cy-
clical Trends in American Foreign Policy Moods (Lanham, MD: University Press of Amer-
ica, 1983); Lawrence S. Kaplan, Entangling alliances with none: American foreign policy in 
the age of Jefferson (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1987); Henry Kissinger, 
Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); Ruggie, “The Past as Prologue”; 
McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam; Stanley Hoffmann, “The 
High and the Mighty,” American Prospect, January 13, 2003, <online>. For textbooks, 
see for instance Bradford Perkins, “The American Prism,” in Major Problems in Ameri-
can Foreign Relations, vol. I, To 1920, eds. Dennis Merril and Thomas G. Paterson, 6th 
ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005); or Daniel Deudney and Jeffrey 
Meiser, “American Exceptionalism,” in U.S. Foreign Policy, eds. Michael Cox and Doug 
Stokes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
14 Contemporary authors who explicitly reject the term “isolationism” are, among oth-
ers, Walter A. McDougall, Promised land, Crusader State: The American encounter with the 
world since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997); Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006); and Rajan Menon, The End of Alliances (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Herring, From Colony to Superpower. Legro, in 
his book Rethinking the World, rejects the term “isolationism” but still uses the term 
“separateness,” which serves much the same function in terms of breaking up U.S. 
foreign policy history into a dichotomy.
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less innocent than previously assumed.15 The continental expansion 
during the nineteenth century and the ideology behind it – formerly 
falling in under western or settler/frontier history – was in fact the 
United States building an empire, and today this history is incorporated 
into the new paradigm as acts of foreign, not domestic, policy.16 It is 
now commonplace for historians of U.S. foreign relations to connect 
the issue of continental expansion and expansionism in the nineteenth 
century to an overall U.S. foreign policy tradition, linking early U.S. 
foreign policy to its twentieth century foreign policy.17 What emerges, 
then, is a picture of U.S. foreign policy as expansionist and internation-
alist since the very founding of the country. This is the new paradigm.
But what does this new paradigm mean? What exactly does an 
“internationalist” foreign policy entail? Can we divide U.S. foreign 
policy history into different periods and categories of international-
ism? And has the paradigm successfully been updated in the works of 
historians, political scientists, and textbook writers? Finally, what are 
the implications of the new paradigm for the assumptions theorists 
employ about twentieth century U.S. foreign policy?
This chapter will briefly review the old isolationist/international-
ist dichotomy, and then trace its current process of reconfiguration 
within the field of history. We shall see that the new paradigm is still 
struggling to supplant the old one, as the old trope of isolationism is 
enjoying a rather long goodbye in history and political science alike. I 
15 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Foreign Policy (Cleveland, Ohio: 
World Pub. Co., 1959).
16 David S. Painter, “Making Connections,” Reviews in American History 21, no. 2 (June 
1993): 267–72. As Williams wrote, moralistic and ideological elements became inte-
grated with the fundamentally secular and economic nature of the “Open Door Poli-
cy,” serving to create a particular American kind of expansionism that aimed at “the 
marketplace of the mind and the polls as well as of the pocketbook.” See William Ap-
pleman Williams, “The Open Door Policy: Economic Expansion and the Remaking of 
Societies,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, eds. Merrill and Paterson, 9.
17 Early works that made this connection, in addition to Williams, include Albert K. 
Weinberg, Manifest destiny: A study of nationalist expansionism in American history (Bal-
timore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935); Norman Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: A 
Study in American Continental Expansion (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955); 
Richard Van Alstyne, The Rising American Empire (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965). 
Later works include Ernest N. Paolino, The Foundations of the American Empire: William 
Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973; Thomas 
Hietala, Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism & Empire, (1985) (rev. ed.) (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Hunt, The American Ascendancy;; Walter Nugent, 
Habits of Empire. A History of American Expansion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008).  
In the past decade, it has also become commonplace to talk of “U.S. foreign relations” 
rather than diplomatic history, because – as Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson 
argue – diplomatic history mainly refers to negotiations or communications between 
states, whereas “foreign relations” encompasses the “myriad of ways in which peoples, 
cultures, economics, national governments, nongovernmental organizations, regional 
associations, and international institutions interact.” See Major Problems in American 
Foreign Relations, eds. Merrill and Paterson, xiv.
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will argue that replacement terms such as “aloof” are in fact ill suited 
to this new understanding of American foreign policy. Rather, the 
term “unilateral internationalism” fittingly customizes the general 
term “internationalism” to the American historical foreign policy re-
cord, encompassing terms and policies such as “nonentanglement,” the 
Monroe Doctrine, and the ideologically informed quest on the part of 
the United States to lead – rather than follow – in international rela-
tions. Unilateral internationalism was not isolationism, nor separatism 
– rather, U.S. policymakers sought to prevent outside influence from 
reaching the American continent, so as to be able to keep the American 
continent and U.S. foreign policy under U.S. direction.18 In short, this 
term better describes the broad historical trends of American foreign 
policy, and makes us better able to understand the seminal events in 
American foreign policy in the twentieth century, which is the topic 
of the next chapters. 
The classic isolationist/internationalist 
dichotomy
 Classic diplomatic historians writing in the mid-twentieth century, 
such as Dexter Perkins, argued that the Declaration of Independence 
and the Revolution constituted “an act of isolation, a cutting of the 
ties with the Old World, the deed of a society which felt itself differ-
ent from those which existed on the other side of the Atlantic….”19 In 
fact, Edward McNall Burns argued, the isolationism of the Founding 
Fathers was probably more deeply embedded than had been acknowl-
edged, because they thought, expressed in the words of one of the 
Founding Fathers, George Mason, that “nature having separated us, by 
an immense ocean, from the European nations, the less we have to do 
with their quarrels or politics, the better.”20 Ernest Lee Tuveson wrote 
18 The reason for the U.S. quest for expansion and influence lies, I argue, elsewhere, in 
American exceptionalism. The kind of Great Power the United States developed into 
is intimately connected to this national identity. Unfortunately, the limited nature 
of this study does not allow me to elaborate on my investigation of the link between 
American exceptionalism and foreign policy. My focus on the ideational impetus be-
hind U.S. foreign policy distinguishes mine from a realist interpretation of U.S. for-
eign policy, however, which looks to material causes of state actions. See ch. 2 for my 
critique of realist theories of U.S foreign policy. 
19 Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy, 2; 136–155.
20 Burns, America’s Sense of Mission, 277. 
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of Thomas Jefferson and those who, like him, thought the “young 
republic should be a haven of goodness” were “the most isolationist.”21 
The old paradigm of isolationism can, in short, be said to have 
stated that (1) the Founding Fathers (meaning the supporters of the 
Revolution and the authors of the Constitution) advocated a policy of 
isolation from Europe; (2) the United States was able to continue this 
policy and stay isolated from great power politics due to the era of 
“free security” the United States enjoyed at the turn of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries;22 and (3) that nineteenth-century continen-
tal expansion was a part of this isolationism.
Defining isolationism
According to Manfred Jonas the first known application of the word 
“isolationist” to U.S. foreign policy was by Edward Price Bell, the 
London correspondent of the Chicago Daily News in 1922. Bell noted 
the United States was moving from “isolation into partnership,” cit-
ing the U.S. entry into World War I.23 The term “isolationist” became 
widely used only as late as post-World War I, and then mostly as a 
slur by pro-Leaguers against those who did not favor U.S. membership 
of the League of Nations.24 The term was not used much until Albert 
K. Weinberg’s book Manifest Destiny of 1935. Significantly, American 
policy during the interwar years would come to be described as isola-
tionist and anomalous, requiring explanation and analysis, something 
that became a common endeavor after the Second World War.25 
21 Ernest Lee Tuveson, Redeemer Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), viii. 
My italics.
22 The term “free security” stems from C. Vann Woodward, who espoused the view that 
the United States was able to develop in a relatively benign international environ-
ment. This was said to breed a strategic culture particular to the United States, where 
European power politics was dismissed as un-American. “Free security” was connected 
to “free land” – the idea that, compared to other countries, the United States was able 
to obtain “free land” for a relatively low cost. “The handful of men who made up the 
regular army during the nineteenth century were not employed in patrolling frontiers 
against foreign invasion, but chiefly in coping with a domestic police problem posed 
by the Indians.” See C. Vann Woodward, “The Age of Reinterpretation,” American 
Historical Review, 66, no. 1 (Oct. 1960): 4. My italics. 
23 See Manfred Jonas, “Isolationism,” in Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, vol. 2, 2nd 
ed., eds. Alexander DeConde et al. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2002). The 
word “isolationist” was listed for the first time in the 1901 edition of the Oxford English 
Dictionary without noting its significance for American politics, and was not listed in 
American dictionaries until 1922.
24 Inis L. Claude, “The Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership,” in American 
Approaches to World Affairs, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, 4th ed. (New York: University 
Press of America, 1986), 4. McDougall, Promised Land, 39. 
25 Jonas, “Isolationism,” 337. Indeed, “isolationist” seems to have a history of use as 
a slur by pro-interventionists, especially after Pearl Harbor, McDougall writes. See 
Promised Land, 39–40. 
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According to Selig Adler, however, the term can in fact be traced 
back as early as the 1850s, when American proponents of Europe’s 
democratic revolutions dubbed their opponents “isolationists.”26 
The political implication of the term was given new emphasis when, 
in 1896, Canadian Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier referred to 
England’s “splendid isolation.” This phrase, shortened to “isolation-
ism,” then became a designation for the twin policies of neutrality and 
non-intervention. 
In Adler’s opinion, the Founding Fathers and their heirs regarded 
isolationism as a “positive policy designed to insure American free-
dom of action, to prevent foreign subversion, and to enable us to take 
advantage of Europe’s distress in order to round out our own bound-
aries,” underscoring that American isolationism was not social, cul-
tural, or economic, but rather distinctly one of political isolationism.27 
Weinberg, on the other hand, equated isolationism with non-entan-
glement, thus defining it more as a negative policy.28 To Weinberg, the 
non-entanglement of the Founding Fathers expressed a theory of the 
national interest according to which “all vital interests, and especially 
peace, flourish best when detached, in so far as possible through main-
taining freedom of action, from the fate of the interests of the others.”29 
The Founders as isolationists
In this classic paradigm of isolationism, first president George 
Washington’s Farewell Address to the nation upon his retirement in 
1796, and third president Thomas Jefferson’s First Inaugural Speech 
in 1801 were seen to comprise the definitive formulation of early 
American thinking on foreign policy. This would later be updated to 
a nineteenth-century context with the Monroe Doctrine – President 
James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams’ statement 
in 1823 that made the American hemisphere a U.S. sphere of influ-
ence.30 Notwithstanding the initial military alliance with France to 
gain independence during the Revolutionary War, “isolationism” was 
26 Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse. It’s Twentieth Century Reaction (1957; reprint, West-
port, CT: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1974), 28.
27 Ibid.
28 See Weinberg, Manifest Destiny; idem, “The Historical Meaning of the Doctrine of 
Isolation,” American Political Science Review 34, no. 3 (June 1940).
29 Ibid., 542.
30 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 11–12. Adler writes that James Monroe “freshened and 
restated” the “theory of isolationism” with the Monroe Doctrine, while at the same 
time arguing that it became, in the course of time, “an object of exaggerated isolation-
ist veneration.” 
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said to be the strategy of choice of a new and idealistic republic, re-
jecting “traditional diplomacy and power politics,” as Felix Gilbert 
wrote.31 As is typical of classic scholarship on this issue, however, what 
Gilbert meant was political isolation from Europe.32 
The United States could be isolationist because, as C. Vann 
Woodward wrote, it enjoyed “free security” and free land, enabling the 
national myth of “America as an innocent nation in a wicked world” 
able to obtain freely and innocently that which other nations sought 
by the sword.33 The idea of “free security” naturally went along with 
an assumption of the United States as an isolated and isolating, as op-
posed to an expanding and expansionist, nation.34 
Westward expansionism as isolationism
The isolationist paradigm contained an inherent contradiction, how-
ever. The United States had expanded dramatically during the nine-
teenth century yet – at the same time – adhered to isolationism. Only 
by assuming nineteenth-century continental expansion was somehow 
part of domestic history, as opposed to acts of foreign policy, could U.S. 
foreign policy be characterized as isolationist until the 1890s, when 
the United States suddenly experienced a brief period of imperial “ab-
erration” with the Spanish–American War. The isolationist paradigm 
thus had important caveats – caveats which hold the key to the para-
digm’s ultimate academic death. As Adler explained, “our isolationist 
barricade only had one wall.” Americans only shut the eastern door, 
“for Americans marched out of their house in other directions.” He 
concluded that isolationism accelerated rather than inhibited continental 
expansionism.35 Essentially, the old thesis of expansionism as isola-
tionism rested on a Eurocentric view of American foreign policy, a 
31 Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 89. 
32 Ibid., 135. 
33 Vann Woodward, “The Age of Reinterpretation,” 7.
34 For authors rejecting the thesis of “free security” and showing how the United States 
was, rather, embroiled in international affairs and great power rivalries, see for exam-
ple, J. C. A. Stagg, Mr. Madison’s war: politics, diplomacy, and warfare in the early Ame-
rican republic, 1783–1830 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); Peter 
Onuf & Nicholas Onuf, Federal union, modern world: the law of nations in an age of revolu-
tions, 1776–1814, 1st ed. (Madison: Madison House, 1993); J. C. A. Stagg, Borderlines 
in borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American frontier, 1776–1821 (New Ha-
ven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). Providing an example of the belated updating 
of historiographical consensus within political science, Ruggie’s article “The Past as 
Prologue” from 1997 repeats the argument that the United States was “removed from 
the continuous jostling of European power politics,” protected by the oceans on either 
side, and surrounded by weak neighbors. See Ruggie, “The Past as Prologue”: 89.
35 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 20.
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perspective that viewed U.S. international relations as primarily faced 
toward the Atlantic Ocean. Anything else did not count.
By assuming westward expansion as a natural development for the 
United States these earlier historians internalized the myth of mani-
fest destiny. The United States was always meant to expand from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean by God’s own will. The scholarly result of 
such an acceptance of manifest destiny, rather than an academic inves-
tigation of this myth, can be seen in the classic literature where mani-
fest destiny and continental expansion were described as an organic 
process of “natural events” that were “blameless” from the American 
side.36 Morning Star editor John O’Sullivan, originator of the term 
“manifest destiny” in 1845, argued Texas had been “absorbed” into the 
Union in an “inevitable fulfillment of the general law which is rolling 
our population westward.”37 These “natural events” were “blameless” 
because “America’s incorporation of all adjacent lands was the virtually 
inevitable fulfillment of a moral mission delegated to the nation by 
Providence itself,” as manifest destiny holds.38 Indeed, Dexter Perkins 
described continental expansion as a “biological” process “carried on 
with less violence than often goes on with such activities” as there 
“were no resentful minorities, in important numbers.”39 In summary, 
the string of territorial acquisitions up till the Spanish–American War 
could only be characterized as a “domestic” matter (thus validating 
an “isolationist” thesis) by believing that large swaths of territory in 
North America and the Caribbean were “naturally” (future) parts of 
America, given to it by God. 
Granted, one could argue that any “isolationism” was purely di-
rected at the European Great Powers. In other words, only Atlantic 
foreign policy counted as foreign policy.40 But this logic contains 
two tensions. First, it does not take into account the fact that these 
very same Great Powers had colonial possessions in the Americas and 
the Caribbean and thus coveting these territories was, in fact, a way 
36 Emily Rosenberg, “A Call to Revolution: A roundtable on early U.S. foreign rela-
tions,” Diplomatic History 22, issue 1 (winter 1998). Rosenberg critiques Bradford Per-
kins’s contribution to the four-volume Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, 
for example, for ignoring diplomacy with any nations that were not European, discuss-
ing America’s western boundaries almost completely as a byproduct of diplomacy with 
Europe. 
37 Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, 44. John O’Sullivan proclaimed that it was the manifest 
destiny of the United States “to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for 
the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.” Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, 
122.
38 Ibid., 2. 
39 Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy, 13.
40 As Lawrence Kaplan did to modify his thesis of isolationism.
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of meddling in European affairs. France controlled the St. Lawrence 
River region through eastern Canada and down the Great Lakes to the 
Mississippi River.41 Spain also controlled Florida and the Caribbean, 
as well as the Southwest and California (until Mexican independence) 
and the Louisiana territory (until the 1800 Treaty of San Ildefonso 
with France).
Second, such an argument would then have to incorporate expan-
sion and expansionism into a narrative about an “isolated” country and 
people not seeking imperial possessions in the manner of the European 
powers. Never mind the awkward fit this makes for cases such as the 
ethnic cleansing of Native Americans, the Mexican–American War, 
and the continued obsession with Cuba and Canada. 
In fact, nineteenth-century continental expansion and expansion-
ism was intimately connected with the building of Great Power sta-
tus – as current literature points out – and should thus not be seen in 
isolation from the United States’ later imperial adventures. When seen 
in the light of the steady expansion and strong expansionist ideology 
espoused by Americans and their leaders since the Founding Fathers, 
one is loath to view the Spanish–American War of 1898 as merely an 
“imperial aberration.”
The dichotomy and its cycles
The common descriptions of isolationism in the literature also had to 
contend with another internal contradiction in its logic: the numer-
ous instances of interventions and diplomatic interactions conduct-
ed by the young American republic. The foreign policy tradition of 
isolationism was thus linked to its opposite; that of internationalism, 
in either a cyclical or periodic fashion. Scholars either wrote that the 
United States had of course first been solidly isolationist, but then 
started vacillating between isolationism and internationalism in its 
foreign policy (cyclical thesis), or they wrote that the United States 
had been isolationist up to the Spanish–American War and then be-
came internationalist (the periodic thesis). Stanley Hoffmann wrote of 
“the Wilsonian syndrome,” characterized by “oscillation from quiet-
ism to activism,” making for a “hectic-static approach to international 
41 After the Seven Years’ War, France ceded most of the Louisiana Territory east of the 
Mississippi River to Great Britain, and that west of the River to Spain. France retained 
the area around New Orleans.
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relations.”42 Henry Kissinger argued in Diplomacy for a dualism be-
tween isolationism and globalism in U.S. foreign policy.43 Frank L. 
Klingberg argued that American foreign policy would cycle between 
“extroversion” and “introversion” as a result of generational mood 
traits.44 
The new paradigm of U.S. foreign relations
The inherent tensions of the old paradigm have made the way for a new 
paradigm in the study of U.S. foreign relations. It generally argues 
that (1) the Founding Fathers were not isolationists but were aiming 
rather to prevent foreign influence in the Americas, not preventing 
U.S. influence around the world. In other words, they were advocating 
unilateralism, not isolationism;45 (2) the Farewell Address was thus not 
a timeless political testament counseling isolationism; rather, it was 
the result of a policy fight between the pro-British Federalist Party (fa-
vored by George Washington and Alexander Hamilton) and the pro-
French Democratic-Republican Party (favored by Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison), proving the new Republic’s early embroilment 
in world affairs; and (3) the continental and overseas empire acquired 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are proof of the inher-
ent internationalist orientation on the part of the United States. 
Today, the consensus among historians of U.S. foreign relations is 
that the term isolationism is unhelpful and should be discarded. But 
the paradigmatic shift has yet to be consolidated, as the new para-
digm is struggling to replace the old one. Some contemporary au-
thors still validate the thesis of isolationism. Indeed, Lawrence Kaplan 
wrote in 1987 that Jefferson’s phrase “entangling alliance” from his 
First Inaugural Speech and a very famous phrase in U.S. foreign policy, 
42 Stanley Hoffmann in Gulliver’s Troubles, quoted in Claude, “The Credibility of Institu-
tions, Policies and Leadership,” 3. It should be said, however, that “quietism” is not 
necessarily isolationism, although it does serve to dichotomize U.S. foreign policy.
43 As stated by McDougall, Promised Land, 7. See Kissinger, Diplomacy, 29ff. 
44 Klingberg, Cyclical Trends, 8. He argues the U.S. was introvert from 1776–1798; 
1824–1844; 1871–1891; and 1918–1940, while being extrovert in between. “Extro-
version” is defined as “a nation’s willingness to bring its influence to bear upon other 
nations, to exert direct positive measures (specially military or diplomatic); “introver-
sion” as “an unwillingness to exert much direct pressure upon other nations, and a 
desire to concentrate upon internal problems, while conducting normal economic, 
diplomatic, and cultural relations.”
45 Stewart Patrick sums up this new consensus on unilateralism in his book, The Best Laid 
Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009). He defines unilateralism as “avoiding for-
eign entanglements abroad and preserving untrammeled sovereignty at home.” 
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counseled isolationism as a strategy. Bradford Perkins argued in The 
Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations – which was published 
as late as 1993 – that the Founding Fathers were devoted to isola-
tionism from the outset despite certain compromises, such as the ini-
tial military alliance with France.46 In 1998, political scientist Fareed 
Zakaria based his well-known book on U.S. foreign policy on the as-
sumption – and to him, the puzzle – that the United States “hewed to 
a relatively isolationist line” after the Civil War, arguing the United 
States underperformed as a great power.47
What is interesting is that even those authors who explicitly re-
ject the term isolationism publish works that reproduce the dichotomy 
in U.S. foreign policy as isolationist/internationalist, by substituting 
“separateness” or “aloofness” for isolationism. For example, in 1998, 
H. W. Brands wrote that U.S. foreign policy comes in either an “exem-
plarist” (meaning aloof) or an interventionist version.48 
U.S. internationalism: A new paradigm for the ages
The new paradigm holds that, “[r]evolutionary Americans did not as-
pire to isolation,” as Peter and Nicholas Onuf write, “but rather to 
closer integration in the European world.”49 Indeed, one of the more 
important consequences of the Declaration of Independence was to en-
able the thirteen American colonies to enter into alliances as a sover-
eign power, which is the very antithesis of isolationism. There was of 
course an important element of Realpolitik to this alliance. The revo-
lutionaries had to make the European balance of power work to their 
advantage since they were so weak compared to the British Empire. 
James Madison was certainly aware of this: It is to the principle of the 
rivalry between France and England, Madison said, that “we owe per-
haps our liberty.”50 The American Revolution had a profound impact 
46 Perkins, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. I, 15.
47 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 5. This assumption no doubt owes 
to views such as Adler’s; who argued that isolationism actually enjoyed “increased vital-
ity during the interlude of comparative tranquility between the downfall of Emperor 
Napoleon I and the war against Emperor William II of Germany.” See Adler, The 
Isolationist Impulse, 12. My italics.
48 H.W. Brands, “Exemplary versus Interventionist America” in Robert Hutching, ed. 
At the End of the American Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 
31–32.
49 Onuf & Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World, 98; Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire, 60.
50 Gilbert, Farewell Address, 89; Onuf & Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World, 117.  
The Treaty of Alliance of 1778 promised islands in the West Indies to France, and 
the Floridas to its ally, Spain. The United States also had to pledge to remain France’s 
partner “forever.” See LaFeber, American Age, 22–23. 
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on the international system.51 The revolutionaries did not seek to 
isolate themselves from Europe, nor were they eager to participate – 
“without powerful allies and on radically unequal terms – in the anar-
chic struggle of all against all that was supposed to be the natural state 
of nations,” Onuf writes. In fact, today the Founding Fathers are seen 
more often as advocates of an American empire than of isolationism.52
The Farewell Address and its legacy
The Farewell Address is seen as the first and therefore very important 
expression of early U.S. foreign policy. As the United States emerged 
as a world power, historians began debating whether the republic’s 
first president, George Washington, was mainly addressing domestic 
politics or international politics upon stepping down from his office. 
Was he addressing his contemporaries or later generations, and was he 
articulating a limited or a broad policy for the nation? Whereas his ad-
monition against the United States engaging in “permanent alliances” 
used to be taken as an argument for isolationism, the current general 
consensus is that Washington was instructing the new nation to avoid 
international intercourse on radically unequal terms.53 
The document is a more complex work than the phrase it is re-
membered for – “entangling alliances” – a phrase which Washington 
never uttered (it was, in fact, Jefferson’s).54 Published in newspapers 
on September 19, 1796, it was most likely a reaction to the frayed do-
mestic unity resulting from the French Revolution and the Jay Treaty 
with Britain, which had developed into a partisan battle between the 
emerging Federalists – Washington and Hamilton’s party – generally 
sympathetic to England, and the pro-French Democratic Republicans, 
represented by Jefferson and Madison.55 Washington’s warning against 
permanent alliances and “inveterate antipathy” toward other nations 
was arguably a warning against a permanent alliance with France (the 
51 Alexander DeConde, Entangling Alliance. Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958), 8.
52 See, for example Hunt, The American Ascendancy: Walter Hixon, The Myth of American 
Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2007).
53 That Washington’s Farewell Address was a statement of independence rather than 
isolationism remains the accepted interpretation in most works on the Federalist era,” 
writes Burton Ira Kaufman, Washington’s Farewell Address: The View from the 20th Cen-
tury (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), 111. 
54 Indeed, John G. Ruggie – by no means the only political scientist guilty of this – as-
sumes Washington warned against “entangling alliances” as opposed to “permanent 
alliances.” See “The Past as Prologue”: 90.
55 Hamilton advocated a pro-British policy because he thought this was the best way of 
fostering U.S. trade and fiscal interests. See DeConde, Entangling Alliance. I also thank 
Martin Öhman for helpful comments.
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only country the United States had an alliance with) and counseling 
people to abandon their antipathy towards Britain. And so, he stated, 
“[i]t is our true policy to steer clear of any permanent alliances with 
any portion of the foreign world, as far, I mean, as we are now at liberty 
to do it.”56 
This was not isolationism, but unilateral internationalism. 
Neither Washington nor Jefferson regarded themselves as advocates of 
a policy of isolation. Both men actually sought to “increase American 
contacts with the outside world.”57 Hamilton advocated steering 
clear of European affairs so the United States could achieve hegem-
ony on its own continent, “to aim at an ascendant in the system of 
American affairs,” as he wrote in the essay Federalist 11, a sentiment 
he also expressed in the Farewell Address Hamilton in fact wrote for 
Washington. Gilbert argues this sentiment was weaker and more sub-
tle in the Farewell Address because “Washington hardly would have 
liked this open announcement of an aggressive imperialist program” 
in his address.58 
The ardent internationalist foreign policy of the Revolution, 
coupled with Washington’s allowance for the necessity of “tempo-
rary alliances in extraordinary emergency” makes it plausible that the 
Founding Fathers did not oppose alliances as a matter of principle. 
Indeed, in July 1787 William Grayson proposed forming an alliance 
with European powers “to maintain a permanent naval force that 
would guard the Mediterranean for peaceful shipping.”59 What we see, 
rather, is an unwillingness to be a junior partner, an aversion to the 
risk of losing sovereignty – safeguarding freedom of action above all else.60 
This point of view was echoed by John Quincy Adams and William 
H. Seward (perhaps the nineteenth century’s most prominent U.S. sec-
retaries of state), as well as in biographies of Washington written by 
Woodrow Wilson and Henry Cabot Lodge at the end of the century 
(both in the vanguard of the growing expansionist movement of the 
1890s, and both portraying Washington as an expansionist).61 In fact, 
56 See Washington’s Farewell Address, <online>.
57 Jonas, “Isolationism,” 338. See also Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 1.
58 Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 133. See also Federalist 11, <online>. 
59 Kagan, Dangerous Nation, 62, citing Frederick W. Marks III, Independence on Trial. For-
eign affairs and the making of the Constitution (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univer-
sity Press, 1973), 4.
60 LaFeber, The American Age, 48. My italics. This is not to deny the presence of a strain 
of thought idealizing isolation – Thomas Paine, for example, did argue for isolation 
and international peace founded on commerce. 
61 Ibid., 32.
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Burton Ira Kaufman argues, the Farewell Address was a statement of 
empire, made by an “apostle of empire,” but was for a long time mis-
represented as advocating isolationism.62 
No entangling alliances
So what, then, does the phrase “entangling alliances” mean? It was, of 
course, Jefferson – and not Washington – who formulated the famous 
phrase. Building upon Paine’s Common Sense and Washington’s Farewell 
Address, Jefferson counseled the Founding Fathers’ foreign policy con-
sensus: avoid alliances now (bound to be detrimental to a relative-
ly weak United States) and grow stronger so as to be able to dictate 
the terms of international intercourse in the future. Indeed, Jefferson 
had rather lofty aspirations for the American republic. Writing to his 
Secretary of State, James Madison, in 1801, he envisioned virtually 
unlimited American expansion: 
However our present situation may restrain us within our own 
limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when 
our rapid multiplication will expand itself beyond those limits, 
and cover the whole northern, if not southern continent….63
Upon leaving office in 1809, he told Madison – his successor – that 
with the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 from Napoleon and with the fu-
ture acquisitions of the Floridas, Cuba, and, of course, Canada, the 
United States would be “such an empire for liberty as [the world] has 
never surveyed since the creation….”64 Nor were Jefferson’s impres-
sive plans for America limited to the Western Hemisphere. In the 
early 1800s, when American shipping was under siege by the Barbary 
Pirates, he proposed building a naval squadron to be on permanent 
station in the Mediterranean as well as the creation of an international 
62 Kaufman, Washington’s Farewell Address, 179.
63 Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 November 1801, quoted in Walter LaFeber, 
The American Age, 51.
64 For a discussion on Jefferson’s “empire for liberty” see Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire, 2, 7. 
Quoted in LaFeber, The American Age, 57–58. Jefferson’s successor also dutifully organ-
ized a coup in West Florida upon which the plotters “asked” for U.S. annexation (for-
mally becoming a part of the Union in 1811); and upon the failed attempt to gain East 
Florida, Madison and Congress declared that henceforth no transfers of New World 
territory between foreign powers would be tolerated. This “nontransfer principle” later 
became part of the Monroe Doctrine. See LaFeber, The American Age, 59–60.
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league for the permanent policing of the Mediterranean, with the 
United States playing a lead role.65 
The Founders’ views on alliances and internationalism, then, seem 
rather more concerned with preserving U.S. unilateral maneuverabil-
ity and future influence over the American continent, than with an 
ideological attachment to isolationism. Indeed, in 1823 Jefferson’s 
advice to President Monroe was to accept British Foreign Secretary 
George Canning’s invitation to joint action with Great Britain against 
the threat posed to Latin America by the Holy Alliance (Russia, 
Austria, and Prussia), on the grounds that it would favorably affect the 
European balance of power. Arguing that if “we can affect a division 
in the body of European powers, and draw over to our side its most 
powerful member, surely we should do it.”66 John Quincy Adams, on 
the other hand, counseled against it – not on the grounds of isolation-
ism, but on the grounds that it would prevent the United States from 
extending its own sphere of influence in the future (over such coveted 
areas as Texas and Cuba, for instance).67
Nineteenth century: from isolationism to expansionism
As early as 1935, Weinberg sought to explain how the United States 
had developed from an “infant republic occupying the seaboard of a 
little known continent to a vast world power with overseas posses-
sions.” Weinberg’s answer was that this expansion had been accom-
panied by an expansionist ideology, expressing a “dogma of supreme 
self-assurance and ambition – that America’s incorporation of all adja-
cent lands was the virtually inevitable fulfillment of a moral mission 
delegated to the nation by Providence itself.”68 The “revisionist” dip-
lomatic historians who emerged in the 1960s –William A. Williams, 
Walter LaFeber, and Lloyd Gardner, among others – would pick up 
65 Kagan, Dangerous Nation, 98. In 1801 Jefferson sent a squadron of three frigates and a 
schooner to Tripoli as the beginning of a four-year long naval campaign. The military 
campaign was accompanied by a very proactive diplomatic effort.
66 Jonas, “Isolationism,” 339.
67 Weeks, Building the Continental Empire, 56.
68 Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, 1–3. Weinberg would explicitly disagree with his later 
revisionist colleagues, arguing that “No one fact, either economic, or social, or even 
political, can account for [American expansion]. Perhaps a national idealism – call it 
manifest destiny or what you will – has had more to do with this expansion movement 
than anything else.” James A. Field criticizes revisionist historians for exaggerating 
American imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century, arguing it was less a con-
solidated movement and intentional policy that haphazard reactions and events. Field 
also critiques the line of argument attempted by for instance Thomas Hietala and 
Ernest Paolino in connecting pre-Civil War expansion with 1890s imperialism. See 
Field, “American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book,” American 
Historical Review 83, no. 3 (June 1978). 
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on Weinberg’s theme of expansion and expansionism, albeit giving 
it a more explicit economic perspective. These authors stressed the 
primacy of domestic social and economic structures in explaining the 
American rise to power.69 Rather than seeing distinct periods or cycles, 
Williams argued that the near obsession with the thesis of “isolation-
ism” as a description of the interwar period had served to obscure the 
overall consistent nature of U.S. foreign policy: expansion and growth 
toward great-power status. Whereas the nineteenth-century continen-
tal expansion used to be seen as “manifest destiny” and essentially a 
domestic matter, expansionism would increasingly come to be ques-
tioned as a domestic issue by diplomatic historians.  
Indeed, one of the big changes in the field of frontier history with 
direct implications for those studying the history of U.S. foreign poli-
cy has been the “reckoning with the fact that that what we called, for 
so long, ‘westward expansion,’ could also fit in the categories of colo-
nialism and imperialism,” Western historian Patricia Nelson Limerick 
writes. Limerick admits to not having known about Williams’ work 
when she did her own work in Western American history, because, 
as she says, “I was a Western American historian and Williams was 
a diplomatic historian….”70 One of the central weaknesses of the old 
paradigm of Western history and diplomatic history occurred from a 
failure to question the assumption, subscribed to by many American 
historians and certainly by textbook writers, that the United States 
took up the practice of imperialism only in the 1890s, after having 
stayed remarkably innocent of the practices of dominance found among 
European nations.71 The curious notion – that expansion across contig-
uous land somehow “didn’t count” and that a nation had to extend its 
powers across an ocean before the terms “colonialism” or “imperialism’ 
could come into play – “governed the periodization, the very definition, 
of American involvement in Empire.”72
Today, the theme of expanding U.S. power is the narrative motif 
of most textbooks currently used in courses on U.S. foreign relations.73 
Although they usually begin with the imperial surge in Asia and the 
Pacific at the end of the nineteenth century, it is now quite common 
69 Kaufman, Washington’s Farewell Address, 114.
70 Patricia Nelson Limerick, “Dilemmas in Forgiveness: William Appleman Williams 
and Western American History,” Diplomatic History 25 (Spring 2001): 293.
71 Ibid.: 295.
72 Ibid.: 296.
73 See Stephen G. Rabe, “Hunt and the Historians,” H-Diplo Roundtables VIII, no. 17 
(2007), <online>. For an example of a textbook that explicitly takes up this theme, 
see Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, eds. Merrill and Paterson.
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to tie late nineteenth century overseas expansion to early nineteenth 
century territorial expansion, rejecting the thesis of Bemis that U.S. 
imperialism was an “aberration” in American history.74 Nineteenth 
century continental expansionism is categorized as inherently part of 
U.S. foreign policy for several reasons. 
First, territorial acquisition was a diplomatic act (either between 
Native tribes and the United States or other states and the United 
States). The treaty-making power accorded to the President and the 
Senate at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 was 
not simply meant for overseas countries, it was also meant to gov-
ern relations with American-Indian tribes, as the tribes were usually 
considered separate nations by the whites.75 The settlers did not en-
counter a vacant east coast lacking in “resentful minorities” as classic 
diplomatic historians wrote. They did not move across an empty con-
tinent. Rather, “a central theme of American diplomatic history must 
be the clash between the European settlers and the Native Americans 
between 1620 and 1890,” a clash that nearly exterminated the Indian 
tribes, counting between 8.5 and 10 million in 1492.76 And, indeed, 
recent scholarship deals more explicitly with this fact.77
Second, the animating ideology behind expansion – manifest 
destiny, “Anglo-Saxon civilizing mission,” or, simply “missionary” – 
whichever term one wants to use, was internationalist at its core.78 The 
settlers and colonists were spreading English civilization, in active 
competition with the efforts of the French and the Spanish imperialists.
Continuities
Whereas it is tempting to treat the Civil War as a break between two 
distinct periods of U.S. foreign policy (which it was, in terms of the 
expansion of slavery), Thomas Hietala argues that the real long-range 
significance of the 1840s transcends the sectionalism of 1848–77.79 
74 For instance, Thomas Hietala, Manifest Design and Ernest N. Paolino, The Foundations 
of the American Empire. William Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1973); William Earl Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global 
Empire (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1992); idem, Building the 
Continental Empire.
75 LaFeber, The American Age, 32; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 41–45.
76 LaFeber, 10.
77 Walter Russell Mead argues this historic neglect of the United States’ relations with 
Native American peoples has been due to both a “general historical amnesia and a 
Eurocentric view of U.S. foreign policy.” Furthermore, this neglect impinges our un-
derstanding of how Americans would deal with the rest of the world, as their approach 
to the outside world first appeared in their dealings with the native peoples of North 
America. See “A Hegemon’s Coming of Age,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2009). 
78 The term “Anglo-Saxon civilizing mission” is Kagan’s in Dangerous Nation, 12.
79 Hietala, Manifest Design, 209.
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Rather than only presenting the 1840s as the first major step toward 
secession and war, historians could also couple the expansionists of the 
late Jacksonian period (named after U.S. president Andrew Jackson) 
with the expansionists of the 1890s. In fact, he argues, the expansion-
ists of the 1840s would have viewed the acquisition of an overseas 
empire in 1898 as a more likely outcome of their own efforts than the 
Civil War of 1861–65.80 
William Henry Seward had the specific misfortune of being 
Secretary of State during the Civil War. “How sadly domestic distur-
bances of ours demoralize the National ambition,” he wrote to John 
Bigelow in 1865.81 This “National ambition” was for Seward to recast 
the territorial U.S. empire into a “commercial, yet destinarian, vision.” 
Inspired by Adams, Seward advocated that the United States become 
the future great commercial power on earth, fueled by oceanic trade 
(the only kind of empire that was “incorruptible”). Commerce would 
take the place of war, New York would become the center of finance 
in the world, and Asia would have to be fought over with the other 
great powers.82 
In other words, when policymakers such as William McKinley 
(president during the Spanish–American War), John Hay, and 
Theodore Roosevelt moved beyond continentalism and sought a glob-
al empire for the United States around the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, the transition was not as dramatic as the old paradigm assumed. 
In retrospect, the objectives of the expansionists of the 1890s closely 
resembled those of their predecessors in the 1840s: each group “had 
hoped to diffuse a domestic malaise through expansionism and war; 
each sought to enhance the country’s commercial position, especially 
in Asia; and each set out to show the European powers that the United 
States could and would employ force to secure its interests.” In other 
words, had the sectional crisis, the Civil War, and Reconstruction not 
directed American attention inward so extensively in 1848–77, it is 
not unlikely that the Mexican–American War (1846–48) rather than 
80 Ibid. 210. There certainly were some rather striking similarities between these two 
expansionist decades. President John Tyler dispatched House representative from Mas-
sachusetts, Caleb Cushing, to China to “stick an American foot into what would be 
termed the Open Door fifty years later.” In the 1840s, Tyler, President James K. Polk, 
and others advocated for a more robust naval policy due to the growing U.S. inter-
national trade, as would Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Cabot Lodge in the 1890s. 
President Polk also decided that Cuba should be added to the American domain, but 
Spain spurned all overtures to buy it. 
81 Paolino, The Foundations of the American Empire, 207.
82 Ibid.
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the Spanish–American War of 1898 would be acknowledged as the 
point of origin of the United States as a Great Power.83
Building an American empire?
Referring to U.S. expansion in the nineteenth century as an exercise 
in empire building is the trend currently found in many writings by 
scholars of early American foreign relations.84
The territorial settlement toward the Pacific Ocean (manifest des-
tiny) was the United States’ “first empire,” completed just after 1850.85 
The subsequent offshore acquisitions across the Pacific and in Asia can 
be said to have made up the “second empire,” ranging from the acqui-
sition of the midway islands and other smaller Pacific islands to the 
acquisition of Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Panama 
Canal Zone. This was the time when Secretary of State William Henry 
Seward’s ideas finally came to fruition, fulfilled in the later “Large 
Policy” advocated by Teddy Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
around the turn of the twentieth century, which aimed at possessing a 
large navy, owning and controlling a canal between the Atlantic and 
the Pacific Ocean (today’s Panama Canal), holding naval bases in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, and being a contender for naval and com-
mercial superiority of the Pacific Ocean and the Far East.86 The United 
States thus built a transcontinental territorial empire in less than half a 
century, achieving supremacy in the Western Hemisphere, and laying 
83 Hietala, Manifest Design, 212.
84 Nugent, Habits of Empire, xiv. 
 For a discussion of what empire entails, see Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American 
Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 63. 
Although Maier hedges on whether or not the United States can be categorized as an 
empire as of yet, he argues that the distinction between hegemon and imperial power 
is a fragile one: “At best, hegemony seems potential empire, not just a high-minded 
renunciation of intervention.” For a discussion of what hegemony entails, see Bruce 
Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony: America’s Ambiguous Relationship with the 
United Nations,” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 103–130. 
Michael H. Hunt argues the United States has been an empire for a long time and in 
several guises, beginning as a continental empire (a form of settler colonialism already 
at the time of national independence); turning to formal overseas empire at the end of 
the nineteenth century; thereafter practicing informal empire in large areas of Central 
America and the Caribbean, maritime East Asia, western Asia, and arguably even 
western Europe in the early Cold War. See “Empire, Hegemony, and the U.S. Policy 
Mess,” (May 21, 2007) History News Network.
85 Nugent, Habits of Empire, xiv. Historical debates on a U.S. empire usually start with 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was significant because it created the North-
west Territory as the first organized territory of the United States, and established the 
precedent by which the United States would expand westward across North America 
by admitting new states, rather than existing states expanding west. As early as the 
1781 Articles of Confederation, however, the future aspirations were clear: the Articles 
reserved a place for Canada in the new state.
86 Seward, The Foundations of the American Empire, 211.
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the foundations for a twentieth century empire – the third, and cur-
rent, U.S. empire.87 
This perspective of continuity challenges the perspective of an 
isolationist U.S. foreign policy up till the Spanish–American War of 
1898, where the war is seen as the start of an American “empire” rather 
than its culmination. In fact, the contemporary empire literature ar-
gues there is little reason to categorize 1898 as a “break” in the his-
tory of U.S. foreign policy at all. Indeed, Henry Cabot Lodge might 
agree. As he noted in the debate over what to do about the Philippines 
during the Spanish–American War, empire was nothing new to the 
United States – it had been practicing it for over one hundred years. 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that at the time of the 
American Revolution the connotations of “empire” were not as omi-
nous as they often are today. The revolutionaries had themselves re-
volted against defective imperial governance – “a corrupt and grasping 
administration that was determined to enrich the metropolis while 
beggaring its distant provinces” – embracing an “improved, republi-
canized version of the imperial ideal in projecting the prosperity and 
freedom of their expanding union of states.”88 Any negative associa-
tions with “empire” had thus been purged through the Revolution 
and the breaking of ties with the British corrupt version of it. By vin-
dicating their independence, then, the revolutionaries would vindicate 
the “imperial idea, the great legacy of antiquity and the great hope of 
progressive and enlightened peoples everywhere.”89 There was, in this 
sense of the word, a widespread consciousness among the Founding 
Fathers that they were the architects of a great empire.90
In this new paradigm, the founding of the United States of America 
was not an act of isolation, then, but rather the inauguration of a Novus 
ordo Seclorum – a new order for the ages (the motto on the reverse side 
of the United States Great Seal). In 1774, Royal American Magazine 
wrote that Americans found it plausible that one day “the knee of 
empires and splendid kingdoms” would “bow to” America’s “great-
ness”; “the spirit of freedom” exemplified by the colonies would spread 
from “pole to pole” and then America would “be the glory and the 
87 Weeks, Building the Continental Empire, x. 
88 Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire, 58.
89 Ibid., 59.
90 Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas 
Jefferson (New York, Oxford University Press, 1990), viii.
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astonishment of the whole earth.”91 As Burns puts it, it would scarcely 
be an exaggeration to say “America became an empire before she be-
came a state.”92 Thus, from the inception of the Republic, American 
leaders expressed lofty visions for this future empire of the Americas. 
Expansionism was an integral part of the building of this empire, and, 
as previously mentioned, is intimately connected to the rejection of an 
isolationist/internationalist dichotomy. The fact that the Americans 
did not see themselves as invaders, aggressors, or occupiers does not 
invalidate this thesis, since most expansive people – such as the Greeks 
and the Romans, for instance – tend not to do so.
As mentioned above, the new paradigm is still competing with 
the old one, however. Prominent historian Walter Russell Mead states 
that there are two basic views among students of U.S. foreign policy 
today. One school sees a distinct break between an early American tra-
dition of reticence and modesty on the international stage and a later and 
more “problematic” era of assertiveness and expansionism (with the 
year 1898 seen as dividing the two ages). The other school connects 
important features of twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy (expan-
sionism, assertiveness, imperial ambition) in American history dating 
back to the colonial era.93 Indeed, current scholarship still straddles 
the expansionism–isolationism issue rather uncomfortably, and, as al-
ways, political science is rather slow in absorbing the latest insights 
from history. Political scientist Patrick Stewart argues, for example, 
that for most of the nineteenth century, “the dominant strain in U.S. 
security policy remained isolationism with a unilateral thrust.”94 As 
a rule, he argues, the United States kept political engagement with 
other nations to a minimum, but, “closer to home, the United States 
moved first toward continental domination – creating Jefferson’s ‘empire 
of liberty’ – and then regional hegemony.”95 Here, Patrick is arguing 
that hegemony in the Western Hemisphere is compatible with isola-
tionism, an argument that seems more than a little Eurocentric. The 
argument of “isolationist expansion” only holds if we assume that the 
acquisition of new territory, previously not belonging to one’s country, 
somehow falls within the realm of domestic, as opposed to foreign, policy.
91 Royal American Magazine 1 (1774): 10, quoted in Greene, The Intellectual Construction of 
America, 164.
92 Burns, America’s Mission, 259. William Earl Weeks even argues the federal union was 
set up in order to create an empire (along with ensuring the security of the states). See 
Building the Continental Empire, ix.
93 Mead, “Review: Habits of Empire.”
94 Stewart, The Best Laid Plans, 5.
95 Ibid.
DSS3_2010.indd   31 07.01.2011   14:53:49
 32 Defence and Security Studies 3-2010
Thus, whereas the concept of isolationism has been discarded, the 
foreign policy dichotomy separating an early tradition of “reticence” 
or “modesty” from a later tradition of assertive internationalism is still 
employed. 
Unilateral internationalism
Discarding the “isolationist” paradigm and accepting the “interna-
tionalist” still leaves us with questions. One might still argue that 
there was a significant break in the execution of U.S. international-
ism after the Spanish–American War, or the First World War, or the 
Second World War, perhaps to such a degree that one should speak of 
different kinds of internationalism. As we shall see in chapter 4, many 
authors separate a unilateral from a multilateral period in U.S. foreign 
policy. In contrast, I argue that the United States has been pursuing 
unilateral internationalism since the very beginning of the Republic, 
and that it did not abandon this overarching strategy after either of the 
two world wars.
Internationalism prior to 1898
Whereas the Civil War did turn attention inward for the United 
States, it quickly regained its post-bellum foothold on the internation-
al scene. Indeed, the Spanish–American War, rather than being the 
“great aberration” in U.S. foreign policy, should be characterized as the 
“great culmination,” Ernest Paolino has argued.96 Notably, the U.S. 
naval build-up preceded the Spanish–American War. At the time of the 
Samoan controversy 1889–90, the U.S. Navy was the sixth largest in 
the world (122,000 tons).97 In 1907 the United States was in second 
place, but was surpassed again by Germany in 1911.98 There was no 
cyclical withdrawal from the world after the imperial adventure in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. The Spanish–American war was followed 
by the enunciation of the Open Door policy aimed at the European 
empires to gain access to China; participation in the First International 
Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899 (and the establishment of the 
96 Paolino, The Foundations of the American Empire, 212.
97 After Great Britain (802,000), France (515,000), Russia (246,000), Italy (203,000), 
and Germany (188,000). See Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt: Foreign Policy of the 
United States, 1913–1945 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), 10–11. 
98 Ibid. The 1907–1909 voyage of the U.S. Fleet to the Pacific was ordered by Theodore 
Roosevelt after consulting with Mahan, and Roosevelt also advised his senators and 
representatives in an official message to read Mahan’s works.
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Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899, to which the United States 
was a party and supporter); and then in 1900 the United States actu-
ally contributed 5,000 troops to an international expeditionary force 
that put down the Boxer Rebellion in China.99 In 1904, the Roosevelt 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine established America’s right to in-
tervene in any country in the Americas (over the next twenty years 
marines landed in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Haiti, 
and Mexico). In 1905, Roosevelt mediated the peace treaty between 
Russia and Japan, an effort for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize. In 
his 1910 Nobel Peace Prize Address he would call on the great powers 
to form a League of Peace.100 
To be clear, “anti-intervention” arguments have been voiced at var-
ious points in American history – for instance by the anti-imperialists 
in the 1890s. However, such voices have consistently been drowned 
out and have lost out in the political realm, meaning that while present 
they have not been very influential. It is perfectly fair to acknowledge 
anti-interventionist sentiments in American history, but to craft a 
long-standing “isolationist” or simply “reticent” foreign policy tradi-
tion out of this is, I argue, wholly incorrect.
The tendency to divide American foreign policy into two periods 
– before and after the Spanish–American War – is perhaps understand-
able, but it is misleading. It creates the impression of a break with the 
past, of a new United States of America after the Spanish–American 
War, ready to take on the mantle of a Great Power. As this chapter has 
shown, in no way was the United States “isolationist,” aloof, or sepa-
rate in its foreign policy up to this point.
The nation was, quite simply, in its early years, “neither isolated 
nor isolationist,” which sums up the current academic paradigm.101 
Some new scholarship seems to have merely substituted “separateness” 
for “isolationism,” however, and still endorses the view of American 
foreign policy history as dichotomous: “isolationist” or “separate” be-
fore the Spanish–American War, or the World Wars, definitively “in-
ternationalist” or “integrationist” after the Second World War. But 
not only is there a serious lag in matching the term (separate) with the 
99 Jonas, “Isolationism,” 340–41; Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World. Amer-
ica’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-
versity, 2005), 61.
100 John Milton Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the fight for 
the League of Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11. Theodore 
Roosevelt’s Nobel lecture was held on May 5, 1910, <online>.
101 Jonas, “Isolationism,” 340.
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new historiographic consensus (the United States was never isolation-
ist), the term isolationism itself refuses to die. Indeed, in the 1990s 
there was again a debate over whether the United States would return 
to “isolationism” due to the lack of any perceived external threat to 
national security after the end of the Cold War. Isolationism lives on 
both in scholarly works and vividly as accepted common wisdom.102 
Even if we can acknowledge that isolationism is not a historic tradi-
tion, the United States still definitively turned “internationalist” in 
1945, the argument goes, which only attests to the short-sighted and 
twentieth-century-centric perspective on American foreign policy, 
particularly within political science. 
The United States, as seen in this chapter, did not wait for its 
Great Power status to “aim at an ascendant in the system of American 
affairs,” as Alexander Hamilton once advocated. Rather, it wasted no 
time in promptly stretching across a vast continent as well as across 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.103 “Taming the frontier,” pursuing 
manifest destiny, promoting commerce, advancing the Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant civilization, picking up the “White Man’s Burden,” pursu-
ing the “liberation and salvation of the world,” making the world “safe 
for democracy,” and, finally, leading the “Free World” were all acts of 
unilateral internationalism. 
102 Paul Johnson, “The Myth of American Isolationism – Reinterpreting the Past,” For-
eign Affairs (May/June 1995).
103 Hamilton quoted in Gilbert, Farewell Address, 133; see also Federalist 11.
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Chapter 2
Wilsonian vs. Lodgian 
internationalism
It is often said that when the United States committed to the United 
Nations in 1945, it vindicated Woodrow Wilson’s failed quest to get a 
U.S. membership of the League of Nations in 1919. Realizing its ear-
lier mistake of refusing membership of the League, the United States 
now turned its back on “isolationism” and permanently committed 
itself to multilateral internationalism. Such an analysis rests on the 
assumption that the League of Nations and the United Nations were 
comparable organizations (especially in terms of their demands upon 
U.S. sovereignty), which the two case study chapters here presented 
will argue they were not. Nor is it an obvious statement that reject-
ing the League of Nations amounted to “isolationism.” This chapter 
will present case studies of the “League fight” and the interwar period 
in order to assess the plausibility of my argument, which is that the 
rejection of the League of Nations did not amount to the validation of 
a tradition of “isolationism” in U.S. foreign policy. I will end by chal-
lenging the argument – intimately connected to the turn-around the-
sis – that it was the exogenous shock of Pearl Harbor that finally ended 
“isolationism” and pushed the United States toward internationalism.
The First World War and the “League fight”
Wilson and Lodge: internationalism on a continuum
The legendary rise and fall of Woodrow Wilson and his mission to 
“make the world safe for democracy” is one of the most evocative ex-
amples of the gripping fight for the soul of American foreign policy, 
casting the foreign policy traditions discussed earlier in dramatic roles. 
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Wilson’s failed quest for world leadership did not, however, vindi-
cate a foreign policy tradition of aloofness; rather the Wilson–Lodge 
dispute is evidence of the strong unilateral internationalist tradition in 
American foreign policy. 
Wilson 
Woodrow Wilson may have been labeled an “idealist” by later real-
ists, but he in fact applied a nationalist perspective to America’s new 
world role.104 Specifically, he argued that the United States and its 
system offered the world its best hope for enduring peace. Indeed, the 
reason for Wilson’s initial favoring of U.S. neutrality and for its en-
try into the war were much the same: Making sure the United States 
would be the main arbiter of the peace negotiations, in other words 
ensuring U.S. supervision of the postwar order, meant to herald an 
era of American reformation of European balance-of-power politics.105 
The League, Wilson believed, would “enable the American nation to 
provide worldwide leadership largely through its moral influence over 
public opinion, and thus fulfill its God-given destiny.”106 
President Wilson set out on no less than a mission to reform the 
Old World, pointing back to America’s original purpose: “It was of 
this we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way.”107 
The League was not simply to be an instrument of international law; it 
also promised a new morality. The fact that Wilson came to believe the 
104 The historiography of Wilson and the League has gone through several stages. The ear-
ly works focused on Wilson’s mental state, such as Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, 
Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1956) and 
Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). Arthur S. Link, drew upon physiological facts to 
counter the psychological analysis, arguing that Wilson’s strokes contributed to his 
stubbornness and inability to compromise with Lodge, as opposed to his psychological 
relationship with his father. John Milton Cooper, Link’s student, also focuses on the 
health aspect, in addition to the political differences between Lodge and Wilson. See 
Cooper Breaking the Heart of the World. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, on the other hand, argues 
that Wilson was consistently stubborn and unwilling to compromise with Lodge both 
before and after his stroke in the fall of 1919. See Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the 
Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ambrosius, 
Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 141. Ambrosius as well as William Widenor rightly point 
to the failure of the previously cited works in acknowledging the real political differ-
ences between the positions represented by Wilson and Lodge. 
105 Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 422. Robert W. Tucker argues Wilson sincerely 
wanted to stay out of the war, but that this became untenable with German submarine 
warfare, which challenged America’s traditional neutral rights. See Robert W. Tucker, 
Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914–1917 (Char-
lottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2007).
106 Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 422.
107 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Democracy, Peace, and World Order,” in Reconsidering Woodrow 
Wilson, ed. John Milton Cooper (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2008), 233.
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United States could still play the role of neutral arbiter despite having 
entered the war on the side of the Triple Entente (England, France, and 
Russia) simply shows the extent of his faith in the special leadership 
role he envisioned for the United States. 
Just as Franklin Delano Roosevelt would two decades later, Wilson 
set out to organize the postwar world before the United States was of-
ficially involved in the war. In other words, there was no single, ex-
ogenous shock that prompted Wilson to “turn” internationalist. After 
several aborted attempts to get the belligerents to let the United States 
negotiate a peace, Wilson and his advisors decided in January 1917 to 
send a message to the U.S. Senate proclaiming that the United States 
would negotiate a “peace without victory.”108 This would be founded 
on principles like freedom of the seas and self-determination, which 
were “American principles,” said Wilson, but not simply American 
principles. They were also “the principles and policies of forward look-
ing men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every en-
lightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must 
prevail.”109 Thus, whether neutral or belligerent, the United States 
would shape the new world order. 
Most important for our purposes, Wilson held the belief that 
the League would be a vehicle for American leadership in the world. 
It would allow the United States to participate in international af-
fairs “without entangling itself in Europe’s wars. It would combine 
American unilateralism with a new multilateralism.”110 Thus, Wilson-
scholar Lloyd E. Ambrosius concludes, it would permit the United 
States to reform European international politics while preserving its 
own independence. In fact, Wilson was convinced the League would 
indirectly allow for American hegemony, although he never used that 
word.111 Multilateral cooperation would be utilized to implement 
America’s universal principles, but without sacrificing its unilateral 
decision-making.112 What Wilson could not do, was convince Henry 
Cabot Lodge of this important fact. This was a fatal error, as Lodge 
by virtue of his position as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
108 Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt, 53. This would be founded on the right of peoples 
to rule themselves, freedom of the seas, disarmament, and a League of Nations to over-
see all this.
109 Woodrow Wilson, “A World League for Peace,” speech January 22, 1917, <online>.
110 Ambrosius, “Democracy, Peace, and World Order,” 227.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., 228.
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Committee was in charge of shepherding the Treaty of Versailles 
through the Senate for ratification.
Lodge
While not as exuberantly moralistic as Wilson, Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge, was “subject to attacks of national euphoria,” Lodge-scholar 
William Widenor writes, and in those times “he thought America ca-
pable of influencing the course of world history.”113 Lodge had long ad-
vocated a “vigorous” foreign policy, favoring American power through 
building up the navy, as well as continental dominance, the sine qua 
non of which was the Monroe Doctrine.114 
Lodge’s primary ideological objection to the League has nothing 
to do with isolationism, then, but rather with the possibility of ced-
ing too much American sovereignty. One fundamental point separated 
Lodge and Wilson on the League: Wilson thought it would allow for 
American leadership, Lodge did not. That did not mean he was nega-
tive toward the idea of a league. In fact, the idea of an international 
organization to enforce peace had its American roots with Lodge’s close 
friend, Theodore Roosevelt, who, in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance 
speech in 1910, urged the great powers to form a “League of Peace.”115 
In the spring of 1915, Lodge, in a commencement address at Union 
College in Schenectady, NY, argued for unity among the great powers 
to resist aggression and deny states the option of going to war, “and 
they can only say that effectively when the country desiring war knows 
that the force which the united nations place behind peace is irresist-
ible.” In this speech, it seems Lodge coined the name of the future 
peacekeeping world body.116 
The second important point to remember is that Lodge did not 
endorse the same kind of League in 1915 that Wilson would later advo-
cate. Lodge endorsed American participation in a “league of victors,” 
113 William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 64.
114 Ibid., 70, 105.
115 Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 11. Roosevelt’s Nobel lecture was held on 
May 5, 1910, <online>. The idea lay rather dormant until the Great War broke out, 
at which point Roosevelt argued in several articles in the fall of 1914 for an “in-
ternational posse comitatus.” Cited in Theodore Roosevelt, “An International Posse 
Comitatus,” New York Times, November 8, 1914. See also “The Belgian Tragedy,” 
Outlook, September 23, 1914; “How to Strive for Peace,” New York Times, October 18, 
1914. These can all be found in Hermann Hagedorn, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, 
[National Edition], XVIII. 
116 Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 12. My italics. In the summer of 1915, the 
League to Enforce Peace was established with former Republican president William 
Howard Taft as its president. This organization became the strongest advocate for 
American membership in a League.
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but not necessarily a general league, as he conceived of the league as 
a means of getting the United States to stand with the Entente (in 
particular, Britain). Thus, Lodge had a fairly consistent internationalist, 
but pro-Allied stance, not necessarily a general pro-League stance.117 
Upon Wilson’s peace initiative in December 1918, Lodge publicly ac-
cused Wilson of being partial towards Germany and privately lament-
ed ever having been “mixed up with” the League to Enforce Peace (an 
American pro-League organization).118 He endorsed Senator Philander 
Knox’s “New American Doctrine,” which declared the domination of 
Europe by an aggressive military power to be a menace to American 
national security, and he argued that should such a situation arise in 
the future, the United States would join again with the Allies.119 
Implications
The “League fight” was not a fight pitting internationalism against 
“isolationism”/aloofness, then, but rather one pitting various versions 
of American internationalism against each other. The unilateral inter-
nationalism of Henry Cabot Lodge fought against the “liberal interna-
tionalism” of Woodrow Wilson, with both camps disagreeing with the 
“Irreconcilables” led by senators William Borah and Hiram Johnson.120 
Wilson faced opposition both on the right and the left. By the 
summer of 1919, after liberals perceived their ideals badly betrayed 
by the final Versailles Treaty (which was seen as conceding too much 
on Wilson’s principles to placate the European Great Powers who 
were seeking revenge over Germany), The New Republic and its edi-
tors, Walter Lippman and Herbert Croly, turned against the League. 
117 Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, 228–29. The Republican platform of 1916 did endorse 
“pacific settlements of international disputes and … the establishment of a world 
court,” but it did not include a plank endorsing the League to Enforce Peace (LEP) 
program, reportedly due to Lodge’s urgings. See Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 
17. Wilson’s “Peace without Victory” speech was met mostly with Republican deri-
sion (although party elders Elihu Root and Charles Evans Hughes remained silent), 
with the most formidable opposition coming from Lodge himself.
118 Ibid., 20. 
119 Ibid., 304.
120 The Irreconcilables were those senators opposed to U.S. membership in any kind of 
League of Nations. After the 1918 midterm elections, the make-up of the Senate was 
47 Democrats to 49 Republicans. 
 Within the Democratic party, there were four Irreconcilables; within the Republican 
party, fourteen Irreconcilables (called “the Battalion of Death”), with William Borah 
serving as their leader. There were also twelve to fourteen “mild reservationists” led 
by future Secretary of State Frank Kellogg (MN); twenty to twenty-five “strong reser-
vationists” led by future president Warren G. Harding (OH) and Lodge. In that one 
needed a two-thirds vote in favor of a treaty, the “inescapable conclusion was that a 
two-thirds majority could not be obtained without giving in to some amendments, 
more or less substantial.” The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, now led by Lodge, 
had four Irreconcilables (out of seventeen members), obviously a much greater propor-
tion than in the Senate as a whole. See Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt, 111–113.
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Progressive Republican from California, Hiram Johnson, described the 
settlement and possible U.S. membership of the League as “the halt-
ing and betrayal of New World liberalism, the triumph of cynical Old 
World diplomacy, the humiliation and end of American idealism.”121
Despite such resistance, the irony in the Senate’s failure to ratify 
the Covenant of the League of Nations is found in the simple fact that 
there was a majority in favor of U.S. membership in the League. In 
April 1919, Literary Digest published the results of a vast poll: 718 
newspapers representing 9,886,449 readers were favorable to the 
League; 181 newspapers representing 4,326,882 readers were hostile; 
478 newspapers representing 6,792,461 readers were favorable under 
certain conditions.122 Despite the fact that a majority of senators and 
the public were in favor of American leadership in European affairs, 
the Irreconcilables won by default.
The immediate reason the Irreconcilables won was because Wilson 
and Lodge could not agree on the issue of reservations, preventing 
a majority for ratification to emerge in the Senate. The philosophi-
cal reason, however, was that they could not agree on what American 
membership of the League meant for American leadership in interna-
tional affairs. Thus, Wilson and the Republican moderates all wished 
for American leadership and involvement in European affairs – in fact, 
Republican leaders such as William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, and 
Lodge himself were all in favor of an alliance involving France and 
Great Britain.123 In their view, however, the League of Nations prom-
ised to treat the United States a little too much as “a nation among 
nations” rather than a leader among nations. This was thus about uni-
lateralism, not isolationism.
The single fact of rejecting membership in the League has none-
theless come to symbolize American “isolationism” or aloofness in the 
“interwar period.” Rejection of the League is a poor indicator of the 
level of “internationalism” in American interwar policies, however. In 
fact, the election of 1920 was not the “referendum for isolation” that 
Senator Borah thought it was. The first decade of the interwar period 
121 Senator Johnson, June 2, 1919, quoted in Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 73. Thomas 
Knock’s argument is that Wilson partly lost the League fight not because of the op-
position from the right, but because he allowed his progressive coalition of 1916 to 
unravel. See To End All Wars, 268.
122 Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt, 96. 
123 See Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the Treaty Fight in Perspective; Milton Cooper, Brea-
king the Heart of the World, 42. Lodge supported the Treaties of Guarantee, in which the 
United States and Great Britain pledged to aid France in the event of another German 
attack. See Widenor, 331.
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entailed a high level of U.S. political, economic, and security activity 
in Europe. The voters were registering their dissatisfaction with the 
Wilson administration, as well as the problems brought on by the war 
and its aftermath, but a vote for Warren G. Harding – Republican 
presidential candidate and winner of the 1920 election – was not a 
vote against the League.124 In fact, the “Statement of Thirty-One” – 
a document released to the press on October 15, 1920 by a group 
of impressive Republican pro-Leaguers (including Root, Taft, Henry 
Stimson, and Herbert Hoover) stated that voters could “most effec-
tively advance the cause of international co-operation to promote peace 
by supporting Mr. Harding for election to the Presidency.” The effort 
was designed to prevent electoral defection of pro-League voters to the 
Democratic candidate, James Cox.125 Thus, these Republican lumi-
naries all favored American participation in the League (albeit with 
reservations) and they thought this was a winning electoral strategy.
In conclusion, the United States would only have become a mem-
ber of the League had the Treaty of Versailles been passed with Lodge’s 
reservations, making allowance for U.S. freedom of action within the 
organization – in other words, facilitate unilateral internationalism.126
The interwar period
The “interwar period” has generally been portrayed as a failure of U.S. 
foreign policy, which has been blamed on “isolationist” or aloof senti-
ment. Political scientist Jeffrey Frieden, for instance, has argued that 
the “inconsistent” American interwar policies were the result of com-
peting “internationalist” and “isolationist” economic and political in-
terests within the U.S. government.127 One cannot subsume the years 
from 1919 to 1941 under one category, however. First, the 1920s were 
generally thought of as a foreign policy success. Second, the United 
States employed both unilateral and multilateral internationalist 
124 Robert Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During the 
Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 10.
125 The immediate cause of this effort on the part of the Republican Party elders was to 
counteract the perceived malicious influence exercised by Senators Borah and Johnson 
over Harding. See Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 394.
126 Widenor concludes that Lodge sincerely favored ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 
but with reservations. See Henry Cabot Lodge, 333.
127 Jeffry A. Frieden, “Sectoral Conflicts and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: 1914–1940,” 
International Organization 42, no.1 (winter 1988); see also Melvyn P. Leffler, “Politi-
cal Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or Diplomatic Realism: American Policy 
toward Western Europe 1921–1933,” Perspectives in American History, 8 (1974); Iken-
berry, After Victory; and E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939).
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foreign policy strategies during this period, rather than stay aloof. The 
1930s are of course universally condemned as a foreign policy failure, 
but this is not a characteristic unique to the United States, and fur-
thermore it overlooks the changes that commenced with Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s second administration in 1936.
1921–29: Republican internationalism
That the Republican Party took an active approach to internation-
al politics in the 1920s is currently accepted in the literature. The 
prominent Republican Secretaries of State – Charles Evans Hughes 
and Henry Stimson – engaged in “resourceful, creative diplomacy that 
contributed greatly to international order and stability.”128 Not only 
did Hughes persuade President Harding that the United States should 
join the World Court, he sought to foster a transatlantic community of 
“ideals, interests and purposes” in 1923–24.129 In 1923, Senator Lodge 
argued for a strong international judiciary to serve as an alternative to 
war, and Senator William Borah was one of the Republicans who spear-
headed the movement for naval disarmament.130 Institutionalizing na-
val disarmament as advocated by Senator Borah; making the Open 
Door Policy towards China universal policy among the signatories; 
and breaking up the Anglo–Japanese alliance was, at that moment 
anyway, proof of very successful American leadership in internation-
al politics.131 In fact, whereas the Irreconcilables may have been op-
posed to the League, they seemed to be highly internationalist (albeit 
in a selective manner) as they advocated their own schemes for what 
they believed to be a “stabler, juster world order.”132 Thus, whereas 
the Republicans rejected the Versailles system, they did not reject the 
Lodgian goal of interfering in European politics. As the protracted 
128 Patrick O. Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain, and the Sta-
bilisation of Europe, 1991–1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8. 
129 Ibid. Elihu Root had been one of the authors of the statute for a permanent court of 
international justice. The problem was that the Court was the League’s Court. The 
text did not pass Senate muster until 1926, at which point it contained so many res-
ervations that the members of the League of Nations refused to accept it. See Cooper, 
Breaking the Heart of the World, 399; Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt, 146–47. 
130 Arms limitation was an American policy objective during the Republican ascendancy, 
but this was not isolationism or unrealistic politics. Rather, “government officials and 
their business supporters tried to formulate and implement disarmament proposals in 
a pragmatic and hardheaded way that would leave American defenses unimpaired,” 
argues Leffler, in “Political Isolationism”: 436.
131 In fact, despite failures and antagonisms between the United States, Britain, and Ja-
pan, this effort remained the only successful arms reductions until the 1980s.
132 Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945, in Warren I. Cohen, ed. The Cam-
bridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. III (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 75; Patrick Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace, 81.
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“Versailles crisis” unfolded 1920–23 the Republican policymakers fo-
cused on the economic stabilization of Europe instead of what they 
deemed to have been Wilsonian “idealism.”133
The one person who was not taking initiatives in foreign policy, 
however, was the president himself, Warren G. Harding. Having 
straddled the issues of the League and international engagement rather 
skillfully during the election, it was anybody’s guess where he would 
come down after the election victory. Lodge held out hope for “some 
new treaty or agreement with our Allies” (since Wilson had made a 
potential security alliance with France and Great Britain dependent 
on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate), but such 
initiatives never came from Harding.134 
The initial American postwar strategy was thus somewhat bifur-
cated: trust in continued prosperity, advocated by the president and 
Secretary of Commerce Herbert C. Hoover, versus increased U.S. 
involvement in European politics, advocated by Secretary of State 
Hughes. The former strategy was grounded in the belief that pros-
perity would lubricate Versailles treaty revision, end the appeal of 
Bolshevism, ease the burden of debts, and enable European recovery 
without much American sacrifice.135 But Hughes’ strategy was more 
ambitious, and historian Patrick Cohrs credits Hughes with a reorien-
tation of U.S. foreign policy toward Europe in the wake of deteriorat-
ing Franco-German relations after 1922. In fact, Cohrs argues that the 
“new and improved” Anglo-American cooperation fostered by Hughes 
and British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald paved the way for the 
first “real” peace settlement after World War I: the London repara-
tions settlement of 1924.136 Negotiated between the western powers 
and Germany, it laid the foundations for the Dawes war debt regime 
and Europe’s “economic peace” of the mid-1920s. Furthermore, this 
“Pax Anglo-Americana” could not have endured without the political 
security settlement, the Locarno pact of 1925. This was, in effect, a 
133 Patrick Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace, 81–83. This economic stabilization was modeled 
on the earlier U.S. policy of “Open Door” economic policy, promoting a non-discrim-
inatory system of bilateral trade agreements, as opposed to a “closed system” of high 
tariffs, cartels, and other trade-restrictive means. This still meant there was a strong 
pro-American bias to this policy, in terms of containing strong protectionist compo-
nents beneficial to the world’s leading exporter of capital and goods. 
134  Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 78; Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, 347.
135 Leffler, “Political Isolationism”: 422. 
136 Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace, 9, 85. Cohrs labels this the “Hughes doctrine,” which es-
sentially was an internationalized Monroe Doctrine, promoting the United States as 
the benign hegemonic power within the Western Hemisphere, and pursuing informal 
influence outside of it.
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western-oriented concert of Europe – one that incorporated Germany. 
Cohrs thus argues against the thesis that the diplomacy of the 1920s 
was inherently flawed and bound to fail (by failing to prevent the 
Great Depression or the rise of Nazism). 
The United States certainly had a strong hand when dealing with 
Europe: it was able to shape European events through its economic, 
cultural, and political predominance. American power was acutely 
felt, and even when pressure was not directly exerted, European states-
men always had to consider how American capital would react to their 
initiatives and actions. Essentially foreshadowing post-World War II 
American “multilateralism,” a British financier sighed: “No country 
is independent except the United States, which secures independence 
through its dominion over all others.”137 In fact, Republican interna-
tionalists such as Stimson and Felix Frankfurter believed they were 
maximizing their influence in European affairs by staying outside of 
the League of Nations and withholding a security commitment from 
France.138 
 In the fall of 1929 it seemed reasonable to expect U.S. involve-
ment in European affairs would only deepen. Not only was it a com-
mercial power that could not overlook the importance of order and 
stability in the international arena,139 but the United States had also 
taken a deep interest in the political situation of the European powers. 
Prospects for the post-Versailles order seemed promising. Indeed, in 
the late 1920s, “military studies concluded that the international en-
vironment was calm and that there was no need for immediate military 
preparations for war.”140 
1929–39: nationalism, not isolationism 
As is well known, the American strategy of influencing internation-
al politics mainly through economic policies proved unworkable in 
the face of the Great Depression.141 Whereas one might criticize the 
London and Locarno settlements for not weathering the deterioration 
in international relations, it is also clear that the Great Depression 
137 Statement by J. R. Bellerby in Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Internatio-
nal Gold Problem (London, 1931) 16) quoted in Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 264.
138 Leffler, “Political Isolationism”:443.
139 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse.
140 Leffler, “Political Isolationism”: 435.
141 Costigliola, Awkward Dominion. 
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was a crisis of unprecedented proportions.142 The bursting of the stock 
market bubble in October 1929 set in motion events that temporarily 
destroyed the international community. Selig Adler, in his classic ac-
count, stressed that this caused a “new isolationism,” a thesis George 
C. Herring reiterates in his latest book.143
Adler’s definition of isolationism was that the “new isolationists” 
were “hemispherists, rather than continentalists,” and that they were 
also economic isolationists in addition to political isolationists.144 
Two factors brought about this “new isolationism” (which Adler con-
trasted with the “superficial detachment of the previous decade”): the 
Depression and the subsequent wave of aggression that ultimately de-
stroyed Versailles.145 The optimistic view on future prosperity in the 
1920s, Adler argued, led to the problem of “entanglements arising 
from a policy of nonentanglement.” Herring argues the “passionate 
1930s quest to insulate the nation from foreign entanglements fully 
merits the label isolationist.”146 
But non-entanglement was not isolationism, and Adler’s and 
Herring’s definitions of isolationism are thus problematic. Senator 
Borah for example – previous leader of the Irreconcilables – was not 
only instrumental in convening the Washington Naval Conference 
of 1921–22, he in fact did more than any other man to bring about 
the approval of the Kellogg–Briand Pact in the Senate in 1929.147 As 
such, Borah was against “entanglements” yet favored an “active” for-
eign policy. 
The fallacies of the term “isolationism” have been duly covered by 
historians, but nevertheless interwar isolationism – especially for the 
142 Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace, 614. Leffler argues U.S. diplomacy in the 1920s became 
“complacent and overly decentralized,” the prosperity generated ironically producing 
a feeling that there was “plenty of time to grapple with potential problems.” See “Ex-
pansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints,” 255–56.
143 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 239; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 485.
144 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 240.
145 Ibid., 243.
146 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 502. And there certainly were virulent anti-in-
volvement groups. The Nye Committee in the Senate, headed by Gerald P. Nye (R-
ND), met between 1934 and 1936 to study the causes of United States’ involvement 
in World War I. John Milton Cooper argues that newspaper headlines on the sinister 
machinations of the munitions industry in pushing the United States into the war 
contributed to a retrospective shift of public opinion against intervention and Wilson, 
and contributed to the Neutrality Acts. Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 402. 
147 Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1966), 49. Whereas one can easily criticize the Kellogg–Briand Pact for be-
ing unrealistic, it fit into the larger scheme of Republican interwar internationalism, 
where “American officials hoped that the slow evolution of arms limitations treaties, 
judicial processes, arbitration agreements, and antiwar pacts would gradually turn 
men’s energy and attention from military preparations to economic undertakings.” See 
Leffler, “Expansionism, Domestic Constraints,” 239.
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1930s – has stubbornly persisted in academe and popular history alike, 
thus making the “turn-around” thesis seem plausible.148 Certainly 
there existed a small group of congressmen and voters who could plau-
sibly be labeled “isolationists” if one defined the term rather broadly. 
But a “broad” definition is precisely the problem. The definition is 
so broad, in fact, one would have to agree that the isolationists were 
actually expansionists, as Franz Schurmann argued: “the true heirs of 
‘manifest destiny.’”149 They saw “a glorious future” beyond America’s 
borders, but they saw it more so in East Asia and Latin America than 
in Europe or Africa.150 As such, isolationism was not really isolation-
ism at all, but rather geographically specific internationalism. There was 
nothing isolationist about advocating hemispheric dominance and 
Asian market penetration. 
Reinhold Niebuhr said it best when he warned in 1930 that 
Americans were “awkward imperialists” – attempting to manage their 
wealth and the world with the same economic, informal methods 
which had created the wealth in the first place.151 Niebuhr’s “awkward 
imperialists,” Jonas’ “isolationists”152 and Adler’s and Herring’s “new 
isolationists” were, in conclusion, unilateralists and nationalists, not 
isolationists. 
With the international order of the 1920s giving way to the anar-
chy of the 1930s, the United States did, however, temporarily resort 
to economic and political nationalism.153 Whereas open door capitalism 
remained important to U.S. foreign policy in this era, these foreign 
policies “remained of distinctly secondary importance to domestic 
concerns and to prevailing practices of privatism and independent 
internationalism.”154 It was the domestic market that was the primary 
148 Akira Iriye writes that “Roosevelt’s first administration echoed the isolationist senti-
ment of the public and emphasized avoidance of trouble,” and that there was “Ameri-
can isolationism” during the 1930s. See Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America Vol. 
III, Warren Cohen, ed., The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 146. See also Weinberg, “The Historical Meaning 
of the Doctrine of Isolation”: 539–547; Adler, The Isolationist Impulse; Duroselle, From 
Wilson to Roosevelt; Tucker, A New Isolationism; Manfred Jonas, “Isolationism.”
149 Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 57.
150 Ibid.
151 Costigliola, Awkward Dominion; See Niebuhr, “Awkward Imperialists,” Atlantic 
Monthly 145 (June 1930): 670–72.
152 See Isolationism in America, 35 for Jonas’ categorization of five different isolationist 
groupings.
153 Meaning economic protectionism and unilateralism in political and security affairs. 
Examples include the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, and Roosevelt’s rejection of 
the recommendations of the London Economic Conference in 1933.
154 Leffler “Expansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints, 1921–1932,” 227, 258. 
Leffler points out that when the depression emerged, there was not yet a threat from 
a totalitarian power, which allowed most policymakers to agree on the primacy of 
domestic issues.
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focus of the Hoover administration in the wake of the crash in 1929, 
and would continue to be so in Franklin Roosevelt’s first term as presi-
dent.155 In 1933, FDR chose the nationalist option over the interna-
tionalist one on each of his decisions on disarmament, trade, debt, and 
the currency question.156
Nationalism did not mean isolationism, however. In fact, with 
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 (violating the League Covenant, 
Hughes’ Washington Treaties (in which Japan had pledged to respect 
China’s borders), and the Kellogg–Briand Pact), the Hoover adminis-
tration “set an all-time record for close cooperation with the League,” 
although the president refused to permit any American actions that 
might risk war.157 The League did not stand up for Manchuria, and 
disappointed Americans who believed in collective action.
While clearly focused on domestic issues such as economic recov-
ery, this does not mean there were no diplomatic initiatives in these 
early years. Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to recognize the Soviet Union 
in November 1933 “did not yield immediate results but was pregnant 
with important implications for international relations,” Akira Iriye 
writes.158 FDR’s Latin America policy, named the Good Neighbor 
policy, was initiated with greater fanfare, and well-received in Latin 
America. There was also the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement – a 
reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 – which allowed 
Roosevelt to negotiate the lowering of tariffs on a bilateral basis – 
and some of its provisions would later be used as a prototype for the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).159 These agreements 
were made with Latin American countries, indicating a move toward 
greater regionalism, as opposed to globalism, which is why Iriye argues 
that the Good Neighbor policy and the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
were aspects of “American isolationism.” This analysis only holds, 
155 Legro argues FDR was an “ardent nationalist” in his first term who clearly gave prior-
ity to the domestic economic recovery rather than to international events. See Rethin-
king the World, 71.
156 Leffler, The Elusive Quest, 367.
157 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 245.
158 Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 146.
159 Ibid., 147–148. See also Michael J. Hogan, “Partisan Politics and the End of the Cold 
War,” in The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, 10th ed., ed. Hogan 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), who argues changes in the industrial 
structure (the emergence of large, capital intensive firms started rivaling small, labor 
intensive business for their political influence) made the New Deal coalition possible, 
which paved the way for internationalism in the form of the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1934. Whereas the “nationalist bloc,” as Hogan calls them, was still 
strong within the Republican party and was able to obstruct many internationalist 
attempts by the Democrats, the shift towards internationalism was “unmistakable” 
even in the early 1930s. 
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however, if greater engagement within the Western Hemisphere 
can be labeled “isolationism,” which seems illogical. The Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements in fact solidified the quasi-colonial relationship the 
United States had with the Central American countries, strengthening 
the dominant U.S. role in hemispheric commerce.160 
Early attempts at a forceful foreign policy met with mixed re-
sults. In 1935, FDR made the calculation that the Senate would fi-
nally approve U.S. admission to the World Court, as a careful poll 
had found that more than two-thirds of the senators were in favor. He 
thus saw little risk in submitting it for approval on January 16, 1935. 
The request, however, caught the eye of Father Charles Coughlin, the 
populist and xenophobic Detroit radio priest, along with the Hearst 
press.161 Their rabid reaction in the media inspired a ten-senator op-
position to grow to thirty-six, and the vote fell seven senators short 
of approval.162 In early 1936, however, Roosevelt’s support for a coop-
erative international monetary system was displayed in the Tripartite 
Monetary Agreement, specifically aimed at propping up the Western 
European democracies against German and Italian economic national-
ism.163 This directly reversed the position the United States had taken 
at the disastrous 1933 London Economic Conference, which is why 
Warren Kimball labels this later agreement the official renouncement 
of the economic nationalism of the early 1930s.164
 It seems clear that after he won his first reelection in the fall of 
1936, Roosevelt began taking more assertive action in foreign policy, 
exemplified by his “quarantine speech” in October 1937 (where he 
called for a quarantine against the aggressor nations).165 When the 
League of Nations proposed a conference to discuss the Sino–Japanese 
War, FDR and Secretary of State Cordell Hull supported it, and the 
United States attended the conference.166 Following the Panay incident 
160 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 501.
161 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 95.
162 Ibid., 96.
163 Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler, 188–189; Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency: 
Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941–1971 (Austin: University of 
Texas press, 1975), 26–27. According to Eckes, this agreement was a “giant stride 
toward Bretton Woods” by which the United States acquired the dominant position 
in international monetary relations it would hold until August 1971, when Richard 
Nixon suspended the convertibility of dollars and gold. 
164 Warren F. Kimball, “U.S. Economic Strategy in World War II: Wartime Goals, Peace-
time Plans,” in America Unbound: World War II and the Making of a Superpower, ed. 
Kimball (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 141.
165 See Miller Center of Public Affairs <online> for transcript and audio of the speech.
166 Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 158.
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– where Japanese military sank a U.S. gunboat on the Yangtze River 
China in December 1937, killing three Americans – FDR sent Chief 
of the U.S. Navy’s Intelligence, Captain Royal Ingersoll, to London for 
secret talks with his British counterpart on a possible joint strategy 
against Japan.167
The Neutrality Acts passed in the Senate between 1935 and 1939 
– seen as the epitome of isolationism168 – had a very mixed group of 
proponents. Some members of Congress were seeking noninvolvement, 
yes, but others wanted to use economic embargo as a weapon against 
aggression.169 Some were seeking to weaken the president to ensure 
he could not lead the United States into another war; another group 
wanted to strengthen the president’s ability to sanction aggressors: 
“Both groups confusingly used the neutrality legislation for this,” Bear 
Braumoeller argues. In fact, a House minority report on the Neutrality 
Act of 1937, objected to the Act on the grounds that it could be used 
as a weapon by the President to take the United States to war, thereby 
robbing Congress of its ability to declare war.170 At the end of 1937, 
Roosevelt also decided to sell military aircraft to France and Britain. 
This was not a violation of the neutrality acts, as there was no war in 
Europe, but it was an indication of the intention on the part of the 
United States to throw its hat in the ring. 
Neutrality legislation, the traditional barometer of U.S. isolation-
ism, did not in fact illustrate aloofness from the world; rather, the neu-
trality legislation was a result of the perceived low threat level to the 
United States. Whereas Americans realized Adolf Hitler was pursuing 
horrible policies, they believed American intervention was unneces-
sary because German weakness meant the democratic states of Europe 
were in no immediate danger of losing a potential war. In fact, Jonas 
noted this in his influential 1966 book on isolationism.171 
167 Ibid., 159. FDR did, however, refrain from taking more forceful steps.
168 Iriye argues the Neutrality Act of 1936 reconfirmed the isolationist thrust of FDR’s 
first presidential period. See The Globalizing of America, 154. The Acts of 1935, 1936, 
and 1937, prohibited the sale of munitions and other war-related products to all bel-
ligerents of a conflict, banned loans and commercial credits, barred American ships 
from belligerent waters, and forbade American citizens from traveling on ships of 
belligerent nations. 
169 Braumoeller, “Myth of American Isolationism”: 359. 
170 Ibid.. In Robert Osgood’s opinion, the neutrality laws were designed to “prevent the 
nation from committing the mistakes which were presumed to have led it into World 
War I.” See Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 367.
171 Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, and Jonas, Isolationism in America. Leffler also points out 
the lack of threat perceived in the 1920s and early 1930s, see “Expansionist Impulses 
and Domestic Constraints, 1921–1932” in Economics and World Power: An Assessment 
of American Diplomacy Since 1789, eds. William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 225–277.
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Public opinion and Pearl Harbor: their 
significance for U.S. internationalism
What is undeniable about the early 1930s, however, is that the 
American people – along with their president – focused primarily on 
domestic issues, as evidenced by nationalist economic legislation and 
unilateral security policies.172 It is absolutely true that the concern 
was first and foremost American economic recovery – not international 
peace and stability. 
Yet the tide against nationalism turned prior to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941. Before that, both public opinion and 
public actions within the United States supported increased involve-
ment with the war. Not only did Roosevelt take actions that would 
eventually make it impossible for the United States to stay out of the 
war, but as we shall see, there was a public opinion majority in sup-
port of these actions.173 Furthermore, the United States committed to a 
postwar political order in the form of the Atlantic Charter before it was 
a formal party to the war. 
The following discussion aims to show that the significance of 
“isolationism” in the late 1930s has been overplayed in the literature; 
and, related, that the “exogenous shock” of Pearl Harbor was not a 
necessary condition for U.S. involvement in world affairs.
Public opinion 
Public opinion polls from the 1930s have been utilized to show that the 
American public was highly “isolationist” in its attitudes to European 
events during this time.174 The widely cited statistics from 1935 and 
1936 showing that ninety-nine Americans out of a hundred would 
“regard as an imbecile anyone who might suggest that, in the event 
of another European war, the United States should again participate 
172 By “nationalist” policies, I mean economic legislation designed to insulate American 
consumers and producers from the international effects of the Great Depression, ex-
emplified by high tariffs such as those enacted with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 
1930. As noted by Robert M. Hathaway, Roosevelt had spoken very little of foreign 
affairs during the 1932 election. See “1933–1945: Economic Diplomacy in a Time of 
Crisis,” in Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy since 1789, 
eds. William H. Becker & Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984), 279.
173 John Chalberg ed., Isolationism: Opposing Viewpoints (San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 
1995), 136–37; Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 426. For one critical and one 
positive assessment of Roosevelt’s handling of foreign policy both before and during 
World War II, see Justus D. Doenecke and Mark Stoler’s respective essays in their 
edited volume, Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policies, 1933–1945 (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).
174 For instance, Geir Lundestad cites this statistic as evidence of pervasive isolationism in 
the 1930s. See The United States and Western Europe Since 1945, 23.
DSS3_2010.indd   50 07.01.2011   14:53:50
 U.S. foreign policy traditions 51
in it,” has been taken as straightforward evidence of such isolationist 
sentiment.175 But two issues must be kept in mind when utilizing sta-
tistics from this time period: threat perception and question wording. 
Threat perception
It has been commonplace to argue that “what ended isolationism was 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,”176 but public opinion polls at the 
time do not bear this thesis out. The evolving public opinion in the 
United States after the Nazi invasion of Poland shows that the public 
was in favor of intervention prior to Pearl Harbor, the most significant 
event in this timeframe being the fall of France.177
The statistics cited above from 1935 and 1936 reflected not only a 
general abhorrence of war, but more importantly, as Manfred Jonas has 
pointed out, such anti-interventionist opinion was based on the clear 
assumption that the coming struggle involved “no vital interests of the 
United States and could be settled in Europe and Asia.”178 Indeed, the 
infamous 1939 issue of Time magazine that made Hitler “Man of the 
Year,” also asserted that British control of the seas was superior and 
that the French Army was regarded as incomparable.179 Thus, the sta-
tistic saying that 95 percent of Americans thought the United States 
should keep out of war reflected the belief that France and England 
would successfully stand up to Germany.180 In other words, the statis-
tics on public “isolationism” must be seen in the context of an evolv-
ing threat perception.181
It seems unlikely that an ideological “isolationism” would be the 
cause of this low threat assessment in the 1930s, as Great Britain was 
guilty of the same underestimation of the Nazi threat. Perhaps re-
flecting their different geographical locations, Great Britain would 
revise this threat estimation after the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
extending unilateral security guarantees to Poland together with 
175 Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1. The quote is from the magazine Christian Century, “A 
Peace Policy for 1945,” LII (January, 1935). 
176 Stewart, The Best Laid Plans, 50; the specific quote is from Lundestad, The United States 
and Western Europe, 25.
177 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 520.
178 Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1. Italics mine.
179 Time January 2, 1939. 
180 A poll conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion in 1936 estimated it to 
be 95 percent. Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1–2.
181 On threat and balancing against perceived threats as opposed to material capabilities, 
see Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Walt 
argues states balance against threats, not power, where threat level is determined by 
geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions. 
DSS3_2010.indd   51 07.01.2011   14:53:50
 52 Defence and Security Studies 3-2010
France.182 For the United States, the revision of the threat assessment 
happened later, after the fall of France in the summer of 1940. 
What this means is that opposition to intervention should only 
be coded as “isolationism” after the fall of France, which is when Nazi 
Germany became a credible threat to the United States.183 Whereas 
there were certain groups such as the “America First Committee” and 
members of Congress, such as senators Gerald P. Nye and William 
Borah, that did continue to ardently oppose any intervention in Europe 
after the fateful summer of 1940 – and thus can rightly be categorized 
as isolationists – a majority adjusted their views toward intervention 
in accordance with the rising threat.184
Roosevelt began talking of global dangers in 1937 and 1938, 
the most prominent example of which was his “quarantine speech” of 
October 5, 1937, which was met with more supportive press reaction 
than the president himself had expected.185 He met strong resistance 
in Congress, however, emanating from a bipartisan coalition that had 
formed in reaction to his New Deal program and his “dictatorial” pres-
idential tendencies. As late as mid-1939 Roosevelt was still unwilling 
to test the cohesion of this coalition, partly because events did not de-
mand such action yet. Furthermore, his New Deal coalition contained 
members staunchly opposed to intervention in European affairs.186 In 
any case, as David Reynolds points out, “war scares in Europe had 
182 I thank Allen Lynch for pointing this out.
183 Braumoeller, “The Myth of American Isolationism”: 360 makes this explicit argu-
ment. 
184 Not only is there a debate over whether or not the American public was “isolationist” 
in the 1930s, there is also a debate over whether Franklin Roosevelt can be said to have 
fallen into this political category during his first or even first two terms. Whereas some 
authors accept the term “isolationism” as a general term for the 1930s, such as Stoler, 
“The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: Flawed, but Superior to the Competition,” in Debating 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policies, 1933–1945, Doenecke and Stoler, 120–122; 
and Iriye, The Globalizing of America Vol. III, 146–47; and Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 
1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (New York: Rowman Littlefield Publish-
ers, 2007), 2. Others argue isolationism is largely incorrect, and that better terms are 
unilateralism and nationalist economic sentiments. See Kimball, The Juggler, 84–98; 
Jeffrey W. Legro, “Whence American Internationalism,” International Organization 54, 
no. 2 (2000). Robert Dallek does not think Roosevelt’s policies in the early 1930s can 
be attributed to an “isolationist impulse” on the part of Roosevelt himself, but was 
rather a response to the perceived public constraints and primacy of domestic issues. 
See Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945, 530.
185 Doenecke, “The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: An Ambiguous Legacy,” in Debating 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policies, 1933–1945, Doenecke and Stoler, 31. The New 
York Times found “general approval of the President’s address in Chicago calling upon 
peace-loving peoples to make a concerted effort in opposition to aggressor nations 
which are creating lawlessness in the world.” See Michael Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: 
Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937–1947 (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1976), 34.
186 Stoler, “The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: Flawed, but Superior to the Competition,” 117.
DSS3_2010.indd   52 07.01.2011   14:53:50
 U.S. foreign policy traditions 53
come and gone. There seemed to be no clear and immediate danger to 
the United States.”187 
Examining public opinion polls in the late 1930s shows a steady 
erosion of the feeling of insularity and security in the Western 
Hemisphere.188 Polls taken 1936–39 by George Gallup’s American 
Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) using variations on the question, 
“Will America be drawn into a European war?” show a steadily ris-
ing “yes” percentage: from 44 percent in April 1936 to 76 percent in 
September 1939.189 An ethical distinction was also being made be-
tween the warring parties. In October 1939, an AIPO poll showed 
clear partisanship in favor of Great Britain in relation to the arms em-
bargo repeal: Asked if they favored a repeal of the embargo if it helped 
Germany, only 4 percent answered yes, 91 percent answered no, and 
5 percent had no opinion. Asked if they favored the repeal if it helped 
Britain and France, 58 said yes, 34 percent said no, and 8 percent had 
no opinion.190 Michael Leigh concludes that by 1939, the public was 
not only making an ethical distinction between the warring parties, 
but the “credibility of American insularity” was also waning. Even so, 
the public still clung to hopes of (military) noninvolvement.191 
Hoping for noninvolvement and being against any involvement is 
not the same thing, however. As early as January 1939, before the war, 
69 percent of Americans favored all aid to Britain short of war. By 
the end of 1939 most Americans were convinced that the European 
conflict entailed moral issues that made the cause of the European de-
mocracies an American cause. Indeed, speaking after the Nazi invasion 
of Poland, Roosevelt told his countrymen he could not ask them to be 
neutral in their hearts, as Woodrow Wilson had done twenty-five years 
earlier.192 
187 David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 173.
188 This would automatically weaken the argument made by anti-interventionists, who 
argued that the Western Hemisphere – properly defended – was impregnable. See 
Justus Doenecke, “American Isolationism, 1939–1941,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 
VI, nos. 3–4 (summer/fall 1982): 205.
189 Leigh, Mobilizing Consent, 42.
190 Ibid., 44.
191 Ibid., 46.
192 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 173. 
 Historians debate whether FDR was too concerned with public opinion – worried he 
would get too far “ahead” of it, like Woodrow Wilson ultimately had, or whether he 
used public opinion as an excuse to delay American intervention in the war. Warren 
Kimball argues for the latter point of view in The Juggler, whereas Robert Dallek, in 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, argues FDR was constrained by his 
perception of public opinion. See Dallek, 530.
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 The success of the German blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940 greatly 
undermined the American feeling of security. After September 1940, 
the number of Americans who preferred aiding Britain and France to 
avoiding war with Germany never dropped below 50 percent.193 In 
fact, by January 2, 1941, almost a year before Pearl Harbor, AIPO 
found that 68 percent of Americans favored all-out aid to Britain even 
at the risk of war, a figure that remained constant for the rest of the 
year.194 
Question wording
It also is important to consider question wording when using poll num-
bers as evidence for “isolationism.” When asked whether the United 
States should enter the war immediately, the proportion in favor never 
exceeded 30 percent in the period 1940–41. When asked if the United 
States should enter the war if there were no other way to defeat Germany, 
however, the affirmatives were high: 72 percent in September 1940, 
68 percent in April 1941, and 70 percent in November 1941.195 
More specifically, in May 1941, AIPO conducted a survey on the 
controversial issue of interventionism. In that survey, 62 percent of the 
respondents said they would rather see the United States go to war than 
see Britain surrender to Germany (26 percent would rather see Britain 
surrender, 12 percent had no opinion). Furthermore, 59 percent an-
swered in the affirmative when asked whether the U.S. Navy should be 
used to guard ships carrying war material to Britain (39 percent said 
no, and 7 percent had no opinion). The respondents were under no il-
lusions what this might entail: To the question of whether U.S. Navy 
ships carrying war material to Britain would get the United States 
involved in the war, 74 percent answered yes, 16 percent thought it 
would not mean war, whereas 10 percent had no opinion. Indeed, 76 
percent thought that even if the United States helping England would 
mean a German declaration of war on the United States, the United 
States should still help England (21 percent said no, and 3 percent had 
no opinion).196 
In fact, when asked in the spring of 1941 whether Roosevelt had 
gone too far in helping England, 53 percent answered that his poli-
cy was about right; 18 percent thought he had not gone far enough, 
193 Braumoeller, “Myth of American Isolationism”: 364. 
194 Jonas, Isolationism in America, 215. 
195 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 173. 
196 Leigh, Mobilizing Consent, 79.
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and 19 percent thought he had gone too far.197 Shortly after this, on 
May 27, 1941, FDR gave a radio address where he proclaimed “an 
unlimited national emergency” and pledged full-scale support for 
Britain. And indeed, public reaction to this speech was immediate 
and overwhelmingly favorable. Despite this, Roosevelt backed down 
and told the press that he envisaged neither convoys nor an attempt 
to repeal the neutrality legislation. The subsequent delay from May to 
September on these policies cannot be explained by “isolationist” pub-
lic opinion. In fact, according to Leigh, since a majority of Americans 
already favored convoys to protect Atlantic shipping, they must have 
“wondered why convoying, which the president deemed to be vital, 
had not begun.”198 Finally, polls taken in November 1941 – in the 
days immediately prior to Pearl Harbor – showed only 2 percent of 
Americans agreeing with the notion that the most important task fac-
ing the United States was to “keep out of war.”199
The role of Congress
The twenty-seven months between the German invasion of Poland and 
Japan’s attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor was not really a 
period of “Great Debate” between Roosevelt and the internationalists 
on the one hand, and the “isolationists” on the other hand, then.200 If 
it were, what should one make of poll results such as AIPO’s, with 
one taken as early as September 1939 showing a majority in favor of 
the United States joining an international security organization?201 
The probable answer is that while the general public was relatively 
197 Ibid., 76. Hadley Cantril of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton argued 
that should the president favor convoys or specific aid, he would continue to enjoy this 
high level of support.
198 Ibid., 77.
199 Braumoeller “Myth of American Isolationism”: 364. 
200 Wayne S. Cole used this term to denote the debate between internationalists and iso-
lationists. He would later also use it as a description of the debate between historians 
after Pearl Harbor and beyond. See “American Entry into World War II: A Histo-
riographical Appraisal,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43, no. 4 (March 1957): 
595–617.
201 Leigh, Mobilizing Consent 79–80. AIPO asked, “Would you like to see the United 
States join in a movement to establish an international police force to maintain world 
peace?” to which a majority – 53 percent – said yes.
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malleable and receptive to internationalist attitudes, an important 
segment of Congress was not.202 
Roosevelt’s approach to Congress was careful, as he was loath to 
ask for anything he was not sure of getting. Nonetheless, Roosevelt 
managed to get all his interventionist policies approved – once he 
asked for them (which had not been the case between 1933 and 1937). 
Three days after his declaration of neutrality on September 5, 1939, 
FDR announced his decision to seek the repeal of the arms embargo 
in the neutrality acts, which Congress granted him on November 4.203 
In fact, Roosevelt was able to get all of his major foreign policy initia-
tives and proposals passed by Congress in 1940 and 1941.204 What is 
significant here is that Congress dismantled the neutrality structure 
before Pearl Harbor: repealing the arms embargo in 1939; passing the 
first peacetime selective service act in American history in September 
1940;205 and passing Lend-Lease in March 1941.206 Rather than re-
strict trade with belligerents, the United States made seven billion 
dollars’ worth of American goods available to Britain and her allies as 
a “virtual gift.”207 America had made itself, in Roosevelt’s phrase, “the 
arsenal of democracy.”208 
The Atlantic Charter
Roosevelt was very much involved in planning the postwar world be-
fore the United States was a party to the conflict, just as Woodrow 
202 Jonas, Isolationism in America, 206. Indeed, according to Winston Churchill’s account 
to his war cabinet, FDR had told Churchill at Placentia Bay in August 1941 that he 
did not regard congressional skepticism toward involvement as truly representative 
of the country. See also Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 285; 
and Doenecke, “American Isolationism, 1939–1941”: 209–210. Michael Leigh makes 
the specific argument that Roosevelt was too cautionary because of his misreading of 
public opinion through Congressional attitudes, which were more anti-interventionist 
than was the general public. 
203 On November 4 the Neutrality Act of 1939 was passed, allowing for arms trade with 
belligerent nations on a cash and carry basis, thus in effect ending the arms embargo. 
The end of neutrality policy came with the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, which al-
lowed the United States to sell, lend or give war materials to allied nations.
204 Chalberg Isolationism, 136–37. This does not mean Roosevelt felt confident that he 
would – as seen for instance in his conducting the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement in 
1940 by executive agreement, and not by treaty.
205 Although the selective service act passed with one vote and was restricted to service 
in the Western Hemisphere, it is also noteworthy that FDR did not openly back this 
legislation in the beginning. In the summer of 1940, however, public opinion was in 
favor of it, and on August 2 he declared himself “distinctly in favor of a selective train-
ing bill.” See Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 248.
206 Warren Kimball calls the Lend-Lease Act “undeclared economic warfare.” See Kim-
ball, The Juggler, 12.
207 Jonas, Isolationism in America, 207.
208 Roosevelt said this in a fireside chat on December 29, 1940. Robert Osgood called it 
“the most extreme statement of the American mission, in terms of a tangible com-
mitment, ever suggested by anyone charged with the conduct of America’s foreign 
affairs.” Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 107.
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Wilson had been.209 It was FDR, in fact, who first suggested the idea 
of agreeing upon common war aims at the meeting in Placentia Bay 
on August 9, 1941, between him and Winston Churchill.210 Roosevelt 
was “anxious” to tie Churchill to American goals, so as not to fall into 
the Wilsonian trap of being accused of allying with European impe-
rialists and anti-democrats. Indeed, Roosevelt had cabled Churchill 
on July 15 to ask, rather brazenly, that Britain “make no secret com-
mitments to any of its Allies” without “the agreement of the United 
States.” Reynolds writes Roosevelt had been “disturbed” to receive no 
reply.211 Furthermore, the United States had wanted British agreement 
to a Lend-Lease “consideration” taking the form of British commit-
ments to a liberalized regime of international trade, something British 
Treasury Representative John Maynard Keynes was opposed to. In 
Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles’ draft of common war aims 
presented to Churchill, Welles also insisted upon Britain conveying 
dominion status on India. Churchill’s reaction was not enthusiastic.212 
The eight point document known as the Atlantic Charter was dis-
tinctly American. The second article rejected territorial changes that 
did not “accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples con-
cerned”; the fourth contained a pledge that both governments would 
try to promote access by all states “on equal terms” to the world’s trade 
and raw materials; and there were references to other Rooseveltian 
ideas such as “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” Whereas 
Churchill argued that the Charter should only apply to Europe, FDR 
would state, after Pearl Harbor, that it applied to the entire world.213 
Like Woodrow Wilson, then, “Franklin Roosevelt wished to define 
the terms of an American peace,”214 and he wished to do so before the 
United States was a formal party to the war. The Four Freedoms as pre-
sented by Roosevelt in his State of the Union Address in January 1941 
were “to apply everywhere in the world,” expressing what Reynolds 
209 See Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World for a detailed description of the Atlantic 
Charter. 
210 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 146; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American 
Foreign Policy, 282. 
211 Ibid., 147
212 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 147. Whereas FDR assured Churchill in Feb-
ruary 1942 that the United States had no intention of asking Britain to trade in impe-
rial preferences for lend-lease, Kimball argues this was in fact what the United States 
aimed for. See Kimball, “U.S. Economic Strategy in World War II: Wartime Goals, 
Peacetime Plans,” in Kimball ed. America Unbound: World War II and the Making of a 
Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 149.
213 Ibid., 148. 
214 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 109.
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dubs “a globalist American ideology.”215 Against “hemispherism” FDR 
asserted that the age of airborne warfare invited the world to threaten 
America. These two issues were interconnected: The president argued 
that “only in a world in which American values reigned supreme could 
the United States feel secure.” Whereas authors have criticized FDR 
for not having a coherent vision of the postwar world, he did exhibit 
a global perspective on international events that was “distinctively 
Rooseveltian.”216 Warren Kimball characterizes FDR’s approach to the 
world as “Americanism” – that “city-on-a-hill/an-example-for-all-the-
world-to-follow” perspective that sometimes necessitated force to get 
its point across.217
December 1941: Pearl Harbor and its significance
George Kennan – and many others – have argued that the war was 
a conflict from which the United States had stayed aloof as long as 
it could, but was ultimately forced into by Pearl Harbor.218 Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg’s diary entry, stating that the attack on Pearl 
Harbor “ended isolationism for any realist,” is usually taken as evi-
dence that Pearl Harbor was the event that vanquished isolationism.219 
After the fall of France in the summer of 1940, however, American 
involvement moved rapidly from benevolent neutrality to armed and 
active belligerency.220 Although measured, the destroyers-for-bases 
deal of September 1940 was a milestone in U.S. policy, Reynolds ar-
gues. It signaled a new commitment to Britain as America’s front line, 
and British resistance and egalitarian sacrifice during the Blitz “con-
firmed the impression [Roosevelt] wanted to convey of the country’s 
ideological compatibility with the values of Americanism.”221 This, 
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid., 4. Justus Doenecke characterizes FDR’s vision as one of “drift.” See Doenecke, 
“The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: An Ambiguous Legacy.” Warren Kimball, who is gen-
erally favorable toward Roosevelt, agrees that he never articulated a cohesive philoso-
phy. Kimball does argue, however, that FDR’s actions betrayed a conceptual consist-
ency. See Kimball, The Juggler, 185. Robert Dallek believes FDR decided sometime in 
the spring of 1941 that the United States would have to go to war, but that he did not 
want to force this decision by announcing for war. Thus, answering the critics who ar-
gue Roosevelt was pushing for war, Dallek notes his caution and restraint, refusing to 
ask for a declaration of war until an unequivocal provocation had occurred. See Dallek, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 530–31.
217 Kimball, The Juggler, 186.
218 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
expanded ed., 160.
219 Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., and Joe A. Morris, eds., The Private Papers of Sena-
tor Vandenberg (Boston: Hougton Mifflin Company, 1952), 1. 
220 Indeed, it was the fall of France which turned Walter Lippmann, the nation’s leading 
columnist on foreign affairs, into a pro-interventionist. See Legro, “Whence American 
Internationalism”: 273.
221 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 175.
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Robert Divine argues, was what marked the end of American neutral-
ity, because from this time forward, “the United States was a nonbel-
ligerent, not yet at war with Germany, but clearly aligned with Britain 
in the struggle against Hitler.” Anti-interventionists may have balked, 
but public opinion polls showed 70 percent support for the destroyers-
for-bases deal.222
The Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 entailed the lending of mu-
nitions to those countries (Great Britain and China) whose survival 
was deemed to be in the U.S. national interest. During the spring 
and summer of 1941 Roosevelt extended U.S. naval operations in the 
Atlantic. On March 15, 1941, during the Battle of the Atlantic, the 
U.S. Atlantic Fleet was ordered to return to port and prepare for ac-
tive duty. On April 20, Roosevelt outlined plans for four task forces 
to patrol the Atlantic in order to track U-boats and broadcast their 
locations to the British.223 From September 1941 FDR authorized the 
“shoot-on-sight” policy, conducting undeclared naval warfare in the 
Atlantic, making the United States in effect a cobelligerent.224 The 
U.S. Navy was helping escort British and Canadian convoys across 
most of the Atlantic, and in November Roosevelt secured a repeal of 
the key provisions of the Neutrality Act, including those that banned 
U.S. vessels from entering British ports. 
In conclusion, arguments that have pointed solely to Pearl Harbor 
have exaggerated its significance. Placing it in its appropriate histori-
cal context shows that it was simply not the watershed event it was 
made out to be: American commitment to fighting the war (if neces-
sary) solidified nearly a year and a half before Pearl Harbor.225 American 
military actions in the fall of 1941 constituted undeclared warfare. Of 
course, events were not simply a reflection of American actions. Hitler’s 
222 Robert A. Divine, “Franklin D. Roosevelt resisted U.S. involvement in World War 
II,” in Chalberg ed., Isolationism: Opposing Viewpoints,, 274. In his book The Reluctant 
Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 
Divine shone a critical light on what he deemed to be an overcautious and vacillating 
policy of FDR’s. Divine argued that because of such a policy, the ultimate decision of 
war was left to the enemy. 
223 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 526.
224 Ibid., 533.
225 Marc Trachtenberg writes that the literature on FDR’s foreign policy up till Pearl Har-
bor generally divides this policy into three distinct periods: During the first period, up 
till the fall of France, FDR probably wanted to stay out of the war. The second period 
saw a military build-up and support of Britain that belied interventionist intention; 
and the third phase, beginning in the spring of 1941, was a move toward undeclared 
war against Germany. See ch. 4, “The 1941 Case” in The Craft of International His-
tory: A Guide to Method (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 85–86. This is 
certainly a more contextualized analysis than the simple pre- and post-Pearl Harbor 
analysis many political scientists adhere to.
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unwillingness to provoke the United States also kept the United States 
from a formal – and premature – involvement in the war.226 
Here we shall suspend the historical narrative for a moment while 
discussing the issue of how to define “multilateralism” so as to be able 
to take us into the Second World War case study.
226 Doenecke, like Divine, criticizes the president for always leaving the initiative to the 
Axis – for “waiting to be pushed into the situation” as FDR told treasury secretary 
Henry Morgenthau Jr. See “The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: The Ambiguous Legacy,” 
38.
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Chapter 3
The many meanings of 
multilateral 
Assessing the plausibility of the argument that the United States 
turned away from isolationism or unilateralism toward multilateral 
internationalism necessitates a discussion of what is meant by “mul-
tilateral.” As the previous chapters have argued, the debate over the 
legitimacy of a “turn-around” thesis of U.S. foreign policy hinges not 
on whether the United States turned from isolationism to internation-
alism – since the term “isolationism” is no longer used by historians 
of U.S. foreign relations – but rather on whether the United States 
turned from unilateral internationalism to multilateral international-
ism. As my literature review will show, there is in fact much concep-
tual confusion surrounding this term, which is why this chapter will 
discuss what is meant by “multilateral” before we can proceed to the 
Second World War case study in the next chapter.
Definitions
“What is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it co-
ordinates national policies in groups of three or more states,” argues 
political scientist John G. Ruggie, because this would mean mere no-
minal multilateralism. Rather, substantive multilateralism coordinates 
national policies “on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations 
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among those states.”227 These principles are indivisibility, generalized 
rules of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity.228 
Indivisibility among the members of a collectivity refers to the 
range of behavior in question. Material things (such as railway lines) 
and immaterial things (such as peace) can be indivisible. Generalized 
rules of conduct simply mean that agreed upon rules apply to all mem-
bers. This can be contrasted with interactions based on ad hoc bargain-
ing or straightforward power politics. Thus, multilateralism entails 
some reduction in policy autonomy, since the choices and actions of 
the participating states are constrained by the agreed-upon rules and 
principles.229 Diffuse reciprocity refers to the expectation that mem-
bers will receive roughly equal benefits over time (as opposed to im-
mediate quid pro quo). Based on these principles, it is clear that – as 
Ruggie himself points out – “multilateralism is a highly demanding 
institutional form” and should be differentiated from bilateralism and 
imperialism. Imperialism is also an institution that organizes relations 
among three or more states, but it does so by “denying the sovereignty 
of the subject states.”230
Building on this, fellow political scientist G. John Ikenberry 
argues multilateralism can be categorized based on what level of in-
ternational order it operates on: system multilateralism, ordering or fo-
undational multilateralism, and contract multilateralism: 
System multilateralism
The Westphalian state system dating back to 1648 is multilateral at 
its most basic level, Ikenberry states, because it organizes the units 
(states) according to norms of sovereignty, formal equality, and legal-
diplomatic practice. At this level there has been constant system mul-
tilateralism in international relations since the seventeenth century.231 
227 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (New York: Routledge, 1998), 106. 
The nominal definition is “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of 
three or more states” in Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism. An Agenda for Re-
search,” International Journal 45, no. 4 (autumn 1990): 731–764. 
228 Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution” in Multilateralism Matters, 
ed. Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); James A. Caporaso, “Inter-
national Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations” in ibid., 
53.
229 Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” 534. 
230 Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” 10–11.
231 Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” 534.
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Ordering multilateralism
Multilateralism can also refer to the political-economic organization 
of regional or international orders. For instance, Ruggie names three 
institutional domains of interstate relations that can be multilateral: 
(1) international orders (such as an economic order or a security or-
der); (2) international regimes (typically applying to a sector of an 
order); (3) international organizations (the physical or institutional 
manifestation of orders and regimes).232 
David Skidmore has a two-part definition of multilateralist foreign 
policies that would presumably apply to this level. A multilateralist 
foreign policy involves two crucial commitments on the part of co-
operating states: (1) to invest in the creation and maintenance of interna-
tional institutions that serve to facilitate coordination. This has to do with 
the inputs necessary to sustain international institutions. Institutional 
investment can take three principal forms: participating in the ne-
gotiations to establish multilateral procedures; provision of resources 
(contributions of money, soldiers, information, expertise etc.); and rhe-
torical support (public backing of the norms, principals, and goals of 
particular institutions).233 (2) To comply with the rules, norms, principles, 
and decision-making processes of these institutions on an equal basis with other 
states. This dimension of multilateralism has to do with institutional 
outputs—how institutions affect state behavior. Compliance involves 
not only the narrow question of whether a state is in violation of spe-
cific commitments but also whether a state seeks waivers, exemptions, 
veto or weighted voting privileges, or other prerogatives that allow it 
to more easily evade actual multilateral constraints. Thus, Skidmore 
argues, a state that subjects itself more fully to constraint is more gen-
uinely multilateralist than one that consistently takes advantage of 
loopholes.
Skidmore’s definition is interesting because it gets to the princi-
ples associated with multilateral behavior rather than simply describ-
ing nominal multilateralism, which is not a “demanding institutional 
form.” As Ruggie himself argues, there is a difference between a 
“nominal” and a “qualitative” definition of multilateralism: a nominal 
232 See Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” 12–13.
233 David Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy,” For-
eign Policy Analysis 1 (July 2005): 208.
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definition would connote multinational cooperation, whereas a qualita-
tive definition would connote multilateral cooperation.234 
Contract multilateralism
Multilateralism also refers to specific intergovernmental treaties and 
agreements, i.e. “contracts” among states. Ikenberry argues that the 
George W. Bush administration’s challenge to multilateralism mainly 
existed on this level because of its rejection of treaties (particularly in 
the areas of arms control and proliferation of nuclear weapons). Thus, 
while the Bush administration’s challenge to multilateralism was re-
grettable in the eyes of its allies, it was not a fundamental challenge to 
the concept of multilateralism, Ikenberry argues. 
At the contract level, it should be fairly straightforward to deter-
mine whether a state is multilateral or not: did the state, after com-
mitting to a treaty, ratify and comply with it? If yes, then its behavior 
was multilateral on the contract level. 
Multilateralism across issue areas
The issue of multilateralism is further complicated, however, when 
one standard definition is applied across issue areas. Multilateralism is 
perhaps easiest to define in economic affairs, where one can look at the 
rules agreed upon at Bretton Woods. As codified in the International 
Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement, monetary multilateralism 
traditionally has meant “the convertibility of national currencies on a 
non-discriminatory basis and rejection of the currency blocs and com-
petitive devaluations that characterized the interwar period.”235 As 
stated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), trade 
multilateralism has meant “application of the most-favored-nation 
principle on a non-discriminatory basis.”236
In the political sphere, multilateralism is embodied in the univer-
sally accepted obligations contained in the UN Charter, the provi-
sions of international treaties, and customary international law. Given 
the somewhat schizophrenic character of the Charter’s attitude toward 
the state, however, unilateralism is both absolutely prohibited (Article 
25: obligation to carry out the decisions of the Security Council) and 
234 Ruggie, “Multilateralism: Anatomy of an Institution,” 6. This corresponds to what 
William Diebold calls “formal” versus “substantive” multilateralism.
235 John Van Oudenaren, “What Is ‘Multilateral’?” Policy Review (March/February, 2003) 
Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
236 Ibid.
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absolutely protected (Article 51: inherent right to self-defense; Article 
2: sovereign equality and sanctity of domestic jurisdiction).237
Sarah Kreps argues that whereas multilateralism can be straight-
forwardly defined in economics or areas such as human rights treaties, 
there is in fact no good definition of multilateral military intervention.238 
For instance, while Ruggie’s qualitative definition of multilateralism 
improves upon Robert Keohane’s nominal definition (“multilateralism 
entails the coordination of practices among three or more states”), it 
is, in fact, overly restrictive in the security realm, because it concedes 
too much power to formal institutional frameworks such as the United 
Nations in deciding what counts as multilateral or not.239 During the 
Cold War, for example, the United States (or any of the permanent 
members) would often avoid the UN Security Council because the 
UNSC might not decide in its favor. This caused states to seek le-
gitimacy for their military interventions through other International 
Organizations (IOs) in order to obtain the stamp of “procedural” mul-
tilateralism, or to amass a robust coalition in order to obtain the stamp 
of “operational” multilateralism. Whereas these interventions would 
not be legal according to the UN Charter (unless, presumably, they 
were in accordance with Article 51), they might still be considered 
legitimately multilateral by the international community.240 
This is the basis for her two-level definition of military multi-
lateralism, which combines measures of procedural and operational 
multilateralism. First, Kreps codes an intervention as multilateral or 
unilateral on the procedural level (where a UN authorization would 
be the highest attainable IO sanction, but sanction from a regional 
organization could also be legitimate); and second, Kreps codes the 
intervention as multilateral or unilateral on the operational level. Was 
it truly a multilateral coalition or was the IO sanction merely cover 
for a largely unilateral operation? Using this combined measurement, 
Kreps finds that of the eighteen U.S. military interventions under-
taken since 1945, half of them (nine cases) were completely unilateral 
(Lebanon 1958; Dominican Republic 1965; Vietnam 1965; Grenada 
1983; Libya 1986; Panama 1989; Afghanistan/Sudan 1998; Iraq 
1998; Iraq 2003); four instances were completely multilateral (Iraq 
237 Ibid.
238 Sarah E. Kreps, “Multilateral Military Interventions: Theory and Practice,” Political 
Science Quarterly 123, no. 4 (winter 2008): 573–603.
239 Ibid.: 579.
240 Ibid.: 586. An example of such an instance would be NATO’s Operation Allied Force 
against Yugoslavia in 1999.
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1990–91; Bosnia 1993–95; Kosovo 1999; Haiti 2004); another four 
instances were procedurally multilateral (Korea 1950; Somalia 1992–
93; Haiti 1994; Afghanistan 2001); and one instance was operation-
ally multilateral (Lebanon 1982–84).241
Ikenberry’s own codification of a multilateral scale of consultation 
among states in the event of a military intervention confirms Kreps’ 
argument that the lack of a standard definition of multilateral mili-
tary interventions makes consistent scholarship difficult. Detailing 
the four ways in which the United States could potentially under-
take military action, Ikenberry argues (1) that it could go it alone, 
without consulting others; (2) it could consult others, but then go 
it alone; (3) it could consult and take action with others, not on the 
basis of agreed-upon rules and principles that define the terms of its 
relationship with those others, but rather on the basis of the current 
situation’s needs; or (4) it could take action with others, on the basis 
of agreed-upon rules and principles. The first option is “clearly uni-
lateral.” Then, Ikenberry argues, the second and third options “can be 
coded as multilateral.”242 However, would not the decision to invade 
Iraq in March 2003 be coded as a “3”? Would we classify this as a 
“multilateral” operation? Not according to Kreps, who, based on her 
two-level definition, codes the Iraq intervention as completely unilat-
eral, despite its multinational coalition.243 
Multilateralism, the American way
Ruggie argues that in the American context, multilateralism can be 
understood as “an international order in which the United States seeks 
to institute and live by certain mildly communitarian organizing 
principles,” whereas unilateralism is “[an order] in which it avoids 
entanglement in any serious institutionalized commitments.”244 This 
seems to present a somewhat simplistic picture, especially since the 
United States was largely able to set the parameters for its own in-
stitutional commitments and define the organizing principles of this 
241 Ibid. Notice that the 1999 Kosovo intervention is deemed to be fully multilateral 
despite the lack of a UNSC resolution.
242 Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” 547.
243 Kreps, “Multilateral Military Interventions”: 597.
244 John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 4–8. See also David M. Malone & Yuen 
Foong Khong, eds. Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003), who define unilateralism as “a tendency to opt out of a multilateral 
framework (whether existing or proposed) or to act alone in addressing a particular 
global or regional challenge rather than choosing to participate in collective action.” 
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international order. Thus, one could say, the United States, while not 
avoiding international institutions in the 1940s, did manage to avoid 
significant entanglements in them. This is not to argue that the United 
States conspired to set up international institutions as tools in a plot to 
rule the world; nor do I argue that there were not commitments associ-
ated with this order, but rather that the United States set out to reform 
the world along its own ideational lines – economically and politically 
– while ensuring minimal (yet still existent) constraints for itself. 
In cooperation with the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the 
United States set up an international order that was a concert of power 
at the great power level, and multilateral at the intermediate and small 
power levels. Ruggie is correct in pointing out how the exact princi-
ples that make up this order must in the end define the commitment 
of the participating states. The smaller participating states were not 
coerced or “duped” into this postwar order – as realist theories might 
argue – rather, the postwar order contained important benefits for the 
medium and small states, such as open markets guaranteed by a liberal 
hegemon; political representation in world forums; and – later in the 
process – security commitments for those who joined NATO.
I argue in the next chapter that the international order the United 
States helped create – although nominally multilateral and unques-
tionably beneficial to its adherents – failed to live up to the principles 
Ruggie and Ikenberry list as a necessary condition for substantive mul-
tilateralism. Thus, I argue, U.S. challenges to multilateralism are not 
only present at the contract level, as Ikenberry argues, but also at the 
foundational or ordering level. The U.S.-led postwar order was not 
communitarian. Had it been, the United States itself would probably 
not have joined, like in 1919. Rather, the postwar order was a multi-
lateral order enacted by a hegemon – in other words, it was a mixed 
system.
Ikenberry’s distinction between “new” and old multilateralism 
highlights the tension inherent in his definition of “multilateral” and 
exemplifies my point. Ikenberry differentiates between “old multilat-
eralism” – that of the 1940s – and “new multilateralism” – meaning 
embodying the principle of generalized rules of conduct – i.e. univer-
salism. Indeed, this is his explanation for the post-Cold War struggle 
over the International Criminal Court. It was the ICC’s universal de-
sign that produced such skepticism in the administration of President 
Bill Clinton. While the treaty was being negotiated, the Clinton 
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administration lobbied for a UN Security Council veto-right on what 
cases were to be brought before the Court, seeking, in Ikenberry’s 
words, “to adopt the traditional postwar approach for multilateral agree-
ments,” meaning the major powers should receive special opt-out and 
veto rights that make the binding obligations more contingent and 
subject to state review.245 Because the ICC did not afford such special 
treatment for the United States, it is an example of “new multilater-
alism,” defined by Ikenberry as offering “fewer opportunities for the 
United States to exercise political control over others and fewer ways 
to escape the binding obligations of the agreements.”246 So, whereas 
the United States was comfortable with “old” multilateralism of es-
cape clauses, weighted voting, opt-out agreements and veto rights, it 
balked at the “new” multilateralism where the principle of “general-
ized rules of conduct” actually applies to all members, great power or 
not. 
One might point to the post-World War II period as evidence 
that multilateralism has precedent in U.S. foreign policy (the objec-
tive argument) and that such an approach leads to positive results (the 
normative argument). Yet, as Ikenberry’s definitions exemplify, this 
exaggerates the degree to which U.S. foreign policy during this era 
was genuinely multilateralist in either theory or practice. In the wake 
of World War II, the United States took seriously the first of the two 
multilateralist commitments cited above (“input” multilateralism), 
but not the second (“output” multilateralism). In other words, the 
United States invested in the creation of international institutions, but 
postwar administrations were only loosely constrained by institutional 
rules and procedures.247 Thus, the U.S.-sponsored institutional order 
was designed to bind the behavior of other states, but not that of the 
United States itself, an approach to international order-building that 
is hegemonic rather than multilateral.248 
Hegemony is a type of authority in which the privileged posi-
tion of the leading state rests not upon coercion alone, but also upon 
the institutionalized consent of other states. As Bruce Cronin puts it, 
“hegemony is a form of leadership, not domination.”249 Rather than a 
245 Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” 534. (My italics.)
246 Ibid.: 534. 
247 But see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on 
U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), who argues that the 
United States did defer to its allies sometimes owing in part to a desire to keep the 
institutions going. 
248 Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy”: 209.
249 Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony”: 107.
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traditional imperial power, the hegemon oversees relations between 
“consenting adults.”250 What it does not entail, is sovereign equality. 
One state is clearly more sovereign than all others, in that hegemony 
allows for a “broad and subtle penetration of economic and cultural 
practices and products across entire regions.”251 U.S. relative power ca-
pabilities in the 1940s unquestionably allowed for a wide action radius 
when designing the postwar order.252 
Historian Michael Hunt argues hegemony’s lack of coercion, dif-
fuse sources of support, and amorphous territorial range distinguishes 
it from empire. Although fellow historian Charles Maier hedges on 
whether or not the United States can be categorized as an empire as of 
yet, he makes the valuable point that the distinction between hegemon 
and imperial power is a fragile one: “At best, hegemony seems poten-
tial empire, not just a high-minded renunciation of intervention.”253 
The fine line between hegemony and imperial power highlights 
the tensions in arguments about American multilateralism. The post-
war institutions themselves allowed the United States a set of unique 
privileges (as well as obligations), meaning the rules governing the 
institutions had built-in legal asymmetry. While multilateralism ar-
guably does not have to entail the equality of all states in terms of 
indivisibility, generalized rules of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity, this 
I contend not only violates the spirit of the definition of multilateral-
ism utilized by scholars such as Ruggie and Ikenberry, it is also what 
250 Kennedy, “What Would Wilson Do?” 
251 See Hunt, “Empire, Hegemony, and the U.S. Policy Mess.” 
252 This is also acknowledged by Ikenberry, see for instance “Rethinking the Origins of 
American Hegemony,” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 3 (Autumn, 1989): 375–400. 
253 Maier, Among Empires, 63. Hunt argues for a distinction because of the lack of focused 
exercise of political and military power; of specific subordinate colonial or client re-
gimes; and the presence of legitimacy. Geir Lundestad has argued that the United 
States did function as an “empire,” but that this only lasted approximately 30 years. In 
the 1970s, the U.S. lead over other powers had declined both militarily and, particu-
larly important, economically, which resulted in a recalibration of multilateralism. See 
“Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal 
of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986): 263–277. See also Christopher Layne, The Peace of 
Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006) for a discussion of U.S. postwar hegemony from a neoclassical realist 
perspective. 
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underlies the critique of U.S. unilateralism which has been voiced ever 
since the postwar order was established.254 
Hegemony is more compatible with unilateralism than with mul-
tilateralism. Thus the United States became a member of the United 
Nations, which was not a purely multilateral organization. Rather, it 
was conceived as a power concert (the Security Council) placed atop a 
collective security organization.255
254 See, for example Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. Mingst, ed. The United States and 
Multilateral Institutions (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Edward C. Luck, Mixed Mes-
sages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999 (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Gwyn Prins, ed., Understanding Unilateralism in 
American Foreign Relations (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000); 
Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman, eds. Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boul-
der, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Malone & Khong, ed. Unilateralism and 
U.S. Foreign Policy; Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, Michael Mastanduno, eds., 
US Hegemony and International Organizations (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003); Michael Ignatieff, ed. American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
255 This is also something Ruggie has pointed out, yet does not seem to tease out the 
consequences of. See “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International 
Organization 46, no. 3 (summer 1992): 587.
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Chapter 4
Hegemony and multilateralism 
in the 1940s 
When the United States government, prominently led by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, took it upon itself to re-organize the interna-
tional order in the 1940s, the United States was necessarily undergoing 
a fundamental change. It was turning away from its previous history 
as isolationist or aloof, and accepting a new role in international poli-
tics as a multilateral team player. Regardless of how this turn-around 
came about (some argue it was because of the Soviet threat, others 
argue it was due to a change in American identity),256 the consensus 
in the history and political science literature is that the turn-around 
happened.257 
Contrary to this common assumption, I argue: (1) that the interna-
tional order created by the United States during the war was compat-
ible with unilateralism, not multilateralism, because it constructed a 
system based on hegemony; and (2) that the United States thus exhibited 
more continuity than change in its foreign policy posture in the first 
half of the twentieth century, explicitly rejecting a sharp turn-around 
in U.S. foreign policy.
This argument is slightly complex, as it involves a two-level analy-
sis: on the domestic level, the American unilateral posture towards in-
ternational relations changed less than has previously been argued; but 
on the international level a multilateral post-war order was constructed. 
Can both things be true? Yes, if we appreciate the extent to which 
256 For the realist argument about the effects of the Soviet threat, see Arthur M. Schles-
inger, Jr., “Unilateralism in Historical Perspective,” in Understanding Unilateralism 
in American Foreign Relations, Prins, ed., 23. For the constructivist argument about 
a change in identity, see Ruggie, “The Past as Prologue”, and Legro, Rethinking the 
World.
257 One of the classic examples of the turn-around thesis is provided by Divine, Second 
Chance. An updated and different take on this turn-around (focusing on international 
law and human rights) is Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World. 
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the United States was the hegemon presiding over a multilateral struc-
ture, as opposed to a country joining a multilateral framework (which 
would mean subjecting itself to the same rules as all other members). 
Whereas the United States created numerous international institu-
tions, subsequent U.S. administrations were not constrained by these 
institutional rules and procedures to the same extent as other member 
states. In other words, the U.S.-sponsored institutional order was de-
signed to bind the behavior of other states, but not that of the United 
States itself.258 It is important to point out that this does not mean 
ignoring the clear and important changes occurring in U.S. foreign 
policy from the 1930s to the 1940s. But focusing only on the differ-
ence between the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s and the commitment 
to international security that was made in 1940 presents a distorted 
picture of the foreign policy tradition that preceded the 1930s, as well 
as that which succeeded it. 
I will now investigate the U.S. wartime planning for the postwar 
international order, examining the two main areas of multilateral in-
stitutions set up during the war: political multilateralism in the form 
of the United Nations, and economic multilateralism in the form of 
Bretton Woods.259 My conclusion is that these institutions, while re-
forming international politics, did not reform the United States funda-
mental skepticism of substantive multilateralism. Indeed, the United 
States only became a member of the United Nations because all of the 
objections and reservations Henry Cabot Lodge had voiced in 1919 
had been addressed.
The second post-war order: hegemony versus 
multilateralism
Henry Luce, in an editorial for Life Magazine urging the United States 
to enter World War II, predicted the twentieth century would become 
known as the “American century.” The United States, apart from the 
duty to oppose Hitler, needed to take advantage of its “natural right” to 
order international affairs, Luce wrote. Indeed Americans had to accept 
“wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful 
258 Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy”: 209.
259 A discussion of the postwar security cooperation set up in the form of NATO is not 
included here, due to issues of space.
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and vital nation in the world,” he argued, “and in consequence to exert 
upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as 
we see fit and by such means as we see fit.”260 Luce would not be disap-
pointed. During the war the State Department, under the leadership of 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, commenced strategic planning for the 
postwar order, producing drafts of the organizations the United States 
was to lead. Indeed, by 1945, Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican 
from Wisconsin, suggested that the United Nations was merely an-
other experiment “in a long line of great American experiments.”261
The second postwar order was indeed an American experiment, 
but not in the way other authors argue. The second postwar order was a 
reaffirmation of Lodgian internationalism, not a belated turn-around to 
Wilsonianism. In stark contrast to the League of Nations, the United 
Nations was anchored in America. Rather than mere formalities, the 
fact that the organization was located in the United States, relied on 
U.S. financing, and accepted U.S. direction sent a clear message: this 
was an American-led international order, not another League of Nations 
based out of Geneva. The reservations Lodge had demanded in 1919 in 
order to ratify the Treaty of Versailles were in place in 1945.262 
In brief, the United States sought, and got, to safeguard its unilat-
eral tradition through the following general mechanisms: a veto over 
potential actions (through the veto in the Security Council or its share 
of votes in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank); ex-
tensive assurances that the Senate (as opposed to the U.S. Ambassador to 
the UN, for example) would be able to veto or sanction U.S. actions in 
these institutions; the opportunity to exempt itself from jurisdiction 
(both in the case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and from 
the UN Charter in general); or through non-participation all together 
(as with the International Trade Organization or human rights trea-
ties such as the Convention to prevent Genocide, which the Senate 
rejected). This will be more fully explained in the case studies below.
The reason the United States was able to construct favorable con-
ditions for itself in the institutional order was, in short, its status 
as hegemon. Due to the war’s heavy toll on the European allies, the 
United States would go from being one of the great powers to being 
260 Henry Luce, “The American Century,” in The Ambiguous Legacy, ed. Michael J. Hogan, 
20.
261 Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
1999), 16.
262 Leo Gross, “The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations,” American 
Journal of International Law 41, no. 3 (July 1947).
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the greatest power.263 But hegemony is not merely a reflection of a coun-
try’s relative material power. It does not entail physical conquest, as 
with empires, but rather acknowledgement of hegemonic authority.264 
Hegemonic leadership can only develop within a social environment 
with the consent of the broader community. Such a community pro-
vides permissive conditions in which hegemony can evolve – as hap-
pened during and immediately after the Second World War.265 More 
specifically, Ernst Haas defines hegemony as the “national capability to 
advance long-range views of world order … for the success of institu-
tions charged with that task.”266
This does not mean the United States endured no limits to its sov-
ereignty, but rather that those specific limitations that were unaccep-
table to U.S. policymakers in 1919 were removed in 1945.267 Because 
of its position, the United States was afforded an opportunity to which 
it had aspired for quite some time: to re-organize international politics 
(and particularly European politics) according to American principles 
of leadership.
The second political postwar order: the United Nations and the 
International Court of Justice
The United Nations was, in a specific sense, shaped by the influence of 
American planning and leadership. The primacy of the United States in 
the postwar planning derived in part from America’s disproportionate 
military and economic power. It also derived in part from the world-
wide prestige of America’s wartime President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
“whose ideological leadership of the drive to win the war and build a 
just and peaceful world order brought him recognition as the spiritual 
263 See Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 1–3 for details on the comparative toll the war 
took on the Allies.
264 Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony.” See also Ikenberry “Rethinking the Origins of 
American Hegemony”: 375–400; Maier, Among Empires; Layne, The Peace of Illusions 
for a discussion of U.S. postwar hegemony from a neoclassical realist perspective. For 
a discussion of whether the United States was constituted an empire, see Lundestad, 
“Empire by Invitation?” and Michael Hunt, “Empire, Hegemony, and the U.S. Policy 
Mess.”
265 An example of such “permissive environment” would be Geir Lundestad’s “empire 
by invitation” argument, whereby the Western European states “invited” the United 
States into a dominant role due to fears of a resurgent Germany, a future threatening 
Soviet Union, and possible American abandonment. 
266 Quoted in Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony”: 109.
267 Hegemony, as Ikenberry uses the term, does not exclude the possibility of the he-
gemon sometimes being constrained by the international institutions it sets up – it 
endures short-term losses for the sake of long-term gains. For example, Lodge was 
willing to join the League if Article 10 was eliminated; a League without Article 10 
would still have constrained the United States to some extent.
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father of the United Nations.”268 Perhaps most important, however, was 
the ever-present threat of a Senate veto. The U.S. position in these 
negotiations was complex; its troubled history with the League gave 
it more leverage over specific details of the new organization. The 
American proposals were a mix of national interests and principles of 
international organizations, aimed in part at preventing internal dis-
sent – in other words, a Senate veto on U.S. membership. This created 
a situation where the foreign negotiators had to give weight not only 
to their own national interests, but also to the overarching interest of 
all parties present: that of ensuring American membership. It was this 
combination of factors which in Inis Claude’s opinion brought about 
the adoption of a Charter that was “fundamentally based upon prin-
ciples advocated by the United States.”269 The threat of a Senate veto 
combined with the practical matter that the proposals worked out by 
the State Department during the war became the working draft of the 
preparatory Dumbarton Oaks Conference – and, by extension, the final 
San Francisco Conference – left a remarkable American stamp on the 
United Nations Organization.270 
Early American preparation and the Dumbarton Oaks Conference
The early and detailed U.S. preparation for the Big Three conference at 
Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and the general conference in San Francisco 
in 1945 would facilitate a deep U.S. influence over the subsequent 
international organization. In this process, the United States and its 
policymakers were careful not to sacrifice real sovereignty, unilateral 
maneuverability, and American leadership.
The United States started preparing for the postwar order earlier 
than Britain or the Soviet Union, beginning, as mentioned previously, 
before the United States was even party to the war. From December 
27, 1939, when Secretary of State Cordell Hull created the Advisory 
Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, designed to deal with all 
problems posed by the coming of peace, and until the U.S. delegation 
268 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Or-
ganization, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 61. 
269 Ibid., 62.
270 Gary B. Ostrower, The United Nations and the United States (New York: Tywane Pub-
lishers, 1998), 20; Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United 
Nations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 47–48.
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left for San Francisco in the spring of 1945, the State Department went 
through innumerable committees and drafts on the postwar order.271 
By the end of April 1944 a “possible Plan for a General International 
Organization” had been completed by the United States. At this point, 
the British had only recently begun planning for the postwar world, 
and the Soviets seemed not to have given much thought to a postwar 
organization.272 The American plan called for the creation of a univer-
sal organization with four principal organs: a General Assembly, an 
Executive Council, an International Court of Justice, and a General 
Secretariat. With some important modifications, this plan formed the 
basis of the draft charter that the State Department eventually pre-
sented at Dumbarton Oaks.273 
On April 25, 1944 Hull began a series of consultative meetings 
with selected senators, meeting four times over the next month. A 
possible contention over supplying troops to a future peacekeeping 
mission was muted by Hull’s assurance that any U.S. commitment 
would be submitted in advance for Senate approval.274 Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg (R-MI) was worried about the possibility – seen from the 
vantage point of twenty years earlier – that the early creation of an 
organization would imply its use to maintain a “bad peace.” Senators 
Vandenberg and Robert La Follette (P-WI) – worried about the elec-
tion year – refused to endorse the plan without the reservation that its 
ultimate acceptability depended upon the justness of the terms of the 
peace.275
The “Big Three” met in Washington D.C. in August 1944 intent 
upon not creating another League of Nations. Common lessons learnt 
from the failure of the League were that the powerful nations, namely 
271 For a detailed look at the various committees, people, and plans leading up to the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, see Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks. The Origins 
of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill, NC: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1990), ch. 1 and 2. 
272 Indeed, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden had remarked to Churchill that if 
Britain failed to develop its own framework for the postwar world, the consequence 
would be that “the United States makes a policy and we follow, which I do not regard 
as a satisfactory role for the British Empire.” British ideas on postwar organization 
only began to take shape during 1943, and Hilderbrand argues it does seem certain 
that no working plan or proposals had been formulated in the Kremlin by the end of 
1943, either. See Dumbarton Oaks, 39, 44. Schlesinger writes that neither the Chinese, 
Russians nor the British seemed to take the preparatory work very seriously, but notes 
the British did prepare notations titled “Future World Organization.” See Act of Crea-
tion, 47.
273 Schlesinger, Act of Creation, 47–48.
274 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, 57. 
275 Ibid., 58; Vandenberg, Private Papers, 95–96, 101–107. Vandenberg was, however, 
impressed with how “conservative” this new organization was, “from a nationalist 
standpoint,” as the organization was “based virtually on a four-power alliance.” 
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United States and the Soviet Union, had to participate, (which at the 
San Francisco conference would give these two countries a veto power 
over the negotiations themselves).276 
Difficult issues at Dumbarton included voting and veto rights in 
the Security Council (with the Soviets insisting on an absolute veto 
on all issues), disarmament, the creation of regional security organi-
zations, and the requisition of bases for peacekeeping purposes. The 
U.S. delegates wanted to have it both ways on regional organizations: 
to make sure they were subordinate to the Security Council in prin-
ciple, while in reality not allowing the Council to interfere in specific 
Western Hemisphere affairs. They also wanted to have it both ways 
on postwar bases and territorial trusteeships. The U.S. delegation was 
looking to use the authority of the new world organization to permit 
the U.S. military to take over strategic islands in the Pacific.277 The 
British found this hypocritical – the United States, in their opinion, 
was seeking to avoid the taint of imperialism, all the while taking on 
an imperial role in the Pacific.278 
The issue of voting and vetoing in the Security Council was also 
complicated. The Soviets insisted on an absolute veto, but, as Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull wrote in his memoirs, “We were no less resolute 
than the Russians in aiming to secure a veto on any possible enforce-
ment action.”279 The Big Three part of Dumbarton Oaks ended with-
out agreement on the veto issue (along with certain other issues).280 
The Dumbarton Oaks plan was released as scheduled on October 9, 
1944, with an accompanying communiqué that revealed little of the 
tension among the delegates. It said only that the attached plan in-
dicated a framework of basic agreement among the Big Four (United 
States, Britain, Soviet Union, and China) to be followed by more com-
plete proposals to serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations 
276 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, 2.
277 Ibid., 170
278 Ibid., 171.
279 Quoted in Stewart, The Best Laid Plans, 75. 
280 The next part of the conference would involve the Chinese and not the Soviets, who 
had refused a meeting including them.
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conference in San Francisco.281 The remaining issues were supposed to 
be settled at the Big Three summit at Yalta in February 1945.282
San Francisco 
Although the U.S. draft of the world organization underwent con-
siderable changes at Dumbarton and San Francisco, “the substance of 
the provisions finally written into the Charter in many cases reflected 
the conclusions reached at much earlier stages by the United States 
Government.”283 
That Senate ratification, rather than general public appeal, was 
the main concern of the U.S. delegation in San Francisco is supported 
by the fact that there were several instances where positions worked 
out by the State Department (and agreed upon at Dumbarton) were 
changed by the U.S. delegation to San Francisco with the specific aim 
of facilitating Senate ratification of the treaty.284 In fact, writing to his 
wife after Senate confirmation of the United Nations Charter in July 
1945, Senator Vandenberg noted that “the things we did at Frisco to 
remove potential Senate opposition have paid rich dividends.”285
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides a good exam-
ple. Whereas the State Department originally had agreed to give the 
ICJ “compulsory jurisdiction” over questions that might otherwise be 
considered “domestic,” the experienced congressional members on the 
U.S. delegation quickly squashed this. The Senate had already rejected 
the World Court in the 1930s; it would not hesitate to do so again. 
In fact, whereas the State Department originally had drafted a ver-
sion of an “updated” League World Court (which was adopted by the 
Committee of Jurists meeting before San Francisco as their working 
281 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, 245.
282 The fiercest battle was over the veto and the so-called “x-matter” (the name Stet-
tinius gave to Ambassador Andrei Gromyko’s idea that sixteen Soviet republics be 
admitted as individual members to the United Nations). They finally decided that the 
permanent members of the Security Council could not veto the discussion of a dispute 
to which they were a party, or veto recommendations of peaceful settlement to such a 
dispute. No actual enforcement could be undertaken without the concurrence of all 
permanent members, however. Only White Russia (Belarus) and the Ukraine would 
be admitted as individual members. See Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, 
533; Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, 253. 
283 Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, 2. 
284 Members of the U.S. delegation to San Francisco were: Senator Arthur Vandenberg 
(exemplifying the Wilsonian lesson of not excluding the Republicans from the ne-
gotiations) and Senator Connally, along with Dean Virginia Gildersleeve of Barnard 
College (a link to women’s groups and the educational community); Naval Lt. Com-
mander Harold Stassen; Congressman Sol Bloom (D) of the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee; Congressman Charles Eaton (R) and a member of the delegation but not present 
due to ill health: Cordell Hull, replaced by Edward Stettinius as Secretary of State in 
November 1944.
285 Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 218.
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paper), the U.S. delegation objected to keeping the League’s Court 
at all. It was thought that establishing a new Court would facilitate 
Senate acceptance, which is also what happened – testifying to the 
power of the silent threat of a Senate veto.286
Despite the numerous committees at the conference – and mim-
icking Dumbarton Oaks – the real center of gravity at San Francisco 
was Secretary of State Edward Stettinius’ penthouse suite at the 
Fairmont Hotel. Here the heads of the Big Four delegations met each 
evening to discuss what changes they would permit in the blueprint 
agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks.287 The main balancing act for the 
U.S. delegation at San Francisco was trying to satisfy calls for “interna-
tionalism as well as for nationalism.”288 In general, Washington sided 
with Moscow more than with the smaller member states during the 
negotiations. The most serious as well as dramatic controversy at San 
Francisco occurred over the Yalta voting provisions giving the perma-
nent members a veto. In the end, in order to get it through the confer-
ence, the great powers had to state quite frankly that unless the Yalta 
formula – as interpreted by them – was accepted, there would be no 
world organization. This was accompanied by a less open controversy 
among the (now) Big Five (adding France) over the interpretation of 
the Yalta voting compromise.289 This was resolved only by the other 
powers refusing to accept the Soviet position (which sought to make 
the veto absolute, applicable even to the initial discussion of a case by 
the Security Council).290 Senator Vandenberg opposed having a veto on 
pacific-settlement issues, but he himself recognized that the stronger 
the veto, the better chance of a Senate ratification.291 
The San Francisco conference ended in late June 1945, two months 
after it started. Virtually all decisions had gone in favor of the position 
of the U.S. delegation: a Security Council controlled by the five allies, 
a weaker General Assembly, a malleable Secretariat and military com-
mission (soon immobilized by the Cold War). To the regret of many 
states present, the majority voted to establish a new court with a new 
286 Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, 864–876. 
287 Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 175; Schlesinger, Act of Creation, 
114. 
288 Ostrower, The UN and the US, 30; Thomas M. Campbell, “Nationalism in America’s 
UN Policy, 1944–1945,” International Organization 27, no. 1 (winter, 1973)
289 France would join the Big Four in May 1945, making the group the Big Five.
290 Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, 713.
291 Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 200. The veto controversy was in 
the end resolved in favor of Vandenberg’s position, who had labored hard to prevent a 
veto on discussion of conflicts (but not enforcement). See also Schlesinger, Act of Crea-
tion, 121.
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name (International Court of Justice), and it was voted that the Court 
should have optional, as opposed to compulsory, jurisdiction over inter-
national disputes. On regional organizations, the U.S. delegation (or 
rather, the congressional and military members of the delegation) had 
succeeded in safeguarding the inter-American system and the Monroe 
Doctrine.292 Whereas State Department planner Leo Pasvolsky pointed 
to the difficulty of granting autonomy to regional blocs (how could 
the United States protect its bloc interests in the Western Hemisphere 
without granting the Soviets the same role in Europe?), the Anglo-
American proposal at San Francisco whereby nations in concert would 
have the right to take collective defensive actions without having to 
get prior approval by the Security Council had a rather successful fate: 
it was written into the UN Charter as Article 51.293 
In the security realm, neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union had any intention of subjecting national policy, especially in 
the event of some future dispute, to the collective control of either 
small countries or of other major powers.294 In essence, “armed with 
the veto, the Americans never relinquished real authority.”295 The 
Security Council membership and veto ensured full control over the 
organization and its possible security actions. Indeed, the absence of 
a veto in the Security Council would probably have prevented Senate 
approval of the charter. As John Morton Blum notes, the Republicans 
had consistently “demanded the retention of national sovereignty, an 
objective to which many Democrats also subscribed, as did most of the 
American people.”296 
Thomas Campbell has argued that it was because of pressure from 
U.S. military spokesmen that the end result of San Francisco entailed 
a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty. Campbell argues this is 
evident in the veto; the opening for large nations to take security mea-
sures through regional organizations without having to obtain prior 
Security Council approval; and a significant dilution of the trusteeship 
system. It seems likely, however, that the strong voice and involve-
ment of the congressional members on the U.S. delegation successfully 
292 Campbell, “Nationalism in America’s UN Policy, 1944–1945”: 37. 
293 Ibid., 40–42.
294 John Morton Blum, V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II 
(New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1976), 313.
295 Gary Ostrower, The U.S. and the U.N., 38.
296 John Morton Blum, V was for Victory, 313–314.
DSS3_2010.indd   80 07.01.2011   14:53:52
 U.S. foreign policy traditions 81
safeguarded any national sovereignty on the part of the United States, 
as opposed to solely a military influence.297 
Senate ratification
president Harry Truman personally delivered the Charter to the pre-
siding officer of the Senate on July 2, 1945 hoping for ratification 
before he went to the Potsdam Conference in mid-July. He made the 
following clear to the Senate, with an eye to its ratification history: 
“The choice before the Senate is now clear. The choice is not between 
this Charter and something else. It is between this Charter and no 
Charter at all.”298 The Committee on Foreign Relations began hearings 
on July 9. Former Secretary of State Stettinius (he resigned on June 
27) opened the hearings by submitting his lengthy official report, and 
Republican adviser John Foster Dulles closed the hearings, emphasiz-
ing the bipartisan character of support for the United Nations. All 
witnesses stressed the need to ratify without reservations.299 
The most significant aspect of the report from the Committee on 
Foreign Relations was its underlining of the freedom of action left the 
United States under the Charter.300 Specifically, several issues that had 
featured prominently in Senator Lodge’s reservations more than twen-
ty years earlier were explicitly cared for: the right of withdrawal; the 
jurisdiction of the organization; the Monroe Doctrine; and of course, 
the issue of collective security as stated in the Covenant’s Article 10. 
Each will be considered in turn.
Lodge’s first reservation had related to Article 1, paragraph 3, of 
the Covenant, which provided for withdrawal after two years’ notice 
and after fulfillment of certain obligations. Lodge’s reservation would 
have excluded any jurisdiction by the League and established the 
United States as the sole judge of whether its obligations to the League 
had been fulfilled.301 The UN Charter, on the other hand, contained 
no regulations with respect to withdrawal. The right to withdraw was 
explained to be absolute at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hearings in 1945, with the only possible effect being “adverse public 
297 Campbell, “Nationalism in America’s UN Policy, 1944–1945”: 28.
298 Text of Harry S. Truman’s July 2, 1945 address to the U.S. Senate (Senate Document 
No. 70, 79th Congress, 1st Session), presenting the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, together with the text of the United 
Nations Charter. From the Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File, <online>. 
299 Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, 937. Dulles had accompanied Senator 
Vandenberg to San Francisco as his adviser.
300 Schlesinger, Act of Creation, 272.
301 Gross, “The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations”: 544.
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opinion” in Senator Vandenberg’s perspective. The right to withdrawal 
was thus fully in line with Lodge’s first reservation, and in fact went 
beyond it. First, the Charter did not make withdrawal contingent 
upon fulfillment of a member’s obligations, and second, there was no 
time interval stated.302
The fourth reservation of Senator Lodge referred to Article 15, 
paragraph 8, of the League Covenant. Its purpose was to reserve to 
the United States “exclusively, the right to decide what questions are 
within its domestic jurisdiction.” In contrast, Article 2, paragraph 7, 
of the UN Charter contained a sweeping reservation, embracing the 
whole field of action by the UN, ensuring that it would be up to each 
member state whether to submit a case for consideration or arbitration 
by the UN.303 Whereas the Covenant attempted to strike a balance 
between state sovereignty and collective security, the UN Charter’s 
Article 2, paragraph 7, safeguarded the discretionary elements of sov-
ereignty at the expense of collective security. Here, “the Charter may 
be said to be fully in line with the principle of Senator Lodge’s fourth 
Reservation.”304 
The fifth Lodge reservation had related to Article 21 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, which was intended to safeguard the validity 
of regional understandings such as the Monroe Doctrine. Whereas this 
article had been inserted at the request of Woodrow Wilson, Lodge 
construed it to mean that Wilson had submitted the Monroe Doctrine 
to the jurisdiction of the League, and his reservation was intended to 
remove this danger.305 In 1945, however, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee declared that “both the Monroe Doctrine and the inter-
American system are effectively safeguarded under the Charter” and 
indeed that “the basic purposes of both will be strengthened by the 
establishment of the organization.”306 No explicit reference to the 
Monroe Doctrine had been included in the Charter, but both Connally 
and Dulles said at the hearings that the Monroe Doctrine survived the 
302 Ibid.: 545.
303 Ibid.: 538–39.
304 Ibid.: 543. The UN’s Article 2, paragraph 7 stated: “Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” Chapter 
VII concerned “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and 
acts of aggression.” See Charter of the United Nations, <online>. 
305 Gross, “The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations”: 535.
306 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Charter of the United Nations, S. Exec. 
Rept. no. 8, 79 Cong. 1 sess. (July 16, 1945), 12–16) quoted in Russell, 940; Schles-
inger, Act of Creation, 272. 
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Charter intact. As with so many other issues, however, the Security 
Council veto would ultimately enable complete U.S. control of the 
interpretation and execution of the Monroe Doctrine.307 
Lodge’s most controversial reservation pertained to the Covenant’s 
Article 10, the “cornerstone” of the League.308 Article 10 entailed the 
negative duty to respect, and the positive duty to protect, the territo-
rial integrity and the political independence of member states. Senator 
Lodge raised no objection to the first part, but the second part was 
immediately controversial in Congress, with some seeing it as an au-
tomatic duty to assist victims of aggression, others seeing it as de-
fense of the territorial status quo.309 The UN Charter in fact contained no 
single provision comparable to the Covenant’s Article 10. Article 10’s first 
negative duty was implicit in the Charter’s Article 2, but efforts aimed 
at including a specific statement on the respect for member’s territo-
rial integrity and political independence failed at the San Francisco 
conference.310 
The late Senator Lodge’s overall objective with his reservations 
twenty-five years earlier had been to make the League “safe” for the 
United States to join. This was exactly what the Roosevelt admin-
istration had attempted to do, and the Truman administration suc-
ceeded in doing. As John Foster Dulles expressed in hearings to the 
Foreign Relations Committee, “the document before you charts a path 
with which we can pursue joyfully and without fear. Under it, we re-
main the masters of our own destiny.”311 Whereas in 1919, the Senate 
Committee had recommended ratification of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations after recommending a long series of amendments 
and reservations, this time, by a vote of 21–1, the Committee recom-
mended unqualified ratification.312 After a week of debate, the Senate 
voted on July 28 to ratify the Charter 89-2. It seems fair to conclude 
that the fact that so much in the way of specific commitments was 
307 Gross, “The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations”: 536–37.
308 For a discussion on Lodge’s reservations in general and article 10 in particular, see Am-
brosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition,, esp. ch. 6, “The ques-
tion of control at home and abroad,” and Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow 
Wilson and a Quest for a New World Order (New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
1992), esp. ch. 12, “A Practical Document and a Humane Document.” Ambrosius 
is generally more favorable toward Lodge, whereas Knock is more favorable toward 
Wilson.
309 Gross, “The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations”: 546.
310 Ibid.: 548. 
311 Ibid.: 532.
312 Senator Hiram Johnson (R-CA) provided the dissenting vote. He would become hos-
pitalized later, and was unable to attend the general Senate vote. Schlesinger, Act of 
Creation, 272.
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either left to the future (as the military agreements), or surrounded 
by the safeguard of reservations (such as in the cases of domestic and 
compulsory jurisdiction), or dependent on specific United States con-
currence (as with the veto in the Security Council) contributed to ob-
taining strong Senate support. As stated by Dulles before the Foreign 
Relations Committee, the Charter “engages our Nation to honorable 
cooperation for peace and justice and, at the same time, protects those 
precious American traditions of which the Senate is our principal cus-
todian.” Dulles thus correctly indicated the reasons for why the Senate 
approved the Charter without reservations and almost without dissent: 
unilateral internationalism had been preserved.313
Results: another “Great American Experiment”
“At its inception, American leaders viewed the institution both as the 
custodian for maintaining a favorable postwar order and as an impor-
tant tool for exercising U.S. leadership,” Bruce Cronin argues.314 State 
Department planners viewed the organization as being at the heart of 
its program to institutionalize American leadership and political val-
ues in the new postwar order. 
The United States became a member of the United Nations be-
cause it was a “non-coercive” organization.315 Whereas the League 
could be classified as a “coercive” type of international security orga-
nization (because Articles 10 and 16 were intended to impose upon 
its members the obligation to employ force in certain cases), Senator 
Lodge’s reservations would have transformed the League into a “non-
coercive” or “intermediate” type organization. A “non-coercive” orga-
nization would entail no such obligations and an “intermediate” type 
organization would entail the obligation to consult, with possible re-
sult of sanctions.316 The UN in general conforms to an intermediate 
type organization, but with one important exception: that of its per-
manent members. The consultation required by the Charter and the 
principle of unanimity in the Security Council precludes any action 
taken against a permanent member, such as the United States. 
313 Quoted in Gross, “The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations”: 
554. 
314 Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony”: 115.
315 Gross, “The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations”: 551.
316 Ibid.
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The second economic postwar order
The story of economic multilateralism is usually assumed, rather than 
explicated: the United States set up rules and institutions explicitly 
limiting national sovereignty in economic issue areas – how could it 
not be a prime example of the multilateral turn-around? As usual, this 
misses the extent to which the United States, as the originator of these 
rules and institutions, set the parameters of cooperation and non-coop-
eration. The conventional puzzle is usually presented in the following 
manner: why, if the United States shunned away from organizing the 
international political economy in the 1930s, would the United States 
do it after World War II?317 Apart from the puzzle’s somewhat biased 
nature (the United States certainly attempted to organize the interna-
tional political economy in the 1920s, but not in the early 1930s), G. 
John Ikenberry provides the answer: “As the world’s dominant state, 
the United States championed GATT and the Bretton Woods institu-
tions as a way of locking other countries into an open world economy 
that would ensure massive economic gains for itself.”318 
There was never any doubt, in Washington or abroad, that the 
Bretton Woods system was designed to serve the long-term interests 
of the United States. In general, the foreign leaders accepted the theory 
that what was good for America would be good for the world; “that 
the world would benefit from the responsible and generous position 
to which the United States had committed itself,” which is, of course, 
how hegemony works.319 The economic postwar order was a fortuitous 
combination of the U.S. national interest coinciding with the general 
interest of the world, as American (and indeed foreign) policymakers 
saw it. For instance, while Secretary Hull’s quest for a British pledge to 
abandon restrictive trade practices would open the British Empire to 
American exports, it would also end artificial impediments to peaceful 
commercial competition (which Hull believed would supplant aggres-
sive competition between nations).320 The most interesting aspect of 
317 This is the puzzle posed by Legro to realist theorists. .
318 Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” 540. Indeed, as early as 1936 
Cordell Hull and Henry Morgenthau had begun steering U.S. economic policy toward 
“cooperation on currency exchange rates and nondiscriminatory trade patterns.” Thus, 
what FDR had rejected in 1933 – a tripartite agreement with France and Great Britain 
to stabilize currency values – was now being pursued. See Warren I. Cohen, “America 
in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991”, in The Cambridge History of American Foreign 
Relations, Vol. IV, ed. Cohen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 4. 
319 Cohen, ed., Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. IV, 6; Warren Kimball, 
“U.S. Economic Strategy in World War II: Wartime Goals, Peacetime Plans,” in Ame-
rica Unbound, ed. Kimball, 149. 
320 Eckes, A Search for Solvency, 39.
DSS3_2010.indd   85 07.01.2011   14:53:52
 86 Defence and Security Studies 3-2010
the U.S. postwar economic planning process, however, was perhaps the 
changing of the guard of the two economic hegemons – the United 
States subtly and sometimes not so subtly wresting away the City of 
London’s imperial status as overseer of the world economy.321 
Changing of the guard
The preliminary discussions on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(the World Bank) between the United States and Great Britain were 
dominated by the Americans, and much resented by the British. The 
Americans would dominate the ensuing process of accommodation, as 
the United States would emerge from the war with huge accumula-
tions of gold and credits, and with undamaged industrial facilities of 
demonstrated productivity.322 Dean Acheson, then Assistant Secretary 
of State, thought “there is a rather pathetic feeling on the part of the 
British that we really are going to write the ticket, and all they want 
is a chance to go over it with us, pointing out their views, and to be 
allowed to come in on the formulation from the start.” In other words, 
they wanted the appearance of being treated as equals, and that was 
all they got.323 
At the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, the Americans in-
sisted on a broad postwar commitment from the British to grant 
the United States commercial access to the Empire, regardless of the 
Imperial Preference System.324 This was a continuation of the Lend-
Lease Agreement, which stated in its Article VII that if Britain ended 
its Imperial Preference System, it would not have to repay its Lend-
Lease goods. Upon being presented with Article VII, John Maynard 
Keynes had lambasted it as “the lunatic proposals of Mr. Hull.”325 
Ironically, while negotiating with Britain in an effort to get the old he-
gemon to relinquish its imperial preference system, the new hegemon 
was negotiating “the equivalent of imperial preference arrangements 
with the Philippines and Cuba.”326 
321 Ruggie has dubbed the postwar economic order one of “embedded liberalism”: the 
reconciliation of markets with the values of social community and domestic welfare. 
See John Gerard Ruggie, “Embedded liberalism and the postwar economic regimes,” 
in Constructing the World Polity. See also Abdelal, Capital Rules, 7.
322 Blum, V was for Victory, 307.
323 Eckes, A Search for Solvency, 61. See also Blum, V was for Victory, 307; James Chace, 
Acheson: The Secretary of State who Created the American World (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1998), 89.
324 Kimball, The Juggler, 189. 
325 Chace, Acheson, 90.
326 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 254.
DSS3_2010.indd   86 07.01.2011   14:53:52
 U.S. foreign policy traditions 87
This is not to say that the economic postwar order was a perni-
cious plan on the part of the Americans, but rather to note the reality 
of relative power. 
The American negotiators, in short, led by Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Morgenthau and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, looked for-
ward to American leadership in the Fund and the Bank, to a conse-
quent diminution of the British voice and share in world trade, and to 
the continuing position, achieved during the war, of New York as the 
capital city of world finance.327
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
On the whole the new hegemon’s plans always prevailed: The charter 
for the International Monetary Fund aggrandized the role of the dol-
lar among currencies, which was the intention of the United States 
Treasury and Congress. In fact, in joining the Fund, members would 
not give up sovereignty to the Fund but rather to the United States, 
“for this country would have a veto over exchange-rate variations and 
access to international reserves.”328 American proposals, resources, and 
influence dominated the World Bank as well. The World Bank design 
appeared to subordinate Anglo-American arrangements to multilater-
al co-operation in postwar economic affairs, but the “internationalism 
associated with the multilateral emphasis was superficial.”329 
Morgenthau was the president of the Bretton Woods Conference, 
held in July 1944 at a mountain resort in New Hampshire. The rec-
ommendations serving as the base for the conference had been worked 
out by the U.S. Treasury weeks earlier.330 The conference structure, 
while “nominally democratic,” ensured that no plan for currency sta-
bilization and reconstruction assistance would work without support 
from the United States delegation.331 
327 Hull was a well-known classical liberalist, convinced that “unhampered trade dove-
tailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with 
war.” Morgenthau was more of a traditional New Deal liberal, and their views were not 
always overlapping. In fact, they engaged in a degree of inter-departmental competi-
tion for control over the economic postwar planning. Whereas the State Department 
took the lead in commercial policy, formulating policies that would culminate in the 
Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Treasury took the initiative in international monetary 
policy, which culminated in the IMF and the WTO. Hull quoted in Eckes, A Search 
for Solvency, 34; 57; see also Stewart, The Best Laid Plans, 110.
328 Eckes, A Search for Solvency, 49; see also Blum, V was for Victory, 308.
329 The idea of the World Bank was essentially developed by Morgenthau’s assistant, 
Harry Dexter White. Quote from Blum, V was for Victory, 308. 
330 Eckes, A Search for Solvency, 137. Keynes’ involvement was also keenly felt; he and 
Morgenthau’s assistant, Harry Dexter White, had authored the joint statement of 
principles on the fund, which had paved the way for final consideration of the bank. 
331 Ibid., 138.
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As with the negotiations at San Francisco a year later, the U.S. del-
egation at Bretton Woods kept a keen eye on the future Senate ratifica-
tion process. When Keynes, in an effort to “secure at least a semblance 
of parity for Britain in the postwar economic structure” argued that at 
least one of the two institutions should have its headquarters in London, 
the American delegation refused to yield because it “seemed likely to 
spark a controversy in Congress.”332 Indeed, Congress would eventu-
ally defeat the idea agreed upon at Bretton Woods for a comparable in-
ternational institution for trade (the later proposed International Trade 
Organization (ITO)) – “the cornerstone” of Truman’s global commer-
cial multilateralism. The ITO Charter, while repeatedly submitted to 
Congress, was never approved.333 Conservative economic nationalists, 
such as Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), Senator Eugene Millikin (R-
CO), and Speaker of the House Joseph Martin (R-MA) argued against 
it based on the fear that the ITO would have jurisdiction over do-
mestic economic issues. The U.S. private sector, on the other hand, 
argued against it because the final agreement negotiated at Havana 
had allowed for the possibility of discriminating against U.S. goods 
and investment.334 Finally, on December 6, 1950, President Truman 
announced that he would no longer seek Congressional approval of 
the ITO Charter. The ITO was replaced by GATT (which had been 
negotiated as a temporary means of liberalizing trade while the ITO 
was being developed) which meant that a “bilateral-multilateral” ap-
proach, as opposed to a straightforward multilateral approach, would 
be the solution to postwar economic cooperation. The fact that GATT 
was an informal arrangement among contracting parties, as opposed to 
a supranational organization, made it more palatable to Congress.335
While on the surface the Bretton Woods institutions remained 
independent of its members, the manner in which the IMF and the 
World Bank were to be financed by those members made them highly 
susceptible to U.S. influence, because of its relative wealth. The United 
States had just over a third of the voting power in each institution in 
332 Ibid., 146.
333 This despite the fact that Truman submitted it after the election in November 1948, 
returning Democrats to a majority in both houses, and that he submitted it as a joint 
resolution – only requiring a majority to pass – as opposed to a treaty. Stewart, The Best 
Laid Plans, 250.
334 Ibid., 256–257.
335 Ibid., 258, 260. It is also important to note that ITO/GATT happened much later, 
after the war had ended, and after the Cold War had started. Stewart argues that the 
Marshall Plan and GATT became elements of a strategy of “economic security,” as 
contrasted with Hull’s earlier vision of global peace facilitated by open trade.
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1945, giving it not the power of a majority, but rather that of a veto-
proof share of votes.336 Whereas the funding structure of the World 
Bank is different from the Fund, the same principle applies: the United 
States’ contributions provide it with a veto-secure share of votes.337 
This is not to say the IMF and the World Bank are “controlled” 
by the United States. Because of the manner in which their financial 
structure was set up at Bretton Woods, U.S. influence over these insti-
tutions is indirect. In essence, the important share of votes held by the 
United States since the beginning has allowed for significant behind-
the-scenes influence. And U.S. influence has been keenly felt not only 
through the financial structure, but also in the way the institutions 
are staffed and managed. Senior managers in both institutions would 
almost never present to the board a proposal that risked U.S. disap-
proval. In fact, these managers would never have been appointed in the 
first place had the United States disapproved.338 
But this is not simply an argument about material self-interest 
advanced through the benefits of power asymmetries in institution-
al structures.339 No one would be surprised that the most powerful 
country attempts to secure benefits for itself. The way in which the 
United States built its new “constitutional order” (as Ikenberry calls 
it) reflected its wish to lead, but in a unilateral manner, not in a mul-
tilateral one, as Ruggie and Ikenberry argue. From the Open Door to 
the Bretton Woods regime, the United States pushed for its own style 
of capitalism to be adopted by other countries, not due to sinister mo-
tives but rather because it desired “to replicate its own understanding 
of macroeconomic theory and its normative preferences with regard to 
the international economy,” thinking it was offering the world the best 
economic system. That U.S. dominance has served to shift the agendas 
336 Ngaire Woods, “The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power 
and Influence within the World Bank and the IMF,” in US Hegemony, eds. Foot et al., 
99. 
337 The World Bank does not rely on direct contributions from its member governments, 
but the United States contributes 16.98 percent of the capital stock which the Bank 
uses as a basis for raising money in financial markets. As Woods writes, the “annual 
subscriptions of members account for less than 5 percent of the Bank’s funds, of which 
the U.S. subscription grants it 16.52 percent of votes on the Bank’s Board and a veto 
over policy decisions requiring 85 percent majority, as with the IMF. Furthermore, 
like the IMF, the World Bank has become susceptible to more direct US influence as 
its activities and resources have expanded.” See ibid., 100–101.
338 Ibid., 113.
339 For a classic statement of this realist logic, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Prom-
ise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (winter, 1994–1995): 
5–49.
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of international financial and development institutions toward eco-
nomic neo-liberalism should come as no surprise.340 
The economic international engagement of the United States after 
World War II was then, because of its economic superiority and the 
rules it created, destined to be rather beneficial to it. As the twenti-
eth century progressed, the economic superiority of the United States 
would gradually decrease relative to its competitors. Not surprisingly, 
when the American economy was experiencing great difficulty during 
the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon unilaterally and without 
consultation with the other members of the international monetary 
system canceled the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and stopped the 
direct convertibility of the United States dollar to gold, making this 
act known as the “Nixon shock.” The “economic Pax Americana” that 
Bretton Woods had initiated seemed to be over.341
Conclusion and re-statement of the argument
the point of the case study above has been to argue that the United 
States changed less than what is commonly argued when it built the 
international order during the Second World War.
In repudiating the turn-around thesis, I point out the following: 
the thesis boils down to an assumption that in 1919 the United States 
spurned international organizations, whereas in 1945 it joined them. 
While obviously true, this simplifies the story to a degree where it dis-
torts it, because 1945 was significantly different from 1919.342 Wilson 
failed to convince a critical mass of his fellow politicians that he, in 
fact, had obtained sufficient unilateral maneuverability for his coun-
try. In contrast, the Roosevelt administration had taken care to “keep 
from the Charter all the important matters to which the majority of 
the Senate, in voting on the Covenant with the Lodge Reservations 
340 Foot et al. eds., US Hegemony, 18. See also Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 256. 
But see Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Lib-
eralism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, issue 2, In-
ternational Regimes (spring, 1982): 379–415. Ruggie argues that the United States 
allowed more social democracy in Europe than it practiced itself because Europeans 
insisted on it – in other words, it was constrained by demands coming from its allies. 
But this is exactly my point: the main concern for the United States was to preserve its 
own sovereignty and maneuverability, which is why Congress defeated the Charter of 
International Trade Organization. 
341 Eckes’ term. See A Search for Solvency, 284.
342 This is not to say actual membership was not very meaningful to U.S. allies, who in 
the 1940s got commitments from the most powerful nation in the international sys-
tem. But this change in outcome does not correspond to a change in the U.S. domestic 
level foreign policy tradition.
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on March 19, 1920, had taken exception.”343 The United States was 
reaffirming Lodgian unilateral internationalism, while repudiating 
Wilsonian multilateralism.344 We should thus move away from the 
black-and-white depiction of the United States as “unilateral” and 
“aloof” before World War II and “multilateral” after it. 
The turn-around thesis often describes both the increased level 
of multilateral cooperation at the international level as well as a do-
mestic foreign policy transformation on the part of the United States. 
Unquestionably, there were important differences on both the domes-
tic and the international level between the 1930s and the 1940s, es-
pecially in terms of formal American security commitments. Perhaps 
conflating somewhat the new developments in the international sys-
tem with domestic developments in American foreign policy, political 
scientists such as Ikenberry, John G. Ruggie, and Jeffrey Legro ex-
aggerate the American commitment to multilateralism.345 I argue it 
is problematic to equate an international multilateral order with an 
American-led hierarchical order. Essentially, the thesis of an American for-
eign policy turn-around overplays both the historic aloofness prior to the 1940s 
as well as the multilateral commitment made during those years. 
As I have also tried to show, the analysis of the two world war case 
studies is complicated by conceptual confusion, partly because authors 
use internationalism and multilateralism interchangeably, partly be-
cause “multilateral” is poorly defined. For example, the point is not, as 
Jeffrey Legro argues, that there was a conversion from unilateralism to 
internationalism during the Second World War, as these are not con-
tradictory categories of foreign policy behavior.346 Indeed, the tem “in-
ternationalism” is, at best, confusing, in this story, because the United 
States was always internationalist. Ikenberry argues that the United 
States would concede to postwar restraints on sovereignty because it 
“operates” in a “loose” multilateral order. Herein lies the fundamental 
challenge I pose to Ikenberry, Ruggie, Legro and other scholars who 
argue for the “great multilateral turn-around of 1945.” The United 
States created a nominally multilateral order with itself as hegemon in 
1945. This order consisted of a plethora of institutions and rules – this 
343 Gross, “The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations”: 531.
344 For a contrary view, see George Schild, “The Roosevelt Administration and the United 
Nations: Re-creation or rejection of the League experiment?” World Affairs 158, no. 
1 (1995): 26–35. Ruggie argues the lesson that Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, 
and Dwight D. Eisenhower drew from the fight over the League of Nations was that 
“unilateralism had opened the door to isolationism.” “The Past as Prologue”: 97.
345 Ikenberry, ibid.; Ruggie, ibid.; Legro, Rethinking the World.
346 Ibid.
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is indisputable. What is also indisputable is that this order was not 
meant to restrict the United States to any significant degree – it was 
hegemonic, hierarchical, and “loose” as Ikenberry points out. States 
did not coordinate their policies on the basis of equality, but rather on 
the basis of the benefits the United States provided. Allied states sanc-
tioned special prerogatives for the United States within the postwar 
institutional matrix in return for a stable, hegemonic system. In some 
cases, the very design of international institutions specified and legiti-
mated special American rights and exceptional privileges.347 In other 
cases, the United States simply bypassed normal institutional channels 
or intentionally weakened the authority of various international insti-
tutions to avoid challenges to American freedom of action.348 
Thus, whereas there clearly were large-scale changes in interna-
tional organization and U.S. commitments to its allies during the 
1940s, then, there was no need for a wholesale transformation of the 
fundamental strategy of American foreign policy, as the emerging in-
stitutional order comported with an American design and limited U.S. 
sovereignty only to a pre-determined and acceptable degree. When 
this international order overstepped the boundaries set up by its crea-
tor, the United States would distance itself from it, as seen during the 
Cold War and beyond. 
I argue that the United States allowed itself to partake in an inter-
national order the second time round not because of a turn-around to 
multilateralism, but rather; because the objections Henry Cabot Lodge 
had presented against the League in 1919 were all accounted for with 
the United Nations in 1945, thus making American leadership com-
patible with the historic tradition of unilateralism. The turn-around 
then – such as it was – becomes a limited thesis of U.S. commitment 
to specific international institutions, rather than a positing of funda-
mental change in the American outlook on how to engage with the 
world.
347 Ikenberry makes the point that the institutionalization of U.S. power is what made the 
order “safe” for the smaller states to join in. But the smaller states were not concerned 
with domination, they were concerned with abandonment, as Ikenberry himself states. 
This seems to open Ikenberry’s argument up to some logical challenges.
348 Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy”: 210.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion: 
change versus continuity
America stands alone as the world’s indispensable nation.
Bill Clinton.349
Ours is the cause of human dignity; freedom guided by conscience and 
guarded by peace. This ideal of America is the hope of all mankind. 
George W. Bush.350
In 1948, George Kennan wrote to Secretary of State George C. Marshall 
that “[w]e have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its 
population…. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pat-
tern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position 
of disparity without positive detriment to our national security.”351 
Because the United States was indispensable in bringing about victory 
in World War II, it could extract postwar concessions while still call-
ing the shots. In Warren Cohen’s words, “the United States perceived 
itself – and was perceived by much of the world – as the great libera-
tor. Its leaders were prepared to be generous, but they expected defer-
ence, acceptance of American principles for the reorganization of the 
349 William Jefferson Clinton, “Second Inaugural Address”, January 20, 1997.
350 George W. Bush, “First Anniversary September 11, 2001,” September 11, 2002, <on-
line>.
351 Cited in Ikenberry, After Victory, 169.
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world.”352 In other words, the international order the United States set 
up in the 1940s was based on U.S. hegemony.
The United States was in much the same position when the Cold 
War ended. The American principles that Cohen writes of were seen as 
vindicated by the way the Cold War ended. Like the French Revolution 
in 1789, the Communist crumbling from 1989 to 1991 was proof that 
the American political model was indeed riding the wave of the future. 
It signaled, in the words of Francis Fukuyama, the “end of history.”353 
What now? Had the assumption about a strong historical tradition 
of isolationism in U.S. foreign policy been correct, one might have 
expected a return to this tradition in the 1990s. Absent clear foreign 
threats, the United States should have retreated back into a modern 
isolationism or aloofness. 
The end of the Cold War did not herald a new isolationism, de-
spite some predictions however.354 Indeed, in 1992, the Defense 
Department Planning Guidance authored by then Undersecretary 
of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, advocated maintaining U.S. 
hegemony in a post-Cold War world.355 In these “modern interwar 
years,”356 the United States went about universalizing its Western or-
der, militarily intervening eight times around the globe between 1989 
and 1999, and – as had been advocated by Wolfowitz – maintain-
ing its hegemony.357 The post-Cold War presidents – operating in a 
352 Cohen, Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. IV, 57.
353 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989). Fuku-
yama’s article, of course, had a question mark after it. Nonetheless, Fukuyama pre-
dicted the end of history in terms of the ideological victory of economic and political 
liberalism over any other ideological competitors. 
354 There was much speculation on whether the United States would retreat back into 
“isolationism” after the end of the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis, for example, specu-
lated whether the very success of the United States in ending the Cold War would 
push it back into a “kind of pre-Cold War isolationism.” See Gaddis, “The Cold War, 
the Long Peace, and the Future,” in Michael J. Hogan, ed. The End of the Cold War: Its 
meanings and implications (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 37. Patrick 
J. Buchanan, of course, advocated for exactly this kind of strategy in A Republic, Not an 
Empire: Reclaiming America’s Destiny (Washington, DC: Regnery Pub., 1999). 
355 Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994–99 fiscal years (February 18, 1992) authored 
by U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and his deputy Scooter 
Libby. The New York Times leaked the draft, and controversy ensued. The draft was 
eventually discarded, but the policy seems to have been followed ever since, regardless 
of which president has occupied the White House.
356 The phrase belongs to Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America between the Wars: 
From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), xiv.
357 Kreps, “Multilateral Military Interventions.” These military interventions were Pana-
ma (1989); Iraq 1990–91; Somalia 1992–93; Bosnia 1993–95; Haiti 1994; Afghani-
stan/Sudan 1998; Iraq 1998; and Kosovo 1999.
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unipolar international system358 – were able to assert U.S. hegemony 
more freely in the world than their predecessors, which the more fre-
quent military interventions attest to. The United States was exercis-
ing, in Robert Kagan’s phrase, “benevolent hegemony.”359 
Nor did the absence of a balancing power mean that the United 
States again used the United Nations for what it purportedly had in-
tended: multilateral diplomacy and security. The penchant for uni-
lateralism and asserting American hegemony did not change with 
the end of the Cold War, but rather proved to be aspects of continu-
ity from the Cold War era and before.360 In the American version of 
the commonly told story, the United States fought and won the Cold 
War, vanquishing the “evil empire” and bestowing “upon the admir-
ing world a benevolent great power,” using and preserving the unipo-
lar system for good.361 Indeed, the reasons for intervening around the 
world were much the same for Democratic liberals and Republican 
neoconservatives: to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law – American principles.362 Despite the permissive condition of 
unipolarity, then, the post-Cold War presidents acted much the same 
upon the world. In other words, the post-Cold War era was a highly 
unilateral internationalist era in U.S. foreign policy. 
With the attacks of September 11, 2001, these interventions took 
on a larger scope under a unifying theme – a “war against terror” in 
358 In the early 1990s, there was initially a debate over whether the end of the Cold War 
meant the world was now multipolar or unipolar. See Charles Krauthammer, “The Un-
ipolar Moment” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1, America and the World (1990/1991). Uni-
polarity, connoting an international system with only one powerful state, theoretically 
allows this state to act as it wishes upon the system. Whereas realists would predict 
that eventually, another state or a coalition of states would rise to counterbalance the 
unipole (see, for example, Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 
Foreign Affairs 25, no. 1 (summer 2000)), neoconservatives advocated for the United 
States’ perpetuating its “unipolar moment” in order to act as the world’s “benevolent 
hegemon” for as long as possible. See, for instance, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, 
“Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4. As opposed to a 
normative argument, authors William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks have argued 
that it seems theoretically unlikely that another power will be able to balance against 
the United States for purely geographic and material reasons. See “American Primacy 
in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002).
359 Robert Kagan, “The Benevolent Empire” Foreign Policy 111 (summer 1998). For a con-
trary view, see Charles William Maynes, “The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America” 
in the same issue.
360 The post-Cold War era, in fact, saw many volumes published on the topic of why 
the United States remained so ambivalent about its multilateral commitment. See, 
for example, Karns & Mingst, ed. The United States and Multilateral Institutions; Luck, 
Mixed Messages; Prins, ed., Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations; 
Patrick & Forman, ed. Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy; Malone & Yuen Khong, 
ed. Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy; Foot et al., eds., US Hegemony and International 
Organizations; Ignatieff, ed. American Exceptionalism and Human Rights. 
361 Luck, Mixed Messages, 17.
362 For a critical examination of neoconservative thought by a previous neoconservative, 
see Francis Fukuyama, America at a Crossroads: democracy, power, and the neoconservative 
legacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).
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the Middle East and Central Asia – but not even compared to the 
war on terror can the 1990s be categorized as inactive, isolationist or 
even a “holiday from history,” as George Will put it.363 Indeed, with 
the presidency of George W. Bush and the appointment of Wolfowitz 
to the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 1992 aim of actively 
maintaining hegemony and preventing future challengers to U.S. uni-
polarity came full circle.
How the end of the Cold War changed very little 
in U.S. foreign policy
George H. W.  Bush
With the removal of the Soviet Union from the picture, there was 
a brief flash of hope in the wake of the Cold War that the United 
Nations Security Council would finally function as intended. And 
indeed, the post-Cold War era started with what is widely seen as 
the classic multilateral case study: the Gulf War.364 Unquestionably, 
it was multilateral both procedurally and operationally. The world 
community, as represented by the United Nations, agreed with the 
U.S. assessment that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had transgressed against 
Kuwait’s sovereignty. Had the age of collective security perhaps finally 
arrived?365 Indeed, George H. W. Bush’ National Security Directive 
(NSD) 74 in November 1992 – the first policy statement since the 
Truman Administration advocating active U.S. support for UN peace-
keeping missions – seemed to suggest exactly that.
But what if the UN had not agreed with Bush’s assessment of the 
threat from Iraq? In the memoir of Bush and his national security 
advisor, Brent Scowcroft, their superficial commitment to multilater-
alism is clearly laid out: ”While we had sought United Nations sup-
port from the outset of the crisis, it had been as part of our efforts to 
forge an international consensus, not because we thought we required 
its mandate.” They go on to write that “The UN provided an added 
cloak of political power. Never did we think that without its blessing 
363 George Will, “The End of our Holiday from History,” Washington Post, September 12, 
2001.
364 Kreps, “Multilateral Military Interventions.”
365 William J. Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” in UN 
Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 2.
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we could or would not intervene.366 What, then, if Beijing or Moscow 
had decided to veto Resolution 678?367 Foreshadowing events in 2003, 
Bush and Scowcroft explain they “would ask the council to act only 
if we knew in advance we had the backing of most of the Arab block 
and we were fairly certain we had the necessary votes. If at any point 
it became clear we would not succeed, we would back away from a 
UN mandate and cobble together an independent multinational effort 
built on friendly Arab and allied participation.”368 This is, of course, 
exactly what happened in 2003. 
Furthermore, nine months earlier, President Bush had not been very 
concerned with multilateralism when intervening in Panama, owing 
in part to the “proprietary stance” the United States has taken on crises 
in the Western Hemisphere since the Monroe Doctrine.369 Echoing 
the negotiations over both the League Covenant and the UN Charter, 
there was clearly no way the international organization would have 
a say inside the U.S. sphere of influence – the Western Hemisphere. 
Furthermore, whereas President Bill Clinton would be accused from 
the right of committing the United States to too many UN peacekeep-
ing operations, it was Bush’s National Security Directive that encour-
aged U.S. support for UN peacekeeping missions, and it was Bush 
who committed U.S. troops to Somalia. In fact, in 1994, after much 
criticism and controversy, President Clinton’s Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 25 stepped back from what had originally been an 
optimistic assessment of future US participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations, essentially overruling Bush’ earlier NSD.370 
In essence, the post-Cold War did not enable a fresh start for 
multilateralism. Bush’s “New World Order” did not signal a new be-
ginning for the United States and the United Nations, but rather a 
continuation of the U.S. penchant for unilateralism. 
366 George Bush & Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1998), 416.
367 This gave Saddam Hussein a time limit for complying with previous UNSC resolu-
tions. See also Edward C. Luck, “The United States, International Organizations, and 
the Quest for Legitimacy” in Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, eds. Patrick & 
Forman, 59.
368 Bush & Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 356.
369 Luck, “The United States, International Organizations, and the Quest for Legitimacy” 
64.
370 This issue took on a new meaning with the botched humanitarian intervention in 
1993 in Somalia. Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing when to say No: U.S. Policy for Peace-
keeping,” in UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. 
Durch, 36. This was the first comprehensive statement on US policy toward multi-
lateral peace operations, and was much more circumscribed than what had been an-
nounced upon Clinton taking office.
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William Jefferson Clinton 
While personally likable as seen from the perspective of America’s al-
lies, the fact that President Clinton was presiding over the world’s 
“benevolent hegemon” was more to the liking of neoconservatives like 
Robert Kagan and William Kristol than U.S. European allies.371 In the 
words of the British permanent representative to the United Nations 
in 1997, “American exceptionalism cannot mean being the exception 
to the laws everyone else has to obey.”372
While the collapse of the USSR would in theory free the United 
Nations to perform its original duties, it also revealed an international 
order no longer distinctly American.373 Republican Senator Robert 
Dole spoke for many Americans when he said that international or-
ganizations too often reflected a consensus that opposed American in-
terests or did not reflect American principles or ideals.374 Indeed, in 
expressing amazement that the United States and the United Nations 
failed to reunite in the 1990s, analysts have overlooked the fact that 
the UN of the 1990s – seen from the U.S. perspective – was a far 
cry from the organization created mainly by the United States in the 
1940s. 
Exemplifying this estrangement, Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright argued on the Today Show in 1998 that the reason the United 
States was having problems getting other UN members to agree with 
the U.S. analysis of the threat from Iraq, was because “we are America, 
we are the indispensable nation, we stand tall – we see further into 
the future.”375 The UN had become, quite simply, something rather 
“un-American” – an epithet rather unique to the United States and its 
special kind of nationalism. 
Whereas President Clinton may have been personally enthusias-
tic about the possibilities of the UN, he focused mainly on domestic 
371 Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.”
372 John Weston quoted in Luck, Mixed Messages, 15. On the issue of being personally 
likable, Europeans seemed to have a fascination for Clinton, apart from the political 
fact that he was a Democrat and therefore closer to most European mainstream parties 
than most Republicans. Clinton was also preoccupied with being liked. In his mem-
oirs, Clinton recalls going to a jazz club in Prague with Václav Havel, where Clinton 
jammed with the band (playing “Summertime” and “My Funny Valentine”) while 
Havel played the tambourine. See My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 137.
373 Whereas Sarah Krebs finds a slight increased rate of multilateral military interventions 
on the part of the United States in the 1990s, David Skidmore finds the opposite. See 
Krebs, “Multilateral Military Interventions” and Skidmore “Understanding the Uni-
lateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy.” 
374 Quoted in Schlesinger, Jr., “Unilateralism in Historical Perspective,” 25.
375 Quoted in Charles William Maynes, “Two Blasts Against Unilateralism,” in Under-
standing Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations, ed. Prins, 45; Malone & Khong, 
ed., Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 14. 
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politics and soon found himself facing a nationalist Congress very 
much suspicious of the UN.376 In an unprecedented address to the UN 
Security Council on January 20, 2000, Jesse Helms (R-NC) – chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations committee – said, “If the United 
Nations respects the sovereign rights of the American people, and 
serves them as an effective tool of diplomacy, it will earn and deserve 
respect and support.” Helms went on to warn that “a United Nations 
that seeks to impose its presumed authority on the American people, 
without their consent, begs for confrontation and – I want to be candid 
with you – eventual U.S. withdrawal.377 Perhaps even more remark-
able was the beginning of his address, where Senator Helms expressed 
the hope that this day would be the beginning of a “pattern of under-
standing and friendship” between UN diplomats and US senators, as 
if these two groups were somehow enemies. 
And indeed, there were times when this seemed to be so. Whereas 
President Clinton was an economic free trade internationalist, he pre-
sided over a government that imposed new unilateral economic sanc-
tions, or threatened to do so, sixty times on thirty-five countries, the 
most extreme of which was the Helms-Burton Act aimed at prevent-
ing trade with Cuba.378 Furthermore, during the 1998 monetary crisis 
in Asia, the United States’ efforts at compelling those Asian states 
receiving assistance from the International Monetary Fund to under-
take internal reforms the United States had long sought, was met with 
accusations of using the IMF to impose a unilateral agenda on much of 
Asia. Indeed, in 1998 South African President Nelson Mandela, dur-
ing President Clinton’s visit, publicly declared that he resented U.S. 
efforts at imposing conditions on its freedom of trade.379
George W. Bush 
George W. Bush came into office with a rather simple foreign pol-
icy strategy: put American interests first, and focus on large (and 
376 Not that the skepticism toward the UN was simply a Republican trait – the Foreign 
Relations Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 – passed by a Democratic Congress – 
stipulated that the United States should unilaterally limit its payments for UN peace-
keeping to 25percent of total costs, while the United States was falling behind in its 
arrears payments to the UN. See Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of 
the 1990s,” 15. 
377 Address by Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, before the United Nations Security Council, January 20, 2000, <online>.
378 Its full name was the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996. 
See Maynes, “Two Blasts Against Unilateralism,” in Understanding Unilateralism in 
American Foreign Relations, Prins, ed., 46.
379 Ibid., 47.
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potentially threatening) state actors such as Russia and China. This 
echoed the realism of his father, which was remarkable precisely because 
the realist doctrine is rarely found in U.S. foreign policy. This doctrine 
was evidenced by, among other things, his choice of Condoleezza Rice 
as his National Security Advisor. Her specialties were the Soviet and 
Czechoslovakian armies – issue areas directly relevant to the bipolar 
superpower politics of the Cold War. When asked by ABC’s This Week 
during the presidential campaign what he would do if another Rwanda 
occurred, for example, Bush said, “We should not send out troops to 
stop ethnic cleansing and genocide in nations outside out strategic 
interest. I don’t like genocide and I don’t like ethnic cleansing, but 
the president must set clear parameters as to where troops ought to 
be used and when they ought to be used.”380 This was clearly differ-
ent from President Bill Clinton’s policy of committing U.S. troops to 
humanitarian missions, as seen in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo (although 
Clinton was vulnerable to critique from both sides of the aisle: too 
much engagement as seen from the right and too little as seen from 
the left). 
But the disagreement was not nearly as fundamental as many like 
to think: first, Clinton did not send any troops to end the Rwandan 
genocide.381 Second, both presidents viewed the United States as the 
natural leader of the world order it had nurtured during the Cold War 
and both saw it as acceptable for the United States to act alone when 
necessary. Clinton was more preoccupied with getting his European 
allies to see things from his perspective and genuinely agree with and 
like him, but the fact that Clinton was less inclined to use American 
military power served to gloss over the fact that the Clinton adminis-
tration would unilaterally employ U.S. military power if so inclined. 
Indeed, after the disaster in Mogadishu in 1993, Clinton ordered UN 
Ambassador Madeline Albright to deliver a speech at the National 
War College declaring readiness to use force without reference to or 
even in defiance of the UN Charter.382 Furthermore, one could argue 
380 Quoted in Daalder & Lindsay, America Unbound, 37.
381 Bill Clinton wrote in his memoirs that he failed to intervene in Rwanda mainly be-
cause “we were so preoccupied with Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia just six 
months old, and with opposition in Congress to military deployments in faraway 
places not vital to our national interests that neither I nor anyone on my foreign policy 
team adequately focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter.” He called it “one of 
the greatest regrets of my presidency.” My Life, 167. 
382 Tom J. Farer, “The interplay of domestic politics, human rights, and U.S. foreign 
policy” in Wars on Terrorism and Iraq. Human Rights, Unilateralism, and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, eds. Thomas G. Weiss, Margaret E. Crahan & John Goering (NY: Routledge, 
2004), 31.
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that Clinton’s policies towards the Israel–Palestine conflict were more 
unilateral than Bush 43’s were.383 
In the area of arms control, Clinton signed (1993) and the Senate 
ratified (1997) the Chemical Weapons Convention, but “implement-
ing legislation” subsequently passed by the Congress carved out uni-
lateral U.S. exemptions. For example, Congress gave the president 
authority to reject a challenge inspection of U.S. chemical facilities if 
the president deemed that such an inspection would pose a threat to 
U.S. security interests. Congress also mandated that any samples col-
lected through inspection must be analyzed on U.S. territory. Finally, 
Congress narrowed the range of industrial facilities that would be 
obligated to declare activities involving chemicals posing a risk of 
proliferation.384
The first eight months of the Bush 43 presidency, while upping 
the intensity of U.S. unilateralism, did not change its direction. Bush 
pulled the United States out of commitments his predecessor had 
agreed to – the Kyoto Protocol (which National Security Adviser Rice 
told European Union ambassadors as early as March 2001 was dead), 
revoked Clinton’s signature on the International Criminal Court trea-
ty, and opposed a pact to control trafficking in small arms, a new pro-
tocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty.385 The pullout of the ICC was particularly hostile, as 
the administration actively put pressure on third countries to sign bi-
lateral agreements with the United States stipulating they would not 
extradite U.S. citizens to the Court. Clinton’s almost-agreement with 
North Korea on freezing its missile program was abandoned, as well 
as peace efforts in Northern Ireland and Colombia.386 But these differ-
ences mask an important fact: the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC were 
unlikely to have been ratified by the Senate anyway – indeed, that is 
why President Clinton did not submit them for such action. 
September 11, 2001 provided the impetus for President Bush’s 
foreign policy doctrine to move from limited to expansive, and with 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a debate commenced on whether the 
383 Thomas G. Weiss, Margaret E. Crahan & John Goering, “The serendipity of war, hu-
man rights, and sovereignty” in Wars on Terrorism and Iraq, 5. Granted, this only holds 
once the Bush administration made the conflict a priority, which it did not do in the 
beginning. Indeed, the U.S. involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict was initially 
scaled back; specifically the Clinton-created position of special Middle East envoy that 
Dennis Ross had held was eliminated.
384 Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy”: 211.
385 Daalder & Lindsay, America Unbound, 65
386 Ibid., 67
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neoconservative mission to spread democracy at the point of a gun at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century was, in fact, the natural con-
clusion to the Wilsonianism found at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.387 Certainly, many liberals supported the war, as did a signifi-
cant majority of the American people and U.S. congress members.388 
Such a widespread majority in favor of the Iraq war signals either a 
fundamental agreement on important assumptions in U.S. foreign 
policy by the American body politic; or the successful manipulation of 
a population by a cynical administration.389 
Unilateralism at the century’s end
Whether one argues that the neoconservative “crusade” in the Middle 
East was a perversion of Wilsonianism because the Bush administra-
tion showed contempt for international law;390 or one argues that this 
“liberal imperial ambition” of spreading democracy was at the core of 
both Wilsonianism and Bush’s foreign policies,391 I would argue this 
debate misses the point. By using Wilsonianism as the baseline for 
comparison, this debate misses the extent to which the Bush foreign 
policy agenda was compatible with the foreign policy tradition that 
387 Henry Kissinger cited in G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter 
& Tony Smith, The Crisis in American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the twenty-first cen-
tury (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3. The difference between the 
foreign policy ideas of Bush 43 during the presidential campaign and those espoused 
after September 11, 2001 are startling in terms of their divergence on the view toward 
military interventions. Bush 43’s views on unilateralism seem not to have changed, 
however.
388 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Midterm Election Preview: 
Americans thinking about Iraq but worried about the Economy,” (October 10, 2002). 
For commentary and link to report, see “Most Americans Support War with Iraq, 
Shows New Pew/CFR Poll – Commentary by Lee Feinstein,” (October 10, 2002) <on-
line>.
389 For instance, in order to support the war in Iraq one would have to agree on the le-
gitimacy of the use of military force to cause regime change, as well as agree on the 
legitimacy of this act despite possible (and after March 2003, actual) lack of procedural 
or operational multilateralism. For opponents to the war, the theory of public manipu-
lation by the Bush administration has been popular, see for example, Miriam Pember-
ton & William D. Hartung, eds. Lessons from Iraq: Avoiding the next war (Boulder, CO: 
Paradigm Publishers, 2008); James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the 
Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies (New York: Doubleday, 2004). For a comparative 
perspective on media coverage leading up to the war, see Alexander G. Nikolaev & 
Ernest A. Hakanen, eds. Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).
390 Thomas J. Knock, “Playing for a Hundred Years Hence: Woodrow Wilson’s Inter-
nationalism and His Would-Be Heirs” and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Wilsonianism in 
the Twenty-first Century” in The Crisis in American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the 
twenty-first century. They both argue this was a perversion because Wilsonianism was 
more about a rule-based international system than it was about spreading democracy. 
Thus, Bush violated the more important tenet of Wilsonianism in order to pursue a 
second-order goal.
391 Tony Smith, “Wilsonianism after Iraq: The End of Liberal Internationalism?” in ibid.
DSS3_2010.indd   102 07.01.2011   14:53:53
 U.S. foreign policy traditions 103
won out with the Second World War: Lodgian, or unilateral, inter-
nationalism. Bush’s aversion to multilateralism in diplomacy and in-
ternational constraints is indeed compatible with this foreign policy 
tradition. What was new was the overt flaunting of this fact. Part of 
the reason why the Bush Doctrine engendered such dramatic opposi-
tion abroad was the fact that the doctrine did not even attempt to 
hide the administration’s efforts at exempting itself from international 
law.392 The focus on spreading democracy at the point of a gun also 
seems entirely consistent with U.S. foreign policy during the Cold 
War.393
Furthermore, although the war on terror has ended the brief 
fame human rights acquired in the 1990s, this does not amount to 
a break in American foreign policy tradition. Rather, the campaign 
against terrorism has marginalized human rights in much the same 
way that the fight against Communism did during the Cold War.394 
This is not to say there were no differences between President Clinton 
and President Bush – there obviously were. It seems that President 
Clinton would have preferred more multilateralism than he got, and 
that President Bush would have preferred more unilateralism than he 
got.395 But Clinton’s primary foreign policy objectives – the defense 
of human rights, enlargement of democracy, and support for market-
based economies – seem identical to Bush’s, and neither president was 
above unilateralism to achieve these objectives.396
In conclusion, the United States has always sought to safeguard its 
historic tradition of unilateral internationalism. For those seeking to 
understand U.S. foreign policy, this is the tradition one must look to.
392 See Harold Hongju Koh, “America’s Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism,” in American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. Ignatieff, 124–28; George W. Bush, National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America 34 (2002).
393 See Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War, for an argument that connects interven-
tionism in the Third World with American and Soviet ideological nationalism. His 
book focuses mostly on the 1970s and 1980s.
394 Jack Donnelly, “International Human Rights” in Wars on Terrorism and Iraq, 98; Jen-
nifer K. Harbury, Truth, Torture, and The American Way. The history and consequences of 
U.S. involvement in torture (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2005). On the issue of human 
rights in the war on terror, see Mark Danner, Torture and Truth. America, Abu Ghraib, 
and the War on Terror (NY: New York Review of Books, 2004).
395 One might speculate, for instance, whether President Clinton, had he been president 
in 2003, would have initiated a war against Iraq. One could also ask what President 
Clinton would have done with the United Nations, for example, were he not facing 
a Republican Congress. On Bush, it was reported that the reason the United States 
returned to the Security Council in the spring of 2003 was because of the urgings 
of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The United States, Great Britain, and Spain 
withdrew their resolution on Iraq once it became clear that France and Russia would 
veto it. See for example, Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2004); Mark Danner, “The Secret Way to War,” New York Review of Books, June 9, 
2005.
396 See Daalder, “U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping,” 40.
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